By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

 

Part 14: An old order gives way to a new one, reshaping global geopolitics

In his first State of the Nation Address (SONA) delivered on July 25, 2022, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. declared that he would not oversee any process that abandons even one square inch of the territory of the Republic of the Philippines to any foreign power.

Today, as per IBON Foundation, he has ceded more than 2/3 of the country to American presence.

Mapping the US military footprint in the Philippines, an analysis of data from IBON Economics visualizes the expanding United States military presence within the Philippines under the framework of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The period from 2022 to 2025 has seen a significant increase in designated sites and operational areas delineating several types of locations:

1. EDCA Sites: (Agreed Locations): These are military bases where the US military has access to designated areas to build facilities, pre-position defense equipment, and rotate forces. The number of these sites has increased from the original five to nine.

2. Non-EDCA Sites: Existing Philippine bases where US military activities occur under other visiting forces agreements.

3. Prospective Sites: Locations under consideration for future EDCA designation or military use.

4. War Material Production Hubs: Industrial areas involved in the production or maintenance of military equipment.

5. Operational Areas: Designated zones for joint military exercises, training, and patrols.

6. Aircraft Landing Facilities: Airfields and airstrips utilized by US aircraft for transit and operations.

This cartographic representation highlights a deliberate and strategic expansion of US military access across the Philippine archipelago. Key implications include:

• Enhanced Interoperability: The presence facilitates increased joint training and operational coordination between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and US forces.
• Geographic Coverage: The distribution of sites provides strategic coverage facing potential flashpoints, including the Luzon Strait and the South China Sea.
• Deterrence and Assurance: The US frames this presence as a commitment to its treaty alliance with the Philippines and a deterrent against regional coercion. The Philippine government supports it as a means to enhance its external defense capabilities.
• Geopolitical Tensions: The expansion is viewed critically by other regional powers, particularly China, which sees it as proliferation of US-led forward operating bases to contain its influence.

The map from IBON Economics provides a clear, visual testament to the deepening US-Philippine military alliance during this period. It underscores a significant shift in the regional security architecture, with the Philippines playing an increasingly offense posture in the Indo-Pacific.

Distorted priorities

As we have said earlier, this fits into the surrogation by the United States to its proxies of its regional security responsibilities because of a deteriorating homeland economy. The U.S. has delegated the Ukraine situation to its allies in Europe and NATO. It has delegated to Israel the Middle East or West Asia and to Japan the Asia-Pacific.

After Marcos added four additional sites to EDCA in February 2023, what followed was an embargo on all China-assisted railway projects, regardless of stage. The Subic–Clark–Manila–Batangas railway, for instance, was re-assigned to the Asian Development Bank, a Japanese multilateral lending firm.

This project has been bruited to serve as the backbone of a proposed Luzon Economic Corridor, launched on April 11, 2024, during the inaugural U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Summit in Washington, D.C. originally designed to accelerate coordinated investments in infrastructure projects across Subic, Clark, Manila, and Batangas.

Until three-months after, erstwhile masked intentions started birthing with the Philippine signing of the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Japan on July 8, 2024, a version of the visiting forces pact between the Philippines and the US.

The move, however,  did not only sideline the civilian skin of the Luzon corridor projects but exposed a sinister equivalent of the American military domination of the island of Luzon north of Manila, for “re-basing” in Clark for its air force and Subic for its navy, this time in partnership with the Japanese, and with the integration of Metro Manila all the way to Batangas (and eventually Cavite where its former Sangley naval existed at the mouth of Manila Bay).

The scheming plot was finally unveiled after Donald Trump lost his trade war with China, with the latter banning exports of its Rare Earth resources to the US and its allies, taking advantage of some weaknesses on the side of the Philippine.

•  Clueless and weak president
•  Corrupted Congress
•  False starts in the South China Seas
•  Induced economic crisis
•  Greedier oligopoly

After almost two years of non-event, Trade Undersecretary Ceferino Rodolfo, concurrently managing head and vice chair of the Board of Investments, inked another declaration signifying the Philippines’ joining of Pax Silica initiative on April 16, 2026. Under the Pax Silica framework, the United States plans to establish a 4,000-acre industrial hub in the LEC, the first of its kind – as an “Economic Security Zone”, to surge production for inputs vital to U.S. rare earth and military supply chains.

