By Ricardo Saludo

Part Three of 4: A President who is on the bad side of history

Elephant in the room. Or dragon.

That’s one way of thinking about the headline question amid President Donald Trump’s push for peace in Ukraine and the acceptance by the Palestinian Hamas group of a Gaza ceasefire proposal.

Once the United States is no longer occupied with conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, will it resume military confrontation with China?

This unspoken issue must concern Filipinos, most especially senators wary of the pro-America line of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. If Washington is headed for conflict with Beijing, should we continue allowing the US to establish “platforms for war,” as former president Rodrigo Duterte called the nine bases of the Armed Forces of the Philippines opened by Marcos to America in February 2023 under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).

Biden roils Beijing

Even in his first term, Trump waged trade war with Beijing, and he has reignited trade and technology tussles.

More telling, his predecessor Joe Biden geared up for armed rivalry. He escalated forces in Asia, including the Philippines under EDCA. He beefed up alliances with us, Japan, Australia and India, and declared “out-competing China and constraining Russia” as top global priorities in his national security strategy.

Roiling Beijing even more, Washington under Biden elevated Taiwan’s international profile, seeking greater United Nations participation for the self-governing territory. His fellow Democrat, then-House speaker Nancy Pelosi, visited Taipei, and Biden himself toasted the island claimed by Beijing in the 2023 Democracy Summit he hosted.

Plus, Biden thrice declared that America would defend Taiwan from invasion, though White House officials always stressed right after that US law recognized the island as part of China and only pledged to help it defend itself.

Then the Biden regime pulled back from the China confrontation after the Gaza conflict erupted on October 7, 2023. To avoid war in Asia on top of Europe and the Middle East, he and his generals sought and resumed direct contacts with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s military. And now, President Trump aims to further ease tensions, even encouraging President Marcos in dealings with Beijing when the latter visited in July.

Still, the question remains: If Ukraine and Middle East conflicts ease, will the US battle China? — America’s paramount rival for decades to come for many or most Americans, from leaders and strategists to everyday Joes. And hawkish Washington security chiefs are gearing up for war with Beijing — witness plans to deploy more US missile launchers in our country besides nine EDCA sites.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and top US brass have warned of possible hostilities over Taiwan — as early as 2027, said the past two chiefs of the Hawaii-based Indo-Pacific Command (IndoPacom) in charge of American forces from India to the Pacific.

For 2025 and maybe 2026, the Trump regime still seems keen to avoid friction, reportedly even nixing a planned New York stopover by Taiwan leader Lai Ching-te, whose Latin America trip was then canceled.

For now, strained weapons stockpiles make Washington war-wary. In 2023, top US think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) already warned that hostilities just over Taiwan would exhaust America’s precision-guided munitions in a week. Last November, IndoPacom chief Adm. Samuel Paparo said funneling those missiles to Ukraine and Israel impacted the ability to respond to regional conflicts.

Meanwhile, in 2023, CSIS deemed it “unrealistic to expect Russia to ever run out of missiles.” As for China armaments, the Stimson Center, a 36-year-old Washington-based international security think tank, warned just last December in its report “Cratering Effects: Chinese Missile Threats to US Air Bases in the Indo-Pacific” that “Chinese missile attacks could indeed close these runways and taxiways in the critical first days — and even weeks — of a war.”

Early last year, Washington unveiled its National Security Industrial Policy to get US weapons manufacturers on war footing with surge capacity to cope with high weapons use and destruction in conflicts. But the Russian and Chinese defense sectors are way ahead. And US arms production will almost surely prioritize Europe and the Middle East as nations there rearm amid ongoing hostilities.

No-no’s in foreign policy

All that may offer at least two years of peace for Asia if Ukraine and Gaza conflicts end. But US arms production will expand and probably spur hawkish American leaders. So, the Philippines, alone in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) staunchly siding with Washington, needs to seriously rethink if it will continue to let America weaponize us for war with China.

In most of Asean, there is nil risk of being dragged into US-China hostilities. Even in once-war-torn Vietnam with its four no’s of foreign policy — no military alliances, no foreign bases, no siding with one country against another, and no use of threats or force in international relations.

But the Philippines, declared President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., was “a frontline state” as in World War II — and for the same reason: American forces in our country, attacked by Japan in 1941 and now facing off with China.

Thankfully, our foreign and defense policy may be shifting. For one thing, under new Foreign Affairs Secretary Teresa Lazaro, who enjoyed success as our longtime negotiator with Beijing, we are engaging China more. For instance, after much recrimination over the recent collision of PLA Navy and China Coast Guard vessels chasing our coast guard, the incident will be tackled in bilateral talks.

The US missile system being considered for coastal deployment here is far less threatening to China than the Typhon hidden somewhere in the country. The Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) has a 193-kilometer range, one-tenth of the Typhon’s reach and even less than BrahMos projectiles procured from India with more planned. Less threat to China means less friction, too.

As we discern which alliances truly enhance our security — and there are many — three no’s deserve consideration: no involvement in Taiwan conflicts, no nuclear-armed allies and no foreign forces on our soil able to strike without our approval.

