By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

 

Series 25

This is sequel to my previous article on China expanding its  legal framework for mass war mobilization, beyond its erstwhile principles of active defense.

In the Asian Century forum last Friday, September 25, coinciding with the state visit of President Xi Jinping to Washington DC, Herman Tiu Laurel traced the historiography of China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI) from the Bandung Conference held in Indonesia on April 1955 by 29 nations representing roughly 1.5 billion people, in what was the first initiative of the Global South to promote economic and cultural cooperation among themselves and oppose colonialism or neocolonialism during the Cold War era.

What was clearly lacking, said guest presentor Dr. Enrico Gloria in that historical event, was the character of permanent stability within a political, economic, and social grouping of roughly 130 developing nations—primarily located in Africa, Latin America, parts of Asia, and Oceania—that share a common history of colonialism and lower positions in the global economic order.

There was some “authority deficit” in the face of some members of the United Nations weakening the institution by their unilateral action driven by their own vested interests.

Today, as we speak under the leadership of China, global governance towards a multipolar world is to be anchored on five principles: sovereign equality, international rule of law, multilateralism, people-centeredness and real results.

President Xi Jinping expounded on this platform in the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and in the BRICS Conference in India, signaling before his state visit to Washington DC this week that unipolarity with the United States as center has seen its demise.

Multipolarity has arrived, and it is irreversible.

Legal framework amended

But the overpowering question that follows has always been who will be the guarantor of peace for the building of this “China dream”?

The prevailing foundational guiding principle for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and China’s strategic defense planning, has been “active defense” famously summarized by the maxim “we will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked”.

So last August 28, China amended its National Defense Mobilization Law, marking the first major overhaul of the country’s legal framework since 2010, with updated rules taking effect on October 1.

Key Revisions and Scope

• Expanded Triggers: Allows mobilization not just for traditional defense, but also to protect broader “development interests,” technology competition, and national unification.
• Advanced Technological Integration: Formally integrates Military-Civil Fusion, aiming to rapidly convert emerging fields like AI, cybersecurity, drones, and satellite communications into military assets.
• Asset Requisition: Authorizes extensive powers to take over private and commercial infrastructure, transport, data systems, and industrial facilities with deferred compensation.
• Civilians and Workforce: Reaffirms civic duties for citizens—reinforcing existing statutory age bands (men aged 18–60 and women 18–55) to support logistics, healthcare, energy, and financial controls under a war footing.

Points of Departure

After dealing with the United States and white Anglo-Saxon protestants (WASPs) for more than a decade, Xi Jinping has fully understood Henry Kissinger who said, “”It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal”.

The U.S. has maintained unmatched global military reach, intelligence-gathering capabilities, and defense technology. Adversaries often faced strict economic sanctions, trade restrictions, and exclusion from major international financial systems.

Nations that rely entirely on the U.S. for defense or economic aid suffered when Washington alters its priorities. Allies can get pulled into regional conflicts, proxy wars, or trade disputes driven by broader U.S. strategic goals.

A superpower, much more a descending superpower, such as the United States prioritizes its own narrow national interests.

Subsequently, dependent states are left vulnerable during sudden shifts in U.S. foreign policy, shifting geopolitical strategies or leadership changes which usually happens every four years after US presidential elections.

Trump Cards

For instance, in the face of midterm elections this November, Donald Trump has been cozying with President Xi since the former visited Beijing last May.

Trump may have said that he will not war with China over Taiwan or engage another theater 10,000 miles away from his west coast, but poking the regional dragon has not abated, but in fact, escalated, because he surrogated the US’ hegemonic role to its allies in the region.

On the ground in Asia, the footprints of his State Secretary Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth are all over the place.

A popular example is there has been no peace between China and the Philippines in the South China Seas since 2023 when we signed four additional sites for US in-country bases.

American functionaries like Sealight Raymond Powell and expired justice Antonio Carpio, and their employers at Stratbase ADR Institute have ben trying to sabotage a provisional agreement for the routine resupply (RORE) of the humanitarian needs of the Philippine marines at the BRP Sierra Madre grounded at Ayungin Shoal, that has had 16 peaceful successful missions since its signing in August 2024.

Delusional maneuvers

Marcos, obviously awed by the proposed transfer of five retired destroyer escorts by Japan to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, signed up with militarist Sanae Takaichi, attempting to marry the “exclusive economic zone” of the Philippines with that of Japan, disregarding encroaching on China’s maritime entitlements at the middle, and assuming Taiwan would not balk at the matter.

(For moment, the Otakus or Japanophiles of Tokyo forgot that World War II had already ended their 50-year rule of Formosa/Taiwan from 1895 to 1945.)

Not to be sidelined, General Xavier Brunson, commander of US forces in South Korea also proposed kill-web triangulating American forward operating bases in Sokor peninsula and their “inter-operability” with Japan and the Philippines.

