
by Atty. Arnedo S. Valera
This is a reflection on Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan’s call for a new course in the South China Sea.
His recent article, “Time to Remove Philippine Derelict Junk from Ayungin Shoal,” is deliberately provocative in both title and argument. It challenges deeply entrenched assumptions surrounding the BRP Sierra Madre, the nature of Philippine rights at Ayungin Shoal, and the wisdom of maintaining a deteriorating military outpost that has repeatedly become the center of dangerous confrontations between Filipino and Chinese personnel.
One may disagree with some of Paglinawan’s language or with particular aspects of his legal analysis. But the essential question he raises deserves serious national reflection: Has the continued presence of the BRP Sierra Madre advanced a peaceful and durable settlement, or has it become an increasingly dangerous symbol around which confrontation, propaganda and great-power rivalry are allowed to accumulate?
Paglinawan argues that the grounded vessel has ceased to function as an ordinary navigable warship and has instead become a fixed military outpost whose continued deterioration has produced recurring disputes over repairs, reinforcement and resupply. He further contends that Philippine policy should move away from cyclical confrontation and toward negotiations, confidence-building and eventual political accommodation.
On this central point, his article is consistent with the position I have advanced in my previous writings on the so-called West Philippine Sea and the broader South China Sea dispute: the Philippines must recover an authentically independent foreign policy anchored in diplomacy, international law and the Filipino national interest.
The dispute should not be reduced to a simplistic choice between China and the United States. Such a framework is itself a diminishment of Philippine sovereignty. The Philippines is not a strategic pawn, a military platform or a subordinate outpost of any foreign power. We are a sovereign republic with our own Constitution, national interests, historic relationships and responsibility to preserve peace for future generations.
Article II, Section 7 of the Philippine Constitution requires the State to pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount considerations must be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest and the right to self-determination.
That constitutional command does not require isolation from the United States. Neither does it demand hostility toward China. It requires something more difficult and more mature: the capacity to cooperate with both powers without allowing either to dictate Philippine policy.
Engaging China Is Not Surrender
The Philippines must engage China as one of the principal architects of the emerging Asian and global order—a major economic, technological and military power whose influence will continue to shape the region for generations.
That reality cannot responsibly be ignored.
China is our permanent geographic neighbor. It is deeply connected to the Philippine economy and to the wider economic life of Asia. Geography does not disappear with changes in presidential administrations, military alliances or political slogans. Neither can a country relocate itself simply because relations with a neighboring power have become difficult.
The Philippines must therefore deal with China directly, confidently and constructively, on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect. We should cooperate where our interests converge, negotiate where our claims overlap and firmly protect our lawful rights where disagreement remains.
Engagement is not capitulation.
Negotiation is not abandonment.
Diplomacy is not treason.
Indeed, diplomacy is how sovereign nations build relations and manage disputes without sacrificing either their rights or the lives of their people.
China must likewise respect the Philippines as an independent sovereign state—not as a minor country to be intimidated, instructed or coerced. Mutual respect cannot operate in only one direction. It requires restraint, reciprocity and recognition that the dignity and security of Filipino personnel must never be treated as expendable.
But respect must also be communicated through serious statecraft rather than through endless theatrical confrontation. National honor is not measured by the frequency of collisions at sea, the volume of official condemnations or the number of viral videos produced after each incident. It is measured by whether our policies make Filipinos safer, strengthen our lawful position and bring the region closer to peace.
The United States Is Ally, Not Master
The Philippines must also preserve and intelligently manage its treaty alliance with the United States.
The United States remains a major economic and military power, a longstanding ally and an important source of defense cooperation, investment, education and people-to-people ties. Millions of Filipinos and Filipino Americans have formed enduring bonds between the two societies.
But an alliance among sovereign states must be founded on consultation and mutual benefit—not automatic obedience.
Philippine foreign policy should not be designed in Washington. Nor should it be designed in Beijing. It must be formulated in Manila, according to the interests of the Filipino people.
To say this is not anti-American. It is simply constitutional.
An independent Philippines may cooperate closely with the United States while refusing to become the front line of an American conflict with China. It may accept legitimate defense assistance while rejecting any strategy that unnecessarily transforms Philippine territory into an instrument of great-power escalation.
The United States and China are both economically and militarily consequential powers. The Philippines must engage each with respect, prudence and strategic clarity. Our relationships with them should be defined not by ideological loyalty, dependency or fear, but by our own national interest.
That is the difference between alliance and subordination.
That is also the meaning of sovereignty.
What the Arbitral Award Did—and Did Not—Decide
Public debate must also be disciplined by legal accuracy.
