A Borrowed Indictment Lead Toward A Self-Defeating Path

August 9, 2026

Contributed article from Mr. Fred Gao of CGTN Radio

by Mr. Fred Gao, CGTN Radio Editor August 8, 2026

Recently, the Philippine Department of National Defense issued a statement targeting specific provisions of China’s newly enacted Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law. Its objection was not about what the law does inside China, but rather that certain clauses supposedly seek to exert influence over individuals beyond China’s legal jurisdiction. The language was precise, technical, and on its surface a legal critique. But its source deserves a closer look.

The charge that a Chinese domestic statute reaches too far, imposing obligations on persons outside the country, is not a novel argument. It is a familiar refrain in certain Western policy circles and congressional hearings, routinely deployed to paint Chinese legislation as inherently overreaching. For a Philippine defense establishment to suddenly echo this highly specific legal grievance — one that has little apparent connection to the South China Sea or to any tangible Philippine national interest — raises an obvious question: is Manila forming its own independent legal assessments, or is it simply adopting, with minimal adaptation, an analytical framework manufactured in distant capitals?

To be clear, the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law is fundamentally a framework for governing ethnic relations and safeguarding minority rights within China’s territory. Like many national laws dealing with security or national unity, it may contain provisions addressing acts committed abroad that have consequences on domestic soil — a principle not unknown to Philippine statutes or to the legal codes of countless other states. Describing such standard jurisdictional concepts as an illegitimate attempt to project power over foreign nationals requires a degree of selectivity that often signals borrowed reasoning rather than independent scrutiny.

The deeper issue, however, is what the Philippines hopes to achieve. The most plausible explanation is that some in Manila have convinced themselves that by parroting Washington’s language attacking China’s domestic laws, they can lock in American backing for their own assertive moves in the South China Sea. The logic seems to be: adopt the script, demonstrate loyalty, and the superpower will stand behind you when tensions rise. If this is indeed the calculation, it is built on a fundamental misreading of how things actually work.

For one thing, Beijing does not link its approach to maritime disputes with what foreign officials say about its internal ethnic policies. Philippine officials reciting American-style indictments of Chinese legislation will not shift Beijing’s negotiating position on reefs or exclusive economic zones one inch. The anticipated reward simply does not exist on the Chinese side of the equation. What this borrowed posture reliably produces is a steady erosion of the diplomatic atmosphere between the two countries. Every time Manila acts as a transmission belt for narratives crafted in Washington, it signals to Chinese policymakers that the Philippines is less an independent neighbor and more a convenient echo of someone else’s strategic anxieties. Trust, the essential ingredient for any meaningful dialogue, suffers accordingly.

There is a dignity in speaking from one’s own experience, assessing laws and events through a national lens rather than a borrowed one. The Philippine government does not need to import indictments about Chinese legislation to have a voice; it can raise with Beijing directly. Setting aside this habit of echoing external legal critiques would not be a concession. It would be a demonstration of the very independence and strategic sobriety that national interest demands.###