By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

 

Series 19: Forever peace or forever war

Our government asked for it, we got it!

On August 21, 2026, Chinese authorities already reported three Philippine aircrafts operating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, identified them as a Y-12B type, C-208 and PA-31T.

The Chinese response was limited to monitoring  and issuance of warning.

On September 2, it appears that the Philippine government substituted a BN-2A Islander for the Y-12B, to fly over the same location together with the C-208 and PA-31T earlier deployed.

But this time, China responded with at least three= armed JL-10  advanced trainer jets carrying PL-5 air-to-air missiles, which locked their fire-control radar systems onto three Philippine aircrafts.

Tactical shift

Significantly, by releasing video footage through the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command showing electronic locking systems and a green tracking crosshair on the Philippine planes, also known as targeting “reticle”, China has made a notable tactical shift and a highly escalatory move.

There is no mincing of words here, the Chinese are signaling a harder line in the South China Sea.

Radar tracking is not automatically equivalent to a missile “lock,” and the publicly released video does not independently establish that a missile-fire-control solution was achieved.

But if the Chinese aircraft were using their weapons systems to target the Philippine aircraft, that is considerably more provocative than ordinary interception.

In military aviation, switching from scanning radar to a “fire-control lock” (often called “painting” a target) is the final electronic step before launching a missile.

To be very graphic about it, Chinese JL-10s carrying live PL-5 short-range air-to-air missiles, locking their targeting crosshairs onto the Philippine aircraft serves as an act of extreme hostility, a kinetic escalation.

reticle/ˈredək(ə)l/

also known as a reticule or graticule, is a pattern or set of markings placed in the focal plane of an optical instrument, such as a microscope, telescope, riflescope, or camera, to provide a reference point or aid in measurement or aiming.

This significantly heightens the risk of miscalculation or accidental engagement. An unexpected maneuver by a Philippine pilot or an electronic malfunction could inadvertently trigger a defensive response or a lethal shoot-down.

Wider scope

   This is an important escalation because the confrontation has historically been dominated by civilian coast-guard and maritime-militia forces.

The September incident brought armed military aircraft directly into the theatre. An East Asia Institute assessment describes this as an expansion of “gray-zone” competition into the air domain.

Moving from slow-moving maritime standoffs to high-speed aerial encounters drastically reduces the time available for pilots and commanders to make decisions, thus as indicated earlier, heightening the risk of accidental mid-air collisions or miscalculations.

It courts Chinese designations of Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ). Worse, in the same manner the US has regarded the Pacific Ocean as an American lake, we are pushing China to make the South China Sea, a Chinese lake, as far as the Philippines is concerned.

By introducing combat-capable aircraft into contested airspaces, actors reset the operational baseline. Over time, this forces China to treat regular military incursions as a new normal.

Precedence

This is not the first time China has shown determination in protecting its sovereignty.

Last December 6, two Chinese Navy J-15 fighter jets operating from the aircraft carrier Liaoning conducted radar lock-on against F15s of the Japan Air Self-Defense Forces flying ADIZ missions southeast of Okinawa, twice within a three-hour window.

There was no damage to the Self-Defense Force aircraft or its personnel.

But 25 years ago, a PLA J8 interceptor fighter jet and a U.S. Navy EP-3E Aries II signals intelligence aircraft collided over the waters off of China’s southern coast.

The Chinese pilot ejected but was never found.

The crippled US spy plane made a mayday emergency landing at the Chinese military airfield at Lingshui, Hainan province — without permission.

Twenty-four American crew members were detained and interrogated, but released after 11 days while Washington and Beijing traded accusations, until a carefully worded U.S. statement of regret — the famous “letter of the two sorries” — secured their release.

The aircraft itself was taken apart and returned months later, in crates.

Respecting red lines

Last July 22, in the sidelines of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting held in Manila, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned our Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro that Philippine-China diplomatic relations stand at a crossroads, urging the Philippine government to immediately stop provocative actions on maritime issues and make concrete efforts to stabilize bilateral relations.

Wang said that in recent years, China-Philippines relations have continued to face difficulties and challenges, which is clearly not in the interests of either side and has not only harmed the Philippines’ own economic development but have also become a source of disruption to regional peace and stability.

Indeed, the first two quarters of this year registered only 2.3% growth in gross domestic product, which did not even make the greatly reduced World Bank targets of 3%, lower than the Covid pandemic years and lowest since 2009.

The growing number of American military bases in the Philippines, in violation of our constitutionally-mandated foreign policy, also threatens the ASEAN treaty of neutrality.

China’s chief diplomat emphasized that facts have proven that third-party external forces meddling in regional affairs and deliberately hyping up maritime disputes will only reduce the Philippines to a pawn manipulated by others and forced to bear bitter consequences alone.