The 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award was a significant legal ruling. It rejected the legal foundation of China’s expansive historic-rights claim within the so-called nine-dash line insofar as that claim exceeded the maritime entitlements permitted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The tribunal also ruled on the legal classification of several maritime features and on certain sovereign rights arising under UNCLOS.
But the tribunal did not decide sovereignty over disputed islands, rocks or other land territory. It expressly lacked jurisdiction to determine territorial ownership. It also did not undertake a comprehensive delimitation of maritime boundaries among all claimant states.
This distinction is essential.
UNCLOS allocates maritime entitlements. It does not, by itself, resolve every dispute over territorial sovereignty. The arbitral award strengthened important Philippine legal claims, but it did not make diplomacy unnecessary. Nor could it impose a complete political settlement upon all the states contesting parts of the South China Sea.
The dispute involves not only the Philippines and China, but also overlapping claims and interests involving Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, with Indonesia maintaining significant interests concerning its exclusive economic zone near the Natuna Islands.
There is therefore no realistic substitute for sustained diplomatic engagement.
The law provides the framework. Negotiation must provide the settlement.

Top-left is Commodore Jay Tarriela who has served as spokesman of the Philippine Coast Guard since 2023 and center left is Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro who has become very vociferous against China since the launch of a Facebook page “Gibo 2028” apparently his platform for nomination to the next presidential elections. At right is Raymond Powell, the US Naval Institute’s overt agent operating inside the Philippines to provide satellite images of shipping activities in the South China Sea., allegedly out of a Gordian Knot Center based in Stanford University in California. Powell is now a non-resident fellow of Stratebase, which is in turn the Manila adjunct of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Deep State’s lobbyist in Washington DC.
Lawfare means the use of legalese and legal systems to harm, silence, or control an opponent. It combines the words “law” and “warfare” to describe turning the legal process into a weapon.
To correct Powell, there is no Chinese blockade. The Philippines and China’s established Bilateral Consultative Mechanism renewed a peaceful and orderly routine-resupply (RoRe) protocol in 2024 after the Philippine under Marcos earlier ignored a pre-existing one through four Presidents from Estrada to Arroyo to Aquino to Duterte. Besides establishing a modus of prior exchange of information and coordination for delivery of only humanitarian needs of the Filipino soldiers on board the derelict junk, the agreed protocol prohibits any repairs on the grounded vessel.
Last July 20, the Chinese Coast guard sent two rigid hull rubber boats to take picture of barriers covering an ongoing repair aboard BRP Sierra Madre when Philippine navy personnel attacked the Chinese inspectors. Powell’s “blockade” lingo is an example of lawfare and propaganda the Philippine-side uses against Chinese Coast Guard. As to why an American agent, who is ignorant of history, international relations and geopolitical dynamics, has joined the information war leaves much to the readers’ imagination. – Editor
Questions Paglinawan Forces Us to Face
Paglinawan’s article asks whether the continued grounding and reinforcement of the BRP Sierra Madre has become inconsistent with the larger objective of de-escalation and negotiated settlement.
He maintains that the vessel’s loss of seaworthiness, fixed location and use as an outpost complicate its characterization as an ordinary warship. He also invokes the obligation of states to exchange views, pursue provisional arrangements and avoid actions that aggravate unresolved maritime disputes.
These arguments should not simply be dismissed through name-calling.
The legal status of the vessel, the rights of the Philippines at Ayungin Shoal and the operational consequences of any proposed removal are not questions that should be resolved through political slogans. They require careful study by international-law scholars, naval experts, diplomats, environmental specialists and national-security officials.
Any decision concerning the BRP Sierra Madre must be made exclusively by the Philippines, consistent with our national interest and without coercion from China, the United States or any other state.
Removal should not be undertaken as an act of surrender or unilateral abandonment. Nor should the vessel be maintained indefinitely merely because policymakers fear being accused of weakness.
If the Philippines eventually determines that the vessel has become strategically dangerous, environmentally unsustainable and diplomatically counterproductive, its removal should occur only as part of a carefully negotiated, verifiable and reciprocal arrangement.
Such an arrangement should protect Philippine sovereign rights, ensure the safety of Filipino personnel, prevent unilateral occupation or militarization by another claimant and establish a durable mechanism for access, resource management and crisis prevention.
The essential principle must be reciprocity.
The Philippines should not make irreversible concessions in exchange for vague assurances.
Any major change at Ayungin must be accompanied by concrete guarantees, transparent procedures and enforceable confidence-building measures.
From Symbolism to Statesmanship
The BRP Sierra Madre has acquired enormous symbolic significance. It represents sacrifice, endurance and the commitment of Filipino Marines stationed under extraordinarily difficult conditions.
