By Ricardo Saludo

Last of 4 parts: A President who is on the bad side of history

Asymmetric warfare, though little understood outside military circles, is now a key defense strategy for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The idea of fighting a far more powerful enemy by leveraging one’s geography, population and other innate advantages is an age-old strategy — google the victories of Hungarian forces over Ottoman invaders in 1456 and the Japanese against Mongol fleets in 1274 and 1281, among other battles. Asymmetrical warfare is also a paramount lesson from the Ukraine and Middle East wars.

Today, unmanned aerial and naval drones give even diminutive fighters like Yemen’s Houthis ample capabilities to hit even superpowers like the United States, which stopped attacks on Houthis after their drones threatened US aircraft carriers.

And Ukraine and Israel struck deep in vast Russia and Iran, respectively, with drones assembled from smuggled parts and launched from harmless-looking cargo containers. They hit atomic bombers in well-defended Russian bases as well as strongly secured Iranian nuclear facilities, and military and atomic research chiefs.

Small can be formidable

No wonder the AFP has embraced asymmetrical warfare, including the acquisition, deployment and domestic manufacture of unmanned air and sea drones, as well as swarming tactics at narrow straits around the archipelago, where large vessels and fleets lose their size and weapons advantage. It would be the maritime version of 1,400 Spartans and other Greeks holding off the colossal Persian army at the narrow pass of Thermopylae, depicted in the movie “300.”

“We don’t have to meet them in the open sea,” explained RAdm. Roy Vincent Trinidad last year, then the Philippine Navy (PN) deputy fleet commander and now its inspector general responsible for fleet readiness and AFP spokesman for the West Philippine Sea (WPS), our exclusive economic zone (EEZ), where we assert sovereign rights over maritime economic activity under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The Philippine Air Force (PAF) is also developing and rolling out asymmetrical warfare strategies, including widely dispersed, redundant, well-concealed, defended and interconnected command hubs, forces and assets posing major challenges to even large invading air forces.

“Weapons systems will be dispersed to the identified and developed remote airstrips or road networks with support facilities that friendly forces will secure,” expounds Capt. Sedfrey Cañizares, PAF director for operations and management, in his article, “Philippine Air Force and the Asymmetric Warfare Concept” (https://tinyurl.com/3re7ktcj).

Cañizares cited Filipino guerrilla tactics as asymmetric warfare in response to superior invading US forces in the Philippine-American War (1899-1902). Without using the term, asymmetric warfare was also urged in our maritime tussles with China by top Washington defense think tank Center for Security and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), known for its reports and recommendations on what weapons and defense programs the US should spend on.

After Beijing took over Scarborough Shoal in 2012, CSBA urged Washington to help us defend ourselves but not with a major naval and air force buildup, which could never match the 3-million-strong People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Rather, its report, “The Geostrategic Return of the Philippines,” strongly recommended maritime surveillance aircraft, anti-ship missiles and air defense systems.

That’s classic asymmetrical defense. PAF surveillance planes can better monitor the WPS than PLA aircraft flying thousands of miles from China and maybe even Chinese satellites. Anti-ship missiles would deter even major warships far more than any PN vessels. That’s why the late national security adviser, US Naval Academy graduate Roilo Golez, had long urged acquiring 200 BrahMos projectiles able to reach across our entire EEZ.

And instead of jet fleets to dogfight with PLA warplanes, CSBA pushed for air defense systems able to take out intruding aircraft well before they get close enough to attack missile batteries. For sure, if the think tank were writing today, it would also urge aerial and sea drones augmenting, if not dominating, the anti-access, area denial, or A2-AD, weaponry designed to deter intruders.

Many will wonder why the US did not follow CSBA’s advice. Indeed, one retired general said the Americans opposed the BrahMos, and it was only in 2019 under then-president Rodrigo Duterte that the AFP moved to acquire the Russian-Indian projectiles. No prizes for guessing that Washington was not keen on helping us defend ourselves, as CSBA urged. Instead, the US sought to build up forces here with access to AFP bases under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

Thankfully, we have acquired and will buy more BrahMos rockets even as Washington aims to deploy its missiles here, capable of hitting most of China and all its surrounding waters. Which raises a crucial issue in asymmetrical warfare and defense strategy.

How asymmetric defense wins or loses

Asymmetrical warfare would deter far superior forces if the defending nation does not pose a major threat to the invading power. Take the Houthi attacks, which cannot mount direct attacks on the US. When Houthi drones threatened major American naval vessels, President Donald Trump quietly called off his campaign against the Yemeni fighters, who then resumed attacks on Israel and international shipping in the Red Sea.

Trump would not have pulled back the US Navy if the Houthis threatened ships and ports in and around America itself.

By contrast, despite Ukraine attacks deep inside Russia using drones and long-range missiles, President Vladimir Putin continues his campaign to defeat Ukrainian forces and keep Russia’s neighbor from joining the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which could then put nuclear-capable missiles within minutes of Moscow, able to nuke Russian government and military centers without retaliation.

In sum, asymmetrical warfare would deter attacking powers if there is no major threat against them from the defending nation. But if there is, then even devastating losses from drones, missiles and other A2-AD systems would not stop the invaders.

Which brings us to the Philippines’ asymmetric defense. If we pose an existential threat to China by hosting nuclear-capable American forces and joining the US alliance to defend Taiwan if it declares independence and triggers a PLA invasion, then Beijing will attack us despite asymmetric or even atomic defenses.