There were emerging reports that Beijing explicitly warned Washington it could cancel the White House summit this week if the Trump administration delivers an earlier-announced $100-billion weapons package to Taiwan.

Given the midterm elections in two months, the US is reportedly looking for a diplomatic workaround, weighing a delay of the Taiwan arms announcement until later in the year—even after the upcoming APEC and G20 summits, or none at all—to ensure the high-stakes bilateral meeting between the two presidents goes forward. If the Republicans lose House and Senate majorities, Trump would even be a lameduck president by next year.

Interlocking waters?

Larry Wortzel, writing for Washington Times, Washington DC’s right-wing daily broadsheet, said “The measure has Taiwanese analysts on alert, and for good reason. They have reasonably interpreted it as a means to prepare for military action against the island, “reunification” of which represents a cardinal priority for Mr. Xi and his leadership — particularly given that 2027 marks the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Liberation Army.”

Yet the wording of the legislation suggests a scope that is broader still. Xi Jinping can also invoke the law if he believes China’s control over the South China Sea, East China Sea or islands in dispute with other countries is threatened.

That’s why, Wortzel added, “it should be of vital importance to the United States. In the East China Sea, China claims territories that are also claimed by U.S. allies South Korea and Japan. America has treaty obligations to come to their aid in the event of conflict.

“In the South China Sea, the U.S. is duty-bound to assist the Philippines under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty”.

China’s Great Wall of Sand

In 2012, China annexed Scarborough Shoal after a standoff with the Philippines.

The United States, however, did not make a move to defend the Philippines. I have often asserted brandishing a Henry Kissinger document that the South China Sea is not within the scope of that treaty, except in the event of an armed attack.

That said, the response will not be automatic; an armed attack can just trigger appeal to the US Congress for appropriate action.

Kissinger marked classic ambivalence in a 1975 document declassified in 2006: “AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, WE SEE PRECIOUS LITTLE CHANCE CONGRESS OR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD SUPPORT U.S. INTER VENTION IN SPRATLY DISPUTE. IF THE PHIL GARRISONS EVER WERE ATTACKED, IT SEEMS TO ME LESS HARMFUL POLITICALLY TO DENY OUR OBLIGATIONS ON LEGAL GROUNDS, THAN TO LEAVE UNFULFILLED AN ACKNOWLEDGED COMMITMENT.”

Kissinger adopted a sound measure given the Philippines’ lack of institutional memory and diplomatic gravitas 38 years after. 

Instead of pursuing bilateral negotiations, the Philippines sought “arbitration” under UNCLOS, with the end-motive of internationalizing its conflicts with China in the South China Seas, through sheer legalese.

But it started on the wrong foot on its “First Submissions”, the Philippines carelessly abandoned its the benefit of protection under the 2002 Declaration of Conduct between ASEAN and China, denigrating such as being ineffective in order to justify to the tribunal no other resort but initiating arbitral procedures.

The situation worsened as China responded by changing the facts on the ground. It reclaimed three features: Mischief, Subi and Fiery Cross and converted them over time into a fully militarized facility on an artificial island. Four outposts were also constructed: on Cuarteron Reef, Johnson South Reef (Chigua Reef), Hughes Reef and Gaven Reef (North).

The Philippines has been employing US-advised grayzone tactics allegedly to strengthen its claims and creating mythical West Philippine Sea that it constantly patrols to provoke conflicts with the China Coast Guard to ending up in a vicious cycle of confrontation accusing China as the aggressor.

Presently only 13 countries have supported the 2016 Arbitral Award in writing, namely Australia, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The latest of which to express support is Poland, where the Philippines had bought 48 Black Hawk helicopters. That count raises to 15 including the Philippines as host signatory. Note however that none of the other 10 ASEAN countries are on this list of mostly American allies.

Of late, China fortified another feature, this time at the Paracels: Antelope Reef.

Protracted Struggle

Wortzel, however, acknowledges that the expanded mobilization law is not, targeted against a specific country or state, making it a broad instrument. China, in other words, can initiate a national mobilization in the event of perceived threats or potential conflicts with the United States, Russia, India, Japan or any other country.

He says “it is best understood as preparation for a possible protracted conflict.”

And for good reason. The PRC has watched Russia struggle with its mobilization, materiel, drafting new troops, funds and supply chains for what has turned out to be a long conflict with Ukraine.

Israel’s extended engagement in the Gaza Strip after Hamas carried out a campaign of terror on Oct. 7, 2023, is likewise instructive. So is the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iranian-controlled forces in Lebanon.

Likewise, Mr. Xi (Jinping) is certainly aware of the effect of the U.S. military campaign against Iran on keeping the sea lines of communication in the Strait of Hormuz open.