Their service must be honored.
But national policy cannot be based solely on symbolism. A rusting vessel should not become more important than the lives of the soldiers assigned to it, the security of Filipino fishermen or the peace of the entire region.
The highest form of patriotism is not the preservation of a symbol at all costs. It is the protection of the Republic through wise and forward-looking judgment.
There is courage in defending one’s rights. But there is also courage in negotiating a responsible settlement when the existing arrangement produces only recurring danger.
It requires far less imagination to preserve confrontation than to design peace.
A Code of Conduct Must Have Substance
Paglinawan also emphasizes the importance of completing negotiations for a regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. His article reports that Chinese officials have continued to express support for completing those negotiations, notwithstanding recent bilateral tensions.
A meaningful Code of Conduct should not be merely ceremonial. It should contain practical rules governing coast guard encounters, military proximity, resupply operations, fishing access, environmental protection and emergency communications.
It should prohibit the use of force and dangerous maneuvers. It should create reliable hotlines and investigation mechanisms. It should encourage joint scientific work, marine conservation and carefully structured resource cooperation without prejudice to the legal claims of any party.
Above all, it should transform the South China Sea from a theater of strategic competition into a region governed by restraint and predictable conduct.
Such an agreement will not resolve every sovereignty question. But it can prevent disputes from becoming wars.
Neither Pro-China or Pro-America
The predictable response to any call for negotiation is to label its author pro-China. The predictable response to any defense of the alliance with the United States is to label the speaker pro-America.
Both accusations are intellectually lazy.
A pro-Philippines foreign policy may oppose Chinese coercion while supporting economic cooperation with China. It may value the American alliance while rejecting the transformation of the Philippines into a military proxy.
It may invoke the 2016 arbitral award while acknowledging the award’s jurisdictional limitations. It may defend sovereign rights while recognizing that final and lasting peace requires negotiation with the other claimants.
There is no contradiction in these positions.
They are the components of strategic independence.
The Philippines should engage China as a major economic and military power whose cooperation is indispensable to regional prosperity and stability. We should engage the United States as a treaty ally whose partnership can contribute to Philippine defense and development. We should also deepen our relations, constructively, with ASEAN, Japan, India, Australia, Europe and the wider international community.
But every engagement must be measured against one standard:
Does it advance the sovereignty, security, prosperity and dignity of the Filipino people?
Choosing Peace Without Abandoning Rights
Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan’s article is valuable because it disrupts the comfortable assumption that the existing policy at Ayungin must continue indefinitely merely because no government wishes to accept the political consequences of reconsidering it.
His proposal should be debated seriously, not accepted uncritically and not dismissed reflexively.
The ultimate question is not simply whether to remove or preserve the BRP Sierra Madre.
The deeper question is whether Philippine policy will remain trapped in an endless cycle of resupply confrontation, diplomatic protest and heightened dependence on external powers—or whether the country will recover the confidence to pursue a negotiated and genuinely independent course.
The Philippines must claim lawful rights in good faith.
And neither should it abandon diplomacy.
The spirit of international law is cooperation and peace. Its rules guides countries to work together fairly, protect rights of all peoples, and resolving problems without conflict, especially war.
We can protect our interests without manufacturing permanent hostility. We can preserve alliances without surrendering independence. We can engage China without becoming subservient to China. We can work with the United States without becoming a proxy of the United States.
This is not a pro-China position.
It is not a pro-American position.
It is a sovereign, constitutional and unmistakably pro-Philippines position.
At a moment when the South China Sea is becoming increasingly militarized, the most patriotic policy is not the one that creates the loudest confrontation. It is the one that protects Filipino lives, preserves Philippine rights and opens a credible path toward peace.
Paglinawan is therefore correct to insist that diplomacy must replace cyclical provocation as the organizing principle of our foreign policy.
The Philippines must speak with all powers, submit to none and negotiate from the strength of its own sovereign dignity.
In the end, the nation’s choice should not be Beijing or Washington.
It must always be the Philippines. #

Atty. Arnedo S. Valera
Atty. Arnedo S. Valera is the executive director of the Global Migrant Heritage Foundation and managing attorney at Valera & Associates, a US immigration and anti-discrimination law firm for over 32 years. He holds a master’s degree in International Affairs and International Law and Human Rights from Columbia University and was trained at the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. He obtained his Bachelor of Laws from Ateneo de Manila University. He is an AB-Philosophy Major at the University of Santo Tomas ( UST). He is a professor at San Beda Graduate School of Law (LLM Program), teaching International Security and Alliances
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