By Atty. Rafael P. Tuvera

The dispute over the South China Sea has become a testing ground for great power rivalry, with the Philippines caught at the intersection of Chinese assertiveness and American strategic maneuvering. While Manila has every reason to defend its sovereign rights in the disputed area, the method by which it seeks resolution is of paramount importance. Its reliance on military posturing and alignment with the United States’ policy of belligerence towards China risks dragging the country into a conflict it cannot possibly win. Thus, diplomacy, not bellicosity, must be the basis of Philippine foreign policy.

The Dangers of Aligning with America’s Belligerence

The United States’ geopolitical behavior follows a pattern: when confronted with disputes, its first instinct is to use force. Washington resembles a hammer that sees every problem as a nail. Its interventions, whether in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, or Southeast Asia, are invariably defined by militarization. For the Philippines to align itself with such a policy is tantamount to inviting unnecessary peril.

Unlike the United States, which sits safely across the Pacific, the Philippines exists within the immediate range of Chinese and even Russian military capabilities. By subscribing wholesale to Washington’s hardline posture, Manila exposes itself to the frontlines of potential hostilities. It bears stressing that China is a nuclear superpower, and that the Philippines is militarily indefensible against a direct Chinese missile assault. This risk alone should compel our leaders to choose diplomacy over confrontation.

The EDCA Bases as Instruments of Encirclement

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) epitomizes America’s strategy of encirclement against both China and Russia. The establishment of EDCA sites, euphemistically referred to as “lily pads”, is part of a wider American military doctrine that emphasizes flexible, forward-deployed positions. These bases are not truly defensive in nature but are parts of the larger U.S strategy of containing its competitors.

In 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin already sounded the alarm over the prospect of American missile deployments in the Philippines under the EDCA framework. This signals that Moscow views the Philippines not as a neutral regional actor, but as a potential launch pad for American weaponry. By consenting to EDCA sites, Manila unwittingly transforms itself into a legitimate target for both Beijing and Moscow, thereby compromising rather than enhancing national security.

Historical Lessons of Abandonment

History is replete with instances demonstrating America’s unreliability as an ally. When the American takeover of the Philippines was consolidated in the early 1900s, Washington established formidable military installations. These are: Nichols Field (later Nichols Air Base), Fort Mckinley (later Fort Bonifacio), Sangley Point Naval Base, Fort Stotsenburg (later Clark Air Base), and Subic Naval Base. Yet, these military fortifications proved useless in deterring the Japanese invasion of the country in the Second World War. American tactics were also inefficient in halting the Japanese invasion. Despite having prepared for decades, U.S. and Filipino forces were quickly overwhelmed.

What makes this failure even more glaring is that American and Filipino troops under the USAFFE actually outnumbered the Japanese invasion force. General MacArthur commanded around 120,000 soldiers while the Japanese Army under General Homma landed about 50,000 soldiers in the initial waves. This notwithstanding, numerical advantage was squandered by poor planning and the early destruction of American air power at Clark and Nichols.

The most painful lesson came in early 1942 when MacArthur fled to Australia, leaving behind Filipino and American troops to face the Japanese onslaught. Thousands of Filipino soldiers endured the Bataan Death March, only to be later abandoned by the very government that they served. Promises of post-war benefits were largely revoked, a betrayal that scarred countless Filipino veterans.

This pattern of abandonment did not end there. In Vietnam, Washington’s duplicity was explicitly shown. South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, once backed by the U.S., was assassinated in a CIA-backed coup in 1963 when America no longer considered him useful for its strategic designs. A little more than a decade later, America’s withdrawal from Saigon left its remaining South Vietnamese allies to their fate as the North Vietnamese achieved victory.

The 1990s offered another humiliating reminder of American limits. In 1993, U.S. forces, including the “elite” Delta Force, were clobbered by a ragtag Somali militia in the Battle of Mogadishu. The images of dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets forced Washington into a hasty retreat, its forces leaving Somalia with their tails between their legs. This debacle was later immortalized in the film “Black Hawk Down”, underscoring the fragility of American will when faced with determined local resistance.