Sovereign trigger: national unification

The legal architecture for national unification primarily targets Taiwan and areas of friction like Hong Kong, creating a domestic legal mandate that obligates the state to act.

• The Anti-Secession Law (2005): It specifies that if “secessionist forces” act to cause the fact of Taiwan’s independence, or if possibilities for a peaceful unification are completely exhausted, the state must employ “non-peaceful means” to protect sovereignty.
• The 2026 National Defense Mobilization Law: Taking effect on October 1, this heavily revised law legalizes seamless “peacetime-to-wartime” protocols. to sustain a prolonged conflict using the entire nation’s civilian resources.
• The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law: This law legally enforces domestic cohesion, mandating a singular, shared Chinese national identity and provides the legal backing to prosecute or suppress non-Han cultural interpretations or movements deemed separatist, reinforcing internal stabilization ahead of potential external conflicts.

Industrial security trigger: Tech competition

Beijing views technology dominance not just as a commercial goal, but as a core pillar of national security. Laws are triggered to prevent foreign tech containment and stop the outflow of strategic intellectual property.

• Export Control Law & Dual-Use Regulations: If a foreign country restricts technology access to Chinese firms, China triggers its export controls of critical materials (like rare earth elements and advance softwares) in retaliation, citing threats to “national security and interests”.
• Data Security Law: Under its Article 26, if another country uses “discriminatory” or restrictive measures against China regarding data or technology investments, China is legally empowered to retaliate with reciprocal restrictions.
• Exit and Entry Border Controls: Border rules give authorities the power to issue exit bans on Chinese citizens or foreign nationals. These are triggered if individuals are suspected of violating technology trade rules or engaging in conduct that threatens “industrial or technological security,” effectively trapping key personnel inside the country to shield domestic know-how.

In effect since September 15, this law has netted the arrest of who have illegally entered or worked in Hongkong, Macau and mainland China, including 100 Filipinos.

Economic trigger: Development Interests

This addition explicitly links economic survival with military and state mobilization.

• How it is triggered: Under Article 47 of the National Defense Law, China can legally justify military or state mobilization if its overseas economic interests—such as critical maritime trade routes (e.g., the Malacca Strait), energy supply chains, Belt and Road infrastructure projects, or Chinese assets abroad—are blocked or threatened.
• The Foreign Relations Law (2023): This law establishes a mandate to counter foreign sanctions, tariffs, or blockades. If international actions threaten China’s economic expansion or “development interests,” the law triggers state-sanctioned retaliation, blocking orders, and countermeasures.

China does not intend this to be an open and shut adventure in the same way America had looked at its role as the world’s policeman only to be consumed by its own greed.

The handwriting has now manifested on Washington’s wall: mene, mene, tekel, parsin – “God had numbered the its reign and brought it to an end, weighed it on the scales and found its lacking, and would give its kingdom to the people.”

Protecting a Multipolar world

After reading all of Xi Jinping’s books, what I know is that it is a decision to commit to an all-out war precisely to enforce no option for countries to settle their disputes except through diplomacy, with peace as the only weapon of choice as the United Nations had envisioned.

China is assuming the role of enforcer of international law under the United Nations charter.

China’s paramount leader’s speech in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan says it all – the multipolar world is already a reality. It is irreversible.

But who will protect this new world order?

Who will cover the back of the nations under international law that supports them against nations that are still under the United States’ rules-based order of zero-sum and cold war solutions?

China is now laying the foundation for something humungous and unprecedented – an economy that can overpower other economies and a war capability that will end all wars.

Peaceful co-existence

Premier Zhou Enlai had decoded it as far back as December 1953 when he introduced the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity: Nations must respect each other’s borders and political independence, treating all countries as equals.

Mutual non-aggression: Countries promise not to attack, invade, or use military force against each other.

Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs: No nation has the right to meddle in the domestic politics, governance, or legal systems of another country.

Equality and mutual benefit: International relations and trade must be fair, bringing advantages to all participating nations rather than exploiting others.

Peaceful coexistence: Countries with different social systems, ideologies, and beliefs should strive to live and cooperate in peace rather than conflict.

Conclusion

Xi Jinping is now enforcing it – where might is right to achieve right is might, in attainment of authentic historical materialism.

He did not propose a community of shared future as a shibboleth. He envisioned all countries to live in global village guided not by unilateral but global governance to reshape international relations in an era of cooperation to face shared challenges.

As for the Philippines, who under Marcos has turned south as a US dog while the majority of the world has boarded the bus north to the new silk road onto multipolarity, we must un-shackled again our nation, so it can return to the wisdom of the framers of our Constitution, towards an independent foreign policy, and bring prosperity back to all our people and not just a privileged few.

The dove must slay the hawk, leading to forever peace, and away from the quagmire of forever wars.

   

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