Two sour notes, however, uncorked a sell-out by the Marcos government of Philippine sovereignty:

•  The zone will be covered by diplomatic immunity
•  US common law will apply within its jurisdiction

In short, the arrangement will be ruled by extra-territoriality. A Guantanamo-style situation within the Republic of the Philippines!

But beyond press releases and propaganda, the plan reeks of the absence of transparency. Another classic syndrome of American conditionality before even any details are laid out.

There are no definite, cohesive, and practicable program to achieve announced objectives. This lack of project management road maps to implement, schedule, and control complex component projects, reeks the absence of what in engineering is called detailed PERT-CPM or program evaluation and review technique and critical path method.

That’s even too highfalutin’ because there is no evidence as yet of an actual feasibility study for Pax Silica or for that matter a funding package for whatever the government is planning for it.

The “Luzon Economic Corridor” therefore only serves as a gift-wrapping of “offering to hegemonic gods”!

Erstwhile LEC was profuse with best intentions for the Filipino people. It had detailed studies by the National Economic Development Authority for 21 infrastructure projects, 12 of which with a total cost estimate of P2.126 trillion have yet no confirmed funding and the remaining 9 still have to be costed.

(The 12 projects are the Subic-Clark-Manila-Batangas Railway, the Bataan-Cavite Interlink Bridge, the Subic Bay [Redondo-Ilanin] bridge, the Central Luzon Link Expressway Phase II, North Luzon East Expressway, the Laguna Lakeshore Road Network Development Phase I; the Central Luzon Bus Rapid Transit, the Manila Bay-Pasig River-Laguna Lake Ferry System, the Kalaanan Irrigation Project, the North-South Commuter Railway, the New Clark City Rail Extension, and the Southern Batangas airport.

Ironically, some of the big ones in this list were already in various stages of development, from feasibility studies to past funding and actual construction under cooperation with when Marcos embargoed them in favor of United States under-deliveries and broken promises to the AFP modernization program.)

Outside of approvals and pledges, the United States and Japan have not given any specifics on how these projects will roll out. Foreign Direct investments are being stymied by the instability of the situation in the South China Sea, and by the incompetence of the Marcos administration and its plunderous record of corruption.

But what has now manifested as a pattern is that economic development and the people’s most urgent concerns are no longer being prioritized by the Marcos government, and worse, leveraged as subsidiary only to the American and Japanese strategy of ensuring freedom of navigation in Southeast Asia and narrow self-serving Western war ambitions.

Nippon cooperation

A status quo ante would not have been problematic between Japan and the Philippines, between whom blossomed constructive bilateral relations for 80 years- hinged at reparations, reconstruction and economic development. But recent developments, especially with the ascent of Sanae Takaichi to the leadership in Tokyo, present evolving complexities that are no longer acceptable to Philippine laws and most urgent national concerns.

Following its defeat in World War II, Japan’s militarism was completely discredited, and its new Constitution enshrined pacifism, notably in its Article 9, which renounces war and the maintenance of a military other than for defense.

The current security landscape has, however, prompted Japan to significantly shift its defense policy, leading to a vigorous debate about a “revival” of militarism: 

• Policy Shifts: Japan has adopted new national security strategies that allow for a more active role in collective self-defense and the acquisition of “counter-strike capabilities” (local Type 25 and US Tomahawk long-range missiles) that can hit foreign targets.

• Increased Budgets: Defense spending has been substantially increased, with plans to reach 2% of GDP (a NATO standard) by 2027, which would give Japan the third-largest military budget globally.
• Erosion of Pacifist Principles: Critics argue these changes, along with discussions about potentially revising the three non-nuclear principles and its Constitution itself, are hollowing out the post-war pacifist identity.
• Geopolitical Context: Proponents of the changes argue they are a necessary and natural reaction to a challenging regional environment, citing threats from China and North Korea.
• Neighboring Concerns: Countries in East Asia, particularly China and South Korea, view these actions and accompanying historical revisionism as an alarming resurgence of past militarist impulses that pose a real and growing threat to regional stability.

Based on reports from late 2025 and early 2026, Takaichi has adopted a strong, proactive stance on Taiwan, marking a significant, more hawkish shift in Japan’s security policy. Her position is widely viewed as a continuation of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s stance that “a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency”. 