More recently, the pattern repeated in Afghanistan. The U.S withdrawal in August 2021 was as chaotic as its departure from Saigon in 1975. The world watched images of American soldiers at the Kabul international airport hastily packing their gear while the Taliban calmly waited just beyond the perimeter fence. A persistent rumor holds that the Taliban refrained from moving against the retreating Americans because they were quietly bribed with millions of dollars to let the evacuation proceed. Whatever the truth, the symbolism was unmistakable. Another superpower undone by its own hubris, leaving allies and dependents behind.

In Ukraine today, America is already signaling fatigue and the possibility of disengagement, suggesting once again that Washington’s commitment to its allies is conditional and fleeting.

Taken together, these episodes from the Philippines to Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, reveal a consistent pattern. America’s allies are embraced only when convenient, and abandoned once things become costly and unsustainable. If America’s tactics could not save the Philippines from Japan in 1942, it is folly to think they would save the country against China today.

The Illusion of Deterrence

The advocates of EDCA contend that U.S. military presence deters Chinese aggression. Deterrence, however, is not merely a question of physical presence but also of political will. The historical record shows that the U.S. bases failed to deter the Japanese during World War 2. In the same way, EDCA bases, no matter how numerous or modern, will not deter China or Russia should hostilities escalate.

Furthermore, deterrence presupposes that America would be willing to risk nuclear war on behalf of the Philippines. This is highly improbable. Washington’s main interest is preserving its own homeland security and maintaining its hegemonic position, and not sacrificing itself for an ally. To assume otherwise is both dangerous and foolish.

The Perils of Diplomatic Collapse

The world did not have to wait long for another grim reminder of what happens when diplomacy collapses. In June 2025, Iran and Israel became locked in a twelve-day missile exchange, raining destruction upon one another and dragging the Middle East into the brink of a regional war. The episode underscored the horrors of escalation once channels of diplomacy are abandoned. This resulted in civilian centers being bombarded, increasing the threat of regional instability, and the constant fear of a wider conflict involving major powers. For the Philippines, the lesson is plain. Wars are easier to ignite than to extinguish, and once started, they take on a destructive life of their own.

The Importance of Diplomacy

In view of the foregoing, the Philippines must revise its strategy in the South China Sea. Sovereignty is best preserved not through reckless militarization, but through the application of diplomacy. This does not mean surrendering claims or succumbing to Chinese pressure. Rather, it means exploiting international law, regional partnerships, and bilateral negotiations for the purpose of finding solutions that avert war while safeguarding national interests.

The Philippines has already demonstrated the effectiveness of such an approach. In 1995, after the discovery of Chinese structures in Mischief Reef, then President Fidel Ramos responded not with threats of war but with dialogue. Manila directly engaged Beijing. Although the problem was not permanently resolved, the crisis was defused without bloodshed. This demonstrates that diplomacy can produce advantages without firing a single shot.

America’s “hammer” approach is unsuitable for a country like the Philippines which does not have the resources to absorb the consequences of war. By pursuing diplomacy, Manila signals to both Beijing and Washington that it refuses to be a pawn in their rivalry.

Conclusion

In light of these realities, it is imperative for Philippine leaders to reconsider their present position. Aligning too closely with America’s policy of belligerence towards China risks dragging the nation into a catastrophic war against a nuclear superpower. History shows that U.S. fortifications and tactics have failed to deter enemies in the past, and alliances with Washington have too often ended in abandonment and betrayal. If the U.S. had to bargain its way out of Afghanistan, amid a chaotic retreat tolerated only by the Taliban’s goodwill, it is naive to believe it would stand firm to defend the Philippines against China.

President Marcos, Jr. and his defense officials, namely Secretary Gilbert Teodoro and General Romeo Brawner, must take heed of this reality. The Constitution itself, under Article II, Section 2, categorically declares that the Philippines “renounces war as an instrument of national policy.” This constitutional commitment leaves no room for belligerence as an option. There is, therefore, no alternative but to employ diplomacy as the central means of advancing Philippine interests in the South China Sea. Only through diplomacy can the Philippines truly safeguard its sovereignty while avoiding the fatal mistakes of blind reliance on an unreliable ally.

As the late Henry Kissinger once observed: “To be an enemy of America can be dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal.”

   

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