To be continued.

This series was first run by The Manila Times.

Postscript by Jude Blanchette and Gerard DiPippo

From Strategic Ambiguity to Strategic Anxiety: Taiwan’s Trump Challenge

Taiwan’s officials are anxious, and rightly so. Taiwan’s strategic dilemma is getting worse.

Beijing is intensifying its pressure on Taiwan, with Chinese fighter jets and naval vessels testing the island’s defenses, while Chinese vessels are implicated in severing Taiwan’s undersea telecommunications cables. At the same time, Taipei faces increasing uncertainty in its relationship with its primary security partner, given President Trump’s previous negative remarks about Taiwan, and the potential for tariffs targeting semiconductors.

The combination of a new U.S. administration and a more assertive China presents Taiwan with a daunting new reality: It must adopt assertive measures to hedge against the risk that the current—or a future—U.S. administration might regard Taiwan’s challenges as a distant concern. Consequently, Taiwan finds itself in a position similar to Europe, compelled to reevaluate its relationship with its historical security patron at the same time that the challenge from its primary adversary intensifies.

In response, Taiwan is taking proactive steps. The government plans to boost its defense spending, is considering how to tackle the trade imbalance with the United States, and the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is committing to new investments in the American semiconductor industry. These measures aim to maintain favorable relations with the Trump administration, prevent potential trade disruptions, and secure continued U.S. security assistance.

However, the critical question remains: Are these steps sufficient?

Improved Resiliency, Lagging Defense

During a trip to Taiwan in. mid-February, we spoke to officials about the island’s national resiliency and defense efforts. Taiwan is taking steps to ensure that its government, economy, and society can withstand a range of threats, both man-made and natural, ranging from maritime blockades to natural disasters. A key driver is President Lai Ching-te’s Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee, which is coordinating across the central government, between Taipei and local governments, and with civil society groups and private industry.

While these efforts are still embryonic, Taiwan now has an institutional framework that positions it to drive future results. It will be important to see how Taiwan tackles pressing risks, such as its reliance on imported energy the vulnerability of the subsea cables linking Taiwan’s telecommunications to the world, the sufficiency of food and resource stockpiles, and the robustness of its cyber defenses in the face of unrelenting attacks from Chinese hackers.

On national defense, progress is unsteady. Despite repeated criticisms within Taiwan and from its external partners like the United States that it needs to do dramatically more to improve its defense capabilities, Taiwan still spends a mere 2.45 percent of GDP on its military. President Lai has recently pledged to get this number above 3 percent of GDP. B

But many in Washington consider this inadequate, given the threat that the island faces. President Trump’s nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Elbridge Colby, stated during his confirmation hearing that “[Taiwan] should be more like 10 percent, or at least something in that ballpark.”

Taipei might argue that its defense budget is large as a share of the total government budget (Figures 1 and 2), and while this is true, it’s important to note that Beijing just announced an annual defense spending increase of 7.2 percent—equal in value to roughly 80 percent of Taiwan’s entire annual defense budget—even though China’s government revenues were flat last year.

In Search of a Trade and Investment Deal with Washington

Like many governments facing the threat of new U.S. tariffs, Taipei is examining what deal it could offer the Trump administration, but the stakes are higher for Taiwan given the importance of U.S. security collaboration. Some of the key goods Taiwan does or could import from the United States contribute to its national defense and resiliency efforts, such as oil, liquified natural gas, coal, or electric generators for power plants. Taiwan also has existing relationships with major U.S. tech firms, which could be boosted.

Semiconductors are likely to remain the key issue, however. Semiconductors and computer components that contain advanced chips accounted for nearly 60 percent of the U.S. goods trade deficit with Taiwan last year (Figure 4). There’s likely no way to substantially reduce the trade deficit as long as Taiwan-based semiconductor production remains dominant, especially given surging demand for advanced chips to power artificial intelligence data centers.

TSMC has already started to produce advanced chips in Arizona. The company’s U.S. investments likely account for most of the surge in Taiwan’s outward direct investment to the United States (Figure 5). As of last year, nearly 90 percent of Taiwan’s approved investment to the United States was in electronic components (semiconductors). But Washington wants more leading-edge chip production in the United States, even though this is unpopular among Taiwan’s public.

TSMC appears willing to comply, with planned new investments of $100 billion in the United States in the coming years, which Trump highlighted as a success in his recent speech to Congress. Given the composition of trade, such investments might be the most Taiwan could plausibly do to reduce the bilateral trade deficit in the medium term. Washington also reportedly wants TSMC to invest in and manage Intel’s fledgling semiconductor foundry business, even though TSMC doesn’t appear interested on commercial grounds.

For the continuation of this article, please click https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/03/from-strategic-ambiguity-to-strategic-anxiety-taiwans.html

Jude Blanchette is the Distinguished Tang Chair in China Research and the inaugural director of the RAND China Research Center. Gerard DiPippo is the acting associate director of the RAND China Research Center and a senior international/defense researcher at RAND.