He noticed that whenever China and the Philippines are about to engage in dialogue, some partisans in the Philippines, particularly within the military and coast guard sectors, deliberately create incidents and undermine the progress of talks.

For instance, a provisional agreement reached in 2004, that has resulted in 15 successful peaceful routine resupply missions to Philippine marines stationed at the BRP Sierra Madre, a derelict wreck grounded at Ayungin Shoal (Ren’ai Jiao), was recently disrupted by the violent incident that occurred last July 20 resulting in injuries to two Philippine personnel.

Wang elaborated on China’ solemn protest over provocations made against Chinese coast guard law enforcers, saying “China has never constituted a security threat to the Philippines and has never invaded or colonized the country in history.”

Disputes between China and the Philippines over territory and maritime delimitation are objective facts, he added, “China has always been committed to managing differences and stabilizing the situation through bilateral dialogue and consultation.”

Psywar

By proactively broadcasting the cockpit footage and telemetry showing the radar locks, Beijing is engaging in a psychological war for the Philippines to curb its maritime domain awareness and patrol flights.

Verily, it projects absolute air dominance over Scarborough Shoal, projecting to domestic audiences and regional neighbors that China can dictate who enters the airspace.

Wang Yi correctly reads Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s  shift from quiet bilateral talks to open global pushback against Beijing’s claims.

This policy has forked onto several major strategic, diplomatic, and security consequences, mostly internationalizing the issues to seek stronger foreign alliances, a narrow and outmoded cold war zero-sum strategy observant of the United States’ rules-based order:

• Quadrilateral Ties: On top of the United States, the Philippines has deepened cooperation with newfound security allies like Japan, Australia and some Europeans.

Some of them have joined the Philippines in war exercises that have so far served as showcases for arms industries, and joint patrols that have only served symbolic.

• Legal Support: Propaganda platform feigning increasing international endorsements to the unilateral Arbitral Award that “invalidated” China’s historic nine-dash line.

When Ambassador Jing Quan assumed posting to the Chinese Embassy in Manila, however, he brought with him thinktank-seasoned diplomats who have engaged Philippine rhetorics point-by-point.

• Frequent Clashes and Active Defense: Confrontations between Philippine and Chinese vessels at hotspots like Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal have increased.

But it has given China the chance to show the world how its policy of active defense can reasonably prevent hot wars through the use of swarms by maritime militia vessels and non-lethal weapons by the coast guard like water cannons, sonars and lasers and today trainer planes’ radar locks.

• Diplomatic Strain: Beijing has imposed political and ministerial friction, including sanctions on defense officials, which blocks traditional communication channels but has exposed Philippine key Marcos officials’ vested interests in not just arms sales but take-over of some arms-related industries and higher public offices.  
• Economic Risks: Tensions threaten trade and joint resource projects, though Manila foolishly separates economic ties from “territorial” defense.

Data from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) showed that for the month of July, foreign portfolio plummeting to $66 million or a 91% crash from the net inflow recorded a year earlier.

Recent surveys also show 75% of the population consider themselves poor.

• ASEAN Division: Other Southeast Asian nations with conflicting claims have been reluctant to join Manila’s hardline multilateral stance, causing friction within ASEAN.

No other ASEAN member state has collectively or officially endorsed the 2016 Arbitral Award. ASEAN as a bloc has struggled to reach a consensus and has not officially recognized the ruling due to divergent interests among its members.

When the Award’s 10th-anniversary joint statement reaffirming the ruling was announced, the number of endorsements even reduced to 14 signatories joining the Philippines, like the US, Japan, Australia, and some European nations but with no other of the 10 remaining ASEAN member countries in tow.

Before and after standoff

China’s own public characterization is that the three Philippine aircrafts had “intruded” into the airspace over Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal) and should leave.

China has strongly asserted sovereignty over the shoal, while the Philippines provides a weak opposition.

The dispute on the ground actually ceased after 68 days of standoff between the Philippines and China 14 years ago, but we have no institutional memory and insist on our own merry, unprofessional ways.

It started April 8, 2012, when a Philippine surveillance plane spotted Chinese fishing vessels at the shoal, leading to a direct confrontation and naval deployment on April 10 to 11.

A Philippine gray ship, BRP Gregorio del Pilar, arrested  and boarded fishing boats bearing the Chinese flag and at gunpoint arrested its fishermen, in what in international law could be construed a s declaration of war against China.

Read:

The Telephone Game That took Scarborough Shoal Away

Before the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, the Philippines exercised sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal on the principle of effectivités – in international law referring to the physical acts, administrative measures, and exercises of state authority that demonstrate a country’s effective control and sovereign intent over a specific territory.