This series was first run by The Manila Times.

 

Postscript by Mauro Samonte

Many Voices lead to War, Not our Own

MY favorite escape route by high Philippine government officials appearing before congressional hearings is to request for an executive session.

An executive session is a private, closed-door meeting where resource persons and witnesses discuss testimony with committee members and their staff away from the public. This option is taken for sensitive topics like potential threats to national security, or to maintain the confidentiality of certain information, which when publicly disclosed may cause embarrassment to the Philippine government.

This is what Foreign Affairs Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro requested after Sen. Imee Marcos, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, pressed her for confirmation that a certain Lin Chia-Lung, allegedly the Taiwanese foreign minister, is currently in the Philippines.

Lazaro was clearly engaging in doublespeak when she told the committee that she has no official knowledge of Lin’s presence in the country, while admitting that the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) had only been informed of a visiting business delegation from the US-Taiwan Business Council, led by its executive vice president Lotta Danielson.

What Senator Marcos was seeking confirmation on, “is the presence of a rather controversial, pro-independence advocate, a separatist and so-called foreign minister that has ignited all sorts of agitation.” Lin has been Minister of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan since May 20, 2024.

The Philippines adheres to China’s “one-China” policy, formalized in the June 9, 1975, joint communique and remains a cornerstone of Philippine diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PROC). The letter of the treaty was intense and left no space for speculation: “… that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory, and [the Philippines] decides to remove all its official representations from Taiwan within one month from the date of signature of this communique.”

China has foreign affairs offices (FAOs) at provincial, prefectural, county, or township levels of government but foreign policy is strictly and centrally controlled. Suffice it to say, PROC’s provincial FAOs are only led by vice foreign ministers coordinating with Foreign Minister Wang Yi to ensure the government speaks only with one voice.

However, Taiwan does not consider itself falling under this category as it fancies itself a separate “Republic of China” (ROC) and has its own foreign minister.

Technically, the PROC and the ROC are still in a state of civil war because no peace treaty or armistice officially ended the Chinese civil war which began on Aug. 1, 1927 fought between the Kuomintang-led government of the Republic of China and the forces of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Zedong declared the formation of the People’s Republic of China on Oct. 1, 1949, predating its total control over mainland China two months and six days after on Dec. 7, driving Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang-led Republic of China to retreat to Taiwan after their defeat.

As we speak, Taiwan is coming under increasing pressure from the PROC for reunification, thus putting a formal ending to the civil war.

On Dec. 17, 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 313 which prohibits all government officials from visiting Taiwan, receiving visiting Taiwanese officials, or carrying out any official activity relating to Taiwan without clearance from the DFA, in recognition of the one-China policy.

But last April 15, under Memorandum Circular 82, signed by Executive Secretary Lucas Bersamin, the travel ban now applies only to the president, vice president, secretary of foreign affairs and secretary of national defense.

Beijing has criticized Manila for manipulating adherence to the One-China policy, following remarks by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in an interview by Firstpost while visiting India: “To be very practical about it, if there is a confrontation over Taiwan between China and the United States, there is no way that the Philippines can stay out of it, simply because of our physical geographic location.”

The problem is the statement is not an isolated case.

Last April 1, Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr., chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was caught on video telling troops to prepare themselves for an invasion of Taiwan.

But it is actually RAdm. Roy Vincent Trinidad, who blew the whistle last May, on a changing context of our Taiwan relationship emanating from the Department of National Defense and not the Office of the President or the DFA: “There is now more coordination, more collaboration and more communication among partners. Talks are under way to regularize warship transits across the Taiwan Strait, a development that could lead to formal joint military activities between the two neighbors (Taiwan and the Philippines) and thus reshape the strategic calculus in the region.”

The AFP spokesman virtually admitted the presence of elephants in the room which are the United States and its war allies. In an interview with the Washington Post, Defense Secretary Gibo Teodoro openly confirmed that, “It would be hiding from the obvious to say that Taiwan’s security will not affect us,” after endorsing a Japanese proposal to view the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula as a “single theater” of battle.

This was followed by Stratbase (Albert del Rosario) Institute’s hosting of a closed-door online meeting last May 27 focusing on key geopolitical issues in the Indo-Pacific, particularly on the perspectives of China’s recent actions. It was jointly organized by Taipei’s Prospect Foundation, whose chairman Dr. Tan Sun Chen is a former minister of foreign affairs of Taiwan.

Notably, the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office participated, as represented by Michael Lee, a retired lieutenant general in the ROC Armed Forces. On the Philippine side, there were also joiners from our National Security Council and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency.

In reciprocity, Coast Guard Commo. Jay Tarriela and Navy Rear Admiral Trinidad himself, traveled to Taipei last July 2 for a “thumbs-up” meeting with Taiwanese leader Lai Ching-te, that included discussions on countering Chinese hybrid warfare strategies.

In strongly worded letters dated July 4 sent to the heads of the Department of National Defense and the Philippine Coast Guard, Foreign Secretary Lazaro said the two traveling high officials had not acted prudently and dealt damage to our good standing with China, proof-positive that their travel was not cleared and coordinated with the DFA.

Lazaro must be having sleepless nights these days.

Mau Samonte wrote this column for the Manila Times last August 30, 2025.

READ: The China Perspective: ‘No way to stay out of it’ or actively getting involved?https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202508/1340469.shtml

 

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