• Survival-Threatening Situation: Takaichi stated in the Diet on November 7, 2025, that a Chinese attack on Taiwan, including a naval blockade, could constitute an “existential crisis” or “survival-threatening situation” for Japan.
• Collective Self-Defense: She indicated that under such a scenario, Japan would be justified in exercising its right to collective self-defense and potentially engaging in military action.
• Japan-U.S. Alliance Focus: Takaichi has emphasized that the Japan-U.S. security alliance would “collapse” if Japan failed to respond to an attack on U.S. forces involved in a Taiwan crisis.

Economics to war competitiveness

In her article last May 9, 2026, entitled From ODA to OSA: Japan’s Warship Diplomacy Comes to Manila, Asian Century Vice President for External Affairs Anna Malindog-Uy wrote “Japan’s security courtship of the Philippines carries a deep historical irony. During World War II, the Japanese Imperial Army invaded and occupied the country, leaving behind memories of massacres, forced labor, repression, destruction, displacement, and the sexual enslavement of Filipino ‘comfort women’.”

Filipinos became refugees in their own country, surrounded by death and destruction. At the end of the war, thje death toll was a million.

“Yet in the postwar era, Japan returned not as an occupier, but as a leading development partner. Through the Official Development Assistance (ODA), it financed major infrastructure, transport, disaster resilience, and socioeconomic projects, becoming the Philippines’ largest ODA source in 2024 at $13.23 billion. The transformation is striking: The former wartime aggressor recast itself as a builder, donor, and strategic partner.”

But Japan’s role is shifting again.

Uy continues, “Today, Japan is still coming to Manila, but now with radars, patrol assets, access agreements, logistics pacts, possible destroyer transfers, and missile exercises. Under its new Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework, Tokyo now provides security-related equipment and infrastructure to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and related institutions, distinct from traditional ODA for economic and social development. This is not a small policy adjustment. This is a strategic transformation.”

Thus, the arc of Japan-Philippines relations has moved from invasion to reconstruction partnership to security cooperation.

The Ph.D. candidate in Economics said, “This transition is geopolitically significant and historically delicate. Japan is no longer only building bridges, railways, and roads in the Philippines; it is now also a military arms supplier and security partner, citing Manila’s need for deterrence capability against China amid South China Sea tensions.

“But for victims’ groups and nationalist critics, the sight of Japan returning to a military role raises an uncomfortable question: Has history truly been reconciled or forgotten, or is strategic urgency simply outrunning historical memory?”

Read https://www.manilatimes.net/2026/05/09/opinion/columns/from-oda-to-osa-japans-warship-diplomacy-comes-to-manila/2339497

Scorch-earth destruction at the Intramuros District, May 1945.

Post office, totally burned                        Congress, levelled to the ground

The Battle of Manila resulted in the near-total destruction of the Philippine capital, widely considered the second most devastated Allied capital city of World War II after Warsaw, Poland. Approximately 80% of the city was reduced to rubble, with over 100,000 civilians killed during the month-long battle, largely due to Japanese atrocities and heavy American artillery bombardment.

Conclusion

Reviving the Hukbalahap has been steaming in some coffee shops in Manila as an option to put a stop to Pax Silica.

Short for Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People’s Army Against the Japanese), was formed on March 29, 1942, in the wake of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Initially, the organization was established as a guerrilla resistance movement against the Japanese invaders.

Led by Luis Taruc and other communist leaders, the Hukbalahap quickly gained support among the peasants in Central Luzon, who saw it as a means to fight both foreign occupation and local oppression

The roots of the Hukbalahap Rebellion can be traced back to the agrarian unrest that plagued the Philippines in the pre-World War II era. The Philippine countryside, particularly in Central Luzon, was characterized by a feudal-like system where a small number of wealthy landowners controlled vast tracts of land. This system, known as “hacienda”, left the majority of farmers as tenants with little to no land ownership. The disparity in land distribution led to widespread poverty and discontent among the peasantry, setting the stage for future conflicts.

The Pax Silica serves is a revolving door to the hacienda and Filipinos as tenants in their own land. Worse, to returning colonials.

Since Marcos became president in 2002, the Filipinos who have had enough of circus acts will not bite the hypocritical political performance  of the Japanese prime minister.

Takaichi cannot just kneel before the Filipino people and get what she and her marionettist the Americans want.

We know when we are already being taken for dangerous joyride to a future of war and derision, not peace and development.

Luis Taruc and his band of patriotic guerrillas.

   

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