It enhanced this de facto possession through state practices over the area—locally known as Panatag Shoal or Bajo de Masinloc (Huangyan Dao or Scarborough Shoal)—routine law enforcement, legislation, and active policing of the waters.

Manila exercised unhindered administrative jurisdiction, viewing the area as a natural extension of Masinloc, Zambales. Foreign vessels that operated in the area historically left or faced arrest by Philippine forces.

The Philippine government enacted Republic Act No. 9522 in 2009, indicating Scarborough Shoal as part of a “Regime of Islands” amending Presidential Decree 1596 that originally created the “Kalayaan Island Group as an archipelago.”

Under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea adopted in 1982 taking effect in 1994, the shoal sits approximately 124 nautical miles west of Luzon, placing it within the 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone the Philippines is “entitled” to.

Philippine authorities installed markers and built structural remnants on the features during the 1980s and 1990s to signify sovereign presence and administrative use.

The US Air Force, with permission from Philippine authorities when the Americans still had Subic and Clark as their military bases, freely used the feature for its target practices.

Filipino fishermen freely used the shoal, its lagoon and surrounding waters as a traditional fishing ground and a safe harbor during severe weather without facing systemic blockades from foreign state ships.

The Philippine Coast Guard patrolled the waters around the shoal. They actively boarded, inspected, and detained foreign fishermen—including Chinese nationals—for illegal poaching and harvesting giant clams or coral inside the lagoon.

But the incident on April 2012 waxed differently on the Chinese population, that the Chinese government decided to shift tactics and respond differently.

Madam Fu Ying, former Chinese ambassador to the Philippines, wrote in Chapter 5 of her book “Seeing the World 2“:

“On April 11, a set of photographs grabbed the Chinese headlines that caused wide-spread furor among the general public. The photographs showed a group of Chinese fishermen standing with their tops stripped off, on the deck of a boat and under the blazing sun. They were being held at gunpoint by Philippine Navy soldiers.

“It transpired that 12 Chinese fishing boats had been undertaking their regular fishing activities inside the lagoon of Huangyan Dao, when on April 10, a Philippine naval vessel approached. It proceeded to send patrol boats into the lagoon, harass and disrupt the fishing operations. This culminated in some soldiers forcibly boarding the fishing boats and arresting some fishermen.

One of the photos that hit China’s social media.

“On hearing the news, China’s Marine Surveillance ships “Haijian 75” and “Haijian 84” that were cruising nearby, along with the fishery administration ship “Yuzheng 303” that was stationed at Meiji Reef, quickly arrived on the scene to protect the Chinese fishermen.” 

The standoff ended June 15, 2012, when the Philippines pulled its remaining government vessels out of the area amid weather conditions and diplomatic shifts, leaving effective control of the territory with China.

Effectivités vs title

In international jurisprudence, however, as frequently affirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), effectivités are generally secondary to established legal titles like treaties or colonial boundaries.

(Uti possidetis juris means that newly independent countries automatically inherit the exact administrative borders they had while under colonial rule or prior federation.)

If a clear legal title does not exist or is ambiguous, continuous and peaceful effectivités can help establish, confirm, or evidence territorial sovereignty.

This weakens the Philippine case.

The 1898 Treaty of Paris that the Philippines inherited from the United States’ convention with Spain states:

“Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line:

“A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich…”

Scarborough Shoals’s coordinates are located at precisely 15°13′09″N, 117°44′25″E to 15.2191° N, 117.7403° E). which is outside the 118^th degree longitude.

“Expired” Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio desperately attempts to create his own history by resurrecting a 1743 cartography by Murillo Velarde in an exhibit based in his June 6, 2014 lecture.

This was easily debunked by the statement “Maps, in international law, are only pieces of information,” by Carlyle A. Thayer, a renowned Southeast Asia security expert and an emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

He frequently uses this formulation to explain why unilateral maps—such as China’s controversial “nine-dash line” or “ten-dash line” maps—cannot legally establish territorial sovereignty on their own under international law, exposing that the Arbitral Award’s ruling giving so much importance that the nine-dash line has no legal basis under UNCLOS, is actually a non-issue.

A map drawn by a single country is merely an assertion of its position or an internal administrative opinion. It holds no inherent legal value to bind other countries.

When do maps have probative value?

In international law, maps generally carry binding legal weight only if they are formally appended to a mutually signed bilateral or multilateral treaty.

The accompanying map to the 1898 Treaty of Paris displaced Bajo de Masinloc, Panatag or Panacot, or Scarborough Shoals.

But Carpio did not stop there.

The expired magistrate further tries to leverage his fallacy by over-interpreting the 1900 Treaty of Washington, claiming that this second convention establishing Philippine treaty limits, included Bajo de Masinloc as one of the “outlying islands” it incorporated as it amended the 1898 Treaty of Paris.

The Treaty of Washington reads:

“Spain relinquishes to the United States all title and claim of title, which she may have had at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace of Paris, to any and all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside the lines described in Article III of that Treaty and particularly to the islands of Cagayan, Sum and Sibutu and their dependencies, and agrees that all such islands shall be comprehended in the cession of the Archipelago as fully as if they had been expressly included within those lines.”

With all due respects to Carpio’s senior moments, the outliers specifically mentioned here after the adverb “particularly” are the islands of “Cagayan, Sum and Sibutu and their dependencies”.

In the accompanying map to this treaty, Bajo de Masinloc was never included.

But a typographical error surfaced – “Cagayan, Sum” was actually Cagayan de Sulu, and together with Sibutu and their dependencies, they factored in the formulation of the third treaty defining our treaty limits – The Convention Treaty between the United States and Britain – for the demarcation of our southern borders in relation to North Borneo.

(The Batanes Island Group was also excluded by the 1898 Treaty of Paris which drew our northern treaty limits at the “twentieth parallel of north latitude”. Batanes is outside the 2oth parallel.

(In a recent blurb, Carpio also alleges that the 1900 Treaty of Washington corrected this omission, “explicitly” making Batanes part of ceded Philippine territory.

(But where the treaty writes the parenthetical “particularly” applied to specific features with nothing implied, Carpio unabashedly induces as a half-truth and misrepresents as “explicitly”.)

China’s rights and its implications

I have particularly cited in my former articles a historiographic and statutory construction the bases of China’s rights and titles to all land sovereignties, starting with the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895.

Read:

Part 1: Three Arbitral Foundational Lies Key to Collapse of Marcos Governance

Briefly stated, following the Second World War that ended in 1945, it was not to the US nor Russia, not to Britain nor France, but to China, that Japan surrendered “all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese” (to quote the 1943 Cairo Declaration), in the 1952 Treaty of Taipei and perfected in the 1972 Communique between Japan and the People’s Republic of China.

The entire South China Seas is one of those territories.

In addition to such historic title, China’s sovereignty is now vouchsafed by China’s effectivités, which coverScarborough Shoal.

The most worrying implication, today as the Philippines continues to stonewall its decadent provocative policy in the South China Sea, is that the current confrontation has simultaneously morphed a legal dispute, a conflict of sovereignty growing onto an increasingly militarized operational contest.

Bottomline is I would call the radar-targeting incident a significant escalation in risk, but not an act of war by itself. It is that China’s active defense is progressively being pushed to  the characteristics of military confrontation, that Manila should be avoiding in the first place.

Its greatest significance is that Beijing appears to be extending its effort to establish *de facto control around Scarborough Shoal from the maritime domain into the air domain.

And because the Philippine aircraft were light surveillance aircraft facing armed Chinese jets, the Philippines has to balance demonstrating its rights with ensuring that “whatever” it is patrolling does not inadvertently become the trigger for a shooting incident.

International law allows China to have limited law enforcement against any foreign government’s entry, air or naval, into the contiguous zone of 12 nautical miles extending from the territorial sea extending 12 nautical miles from its land sovereignty at Scarborough Shoal.

But for non-fishing boats entering the territorial sea itself, with no confirmed intentions of innocent passage, they can become fair game for trespassing China’s sovereign domain and challenging its effectivités.     

A collision or deliberate attack involving a Philippine or Chinese military aircraft could create a much more serious crisis than a routine coast-guard confrontation.

It could force Washington and Manila to make rapid decisions about the Mutual Defense Treaty. That is precisely why avoiding a kinetic accident is strategically important.

The problem that most Philippine defense and coast guard officials ignore that the Mutual Defense Treaty is a paper tiger and the United States is an unreliable partner.

Henry Kissinger, US former secretary of state, himself inputted such ambivalence in his 1975 memorandum (declassified 2006) to US Ambassador to the Philippines, William Sullivan, after Marcos Sr. started grabbing islands in the Spratlys.

Driving the final nail in terms of realpolitik, he wrote, “As a practical matter, we see precious little chance Congress or the American people would support US intervention in Spratly dispute.

“If the [Philippine] garrisons ever were attacked, it seems to me less harmful politically to deny our obligations on legal grounds, than to leave unfulfilled an acknowledged commitment.”

Seven year earlier, he told writer William F. Buckley in a private phone call, his famous political adage:

“It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal.”

Read: https://asiancenturyph.com/2024/04/18/secret-doc-belies-biden-iron-clad-spin-makes-bbm-look-like-gullible-puss/

   

Email: contact@asiancenturyph.com

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/asiancenturyph/

Twitter: https://twitter.com/AsianCenturyPH

Substack:

Also read: