By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

 

Part 16: An old order gives way to a new one, reshaping global geopolitics

Two weeks before meeting Xi Jinping in Beijing mid-May, Donald Trump hosted Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, for a visit that according to Luke Collin, a principal at the Asia Group, “exposed the shortcomings of America’s Indo‑Pacific strategy.”

In some ways, he said, the meeting was a success as it “produced a few commercial deals and reaffirmed the strength of the bilateral relationship”, but the visit was overshadowed by the Middle East conflict “that was absorbing U.S. attention and resources.”

Zack Cooper, a prominent American policy analyst and national security expert, specializing in U.S.-China relations and Asian security, affirms in Foreign Affairs, that “this gap between stated goals and priorities and its actions exposes a deeper problem in America’s Indo-Pacific.”

Their common denominator published by War on the Rocks, is that Washington’s allies are spending more on defense than at any point in recent decades, but confidence in American leadership and the credibility of its alliance commitments are at post-Cold War lows.

The predictable result has been hedging behavior as partners diversify strategic relationships to manage uncertainty about U.S. reliability and staying power.

In this strategic context, that a return to the pivot’s lofty ambitions of building an enduring U.S.-led political, economic, and security order in the Indo-Pacific is no longer realistic in the short to medium term.

Pivot Away from Asia

When the Trump administration released its National Security Strategy last December 4, 2025, its allies were cautiously optimistic that Washington would sustain its strategic focus on Asia.

While both documents elevated Western Hemisphere concerns, deterring conflict and deepening economic ties in Asia ranked a close second — well ahead of Europe and the Middle East.

The document even declared that “the days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy…are thankfully over.” But six months later, allied expectations crashed as Trump opened and lost another war. …in the Middle East at that, further damaging U.S. credibility.

Collin argued that “the war exposes a gap between the administration’s stated priorities and its actions. If official strategies and policies can be so quickly contradicted by Trump, allies have reason to question U.S. commitments more broadly.”

At the same time, heavy U.S. munitions expenditures- especially of Tomahawk cruise missiles and Patriot interceptors have eroded readiness and the need to replace them will constrain U.S. defense industrial capacity, delaying deliveries. Japan’s order of 400 Tomahawks could now only be completed as early as 2028.

As a result, its war inventory is not expected to settle even in more than five years as severe depletion has been caused by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. The US has not confirmed it but US bases in West Asia has also suffered serious logistical loses to command controls, munitions warehousing, barracks and even air force equipment involving F35s and F15s.

Worst of all, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has driven up energy prices, straining Asian economies while the prospect of long-term Iranian control over the waterway raises serious concerns about the preservation of freedom of navigation and international law in Asia.

Reunification

More aggravating factors followed Trump’s visit to China.

Taiwan’s reunification baby steps may come as early as the next elections in Taipei, as the Kuomintang (KMT) is expected to floor the ruling Democratic Progressive Party and win the presidency.

The tell-tale signs were confirmed by Trump himself when Trump cautioned Taiwan against formally declaring independence from China.

“I’m not looking to have somebody go independent,” the US president told Fox News.

The exodus of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s largest dedicated independent semiconductor foundry, headquartered in Hsinchu Science Park, Taiwan to Arizona cannot be completed in more than ten years.

While this game-changing journey is in the works, Trump added  he was not willing to fight a war 9,500 miles from home.

That also means, despite the much-ballyhooed joint military exercises in the South China, he would not commit boots on the ground in the Philippines, in the event of an actual shooting war.

Shifting math

To remain consistent to its National Security Strategy, however, the US has begun to pass the baton to an Asian country.

The idea was first broached by Richard Nixon in July 1969, also known as the Guam Doctrine, referencing his belief that, rather than the U.S. fighting land wars in Asia, “Asians should fight Asians”. Nixon believed this shift was necessary to prevent the U.S. from being continuously dragged into regional conflicts, such as the war in Vietnam.

It also stated that while the U.S. would honor its treaty commitments, Asian allies would be expected to handle their own ground defense without direct U.S. combat troop involvement.

Its  proxy, however, cannot be the Philippines, its most devoted canine that intensified law fare and information war against China since 2023

There are ongoing discussions in Capitol Hill since the beginning of 2026 but Trump wants to avoid using the term “pullout”.

Worst hit, is the Philippines.

The official version is a series of operational decisions that collectively produce an effective withdrawal of American military utility from the Philippine basing arrangement, even while maintaining the formal legal structure of the alliance.

The enhanced defense cooperation agreement, the EDCA signed in 2014 and expanded in 2023 to include access to nine Philippine military installations, provides the legal framework for American forward positioning in the Philippines.

With the softening of Trump’s attitude towards Taiwan’s independence, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said there is no change in Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity. But the cost to the Philippines is staggering.

That framework remains in place but with an earlier announcement of  a 67 percent reduction in the rotational forces that would result in a suspension of planned construction at the four northern Philippine bases that were specifically selected for their proximity to the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea contested features, and a reduction in annual joint exercise spending from $340 million to $89 million.

These decisions individually are presentable as budget management. The rotational forces reduction saves approximately $420 million annually. The construction suspension delays $1.2 billion in planned capital expenditure. The exercise reduction saves $251 million. Total annual savings approximately $1.87 billion.

That $1.87 billion in savings is purchased at a cost that the administration’s public statements have not yet quantified.

That cost is the effective operational degradation of the military architecture that makes American power projection into the South China Sea credible, and the consequent strategic signal to every actor in the region that American commitments are more contingent than the alliance documents suggest.

Divergent publicity

USNI News, however, is singing a different tune.

The naval institute is bullish that Manila could receive $2.5 billion in U.S. security assistance through the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), marking Washington’s most intensive defense investment into the Philippines since the Cold War.

The Philippine Enhanced Resilience Act (PERA) was passed by the Senate last Christmas eve as part of the 2026 NDAA. Introduced by senators Bill Hagerty (R-Tenn.) and Tim Kaine (D-Va.) in 2024, the legislation seeks to open up $500 million in security assistance annually for five fiscal years in support of Philippine defense modernization efforts and military cooperation between the U.S. and Manila.

The Biden Administration previously committed $500 million in security assistance and deployed drones to the Philippines last year, efforts that the current Trump Administration have doubled down on, with Pete Hegseth upping the ante by opening up $1.5 billion for FY 2026

RAND Corporation’s analysis on improving U.S. posture is that foreign aid may not easily guarantee allied participation during a high-end conflict. In its commentaries on regional security. RAND highlights that the Philippines under the Marcos administration is increasingly focused on the Taiwan Strait, drumming up false starts in the South China Seas under the camouflage of worn-out transparency narrative.

Trump’s recent warming up to China over Taiwan seems to not yet have sobered up the Philippine president on what is impending to be the new normal.

As Marcos become a lame duck towards the end of his term, I doubt if Washington will still deliver on its word.

Surrogation

Constrained by an existential economic crisis at home and the prospect another presidential election, the US now is passing on its obligations to the War in Ukraine to Europe and NATO, and the Middle East War to Israel and whatever remains of it Gulf State alliance.

This begins the surrogation by the US of its hegemonic role in Asia. The pivot to Asia has become a pivot to Japan.

Collin said, “A policy course correction starts with Japan — America’s most strategically important ally in maintaining deterrence, this time expanding along the first island chain, aligned with shared operational concepts, interoperable capabilities, and clearly defined and operationally relevant roles and missions.

To achieve that alignment, the Trump administration should revise its defense guidelines with Japan, a process that would include a comprehensive assessment of regional threats, the division of alliance roles and missions, required capabilities, command‑and‑control arrangements, and force posture.

Critically, the review ought to consider how to integrate U.S.-Japanese bilateral cooperation with other security partners, especially South Korea and Australia.

Finally, the process should be linked to expanded co‑development and co‑production efforts — especially through the nascent Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment Forum – so that new capabilities are effective, interoperable, and supported by resilient supply chains and a diversified defense industrial base.

This is where Pax Silica comes in, an initiative to base in the Philippines, a 4,000-acre industry intended to rival China’s dominance of rare earth elements from mining, refining and actual application production

Revising the guidelines will require significant work and consume alliance bandwidth for an extended period, for purpose in addressing the changing landscape.

Reinvigorating bilateral institutions to revise the guidelines is an essential activity if the U.S. intends its Japanese alliance to remain the bulwark for defending the first island chain.

Trilateralism

The US must also be able to draw South Korea out, without undermining peninsular deterrence.

A more disciplined and holistic approach is required. It must accelerate the transfer of operational control  so that Seoul takes the lead in defending itself against North Korea.

Nokor’s nuclear and missile programs remain a direct threat to U.S. forces and allies, particularly Japan, and should remain central to alliance planning.

The third leg is concerned with repairing the U.S.-Australian Alliance.

On one level, defense cooperation remains strong, as both countries avoided targeted tariffs, and early concerns about the U.S. commitment to the AUKUS partnership were put to rest  when Trump and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met last October.

But Collin observed that relative stability at the top has belied a deeper sense of inertia and strategic drift in the U.S.-Australian alliance — a perception magnified by the sharp decline in the Australian public support for the United States.

The challenge for the Trump administration is to repair and restore Australia’s faith in U.S. leadership, and by extension, a U.S.-Australian alliance focused on deterrence along the first island chain. This process will clarify where both sides should direct their focus and resources.

Takaichi kneels

In realistic terms, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s kneeling before the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Canberra was a highly calculated diplomatic maneuver, acknowledging American surrogation.

It was designed to solidify defense and economic alliances with Australia while projecting humility on the world stage, though it also drew criticism from other countries occupied by Japan during World War II, as “kneeling only to the West”, a performative geopolitical calculation to secure Western support for containing China, rather than a genuine reflection on past aggressions.

This symbolic reconciliation. However, was the foundation for securing major agreements on critical minerals, energy security, and defense pacts (including the procurement of Japanese frigates).

The gesture was seen as a deliberate public relations move to align Japan with Western allies signaling to the U.S. and its partners that Japan is its trusted, forward-looking surrogate leader in Asia.

Conclusion

The cascading effects of the Iran war and Trump’s obsession with burden‑sharing have damaged American credibility and crowded out effective strategy and policy implementation. Key bilateral and multilateral institutional and operational structures are languishing, and public confidence among some allies is slipping.

On the other hand, China’s playbook was written many years ago. China’s response to the American pullout from its Asian pivot is not improvised.

It is the execution of a strategic plan that has been visible in Chinese military and economic behavior since approximately 2012, when the Xi Jinping era began with explicit commitments to recovering China’s historic rights in the South China Sea and building the naval capacity to enforce them.

The island-building campaign in the South China Sea, which transformed seven reefs and shoals into artificial islands with military-grade runways, radar installations, port facilities, and missile batteries between 2013 and 2016, was designed specifically to create strategic depth that makes the South China Sea operationally contested in ways that favor China, regardless of American presence levels.

These installations, are now fully operational military bases 500 to 1,000 kilometers west of the Philippine coastline.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy has expanded from 340 to 395 warships since 2020, surpassing the American Navy’s hull count and building toward a quality equivalence in the western Pacific that the American advantage in global naval reach cannot easily compensate for in a localized conflict scenario.

China’s Type 055 destroyers, of which 11 are now plying the waters, are globally competitive naval combatants that have fundamentally altered the regional balance of naval power from what it was when the EDCA was negotiated in 2014. China’s response to the pullout has been measured and deliberate.

The People’s Liberation Army has increased patrol activity around Scarborough Shoal, the maritime feature that is 220 kilometers from the Philippine coast and has been under Chinese de facto control since 2012 by approximately 40 percent in the 30 days following the American pullout announcement.

These are not provocations. They are measurements.

China is taking precise readings of Philippine and American responses to incremental pressure escalation, calibrating the next step based on the resistance encountered.

It is a technique China has applied consistently in the South China Sea for a decade, and it works because it keeps each individual incident below the threshold that would trigger a formal American military response while cumulatively shifting the territorial reality on the water.

Ironically, Philippine foreign policy seems inflexible and tends to  pivot more in favor of Japan than China.

But with Taiwan’s own pivot to reunification without firing a single shot, what appears is that the West has already conceded the first island chain to China.

Another crucial star for peace.

For Xi Jinping , the strategy is clear: secure the stabilizing gains with the US, consolidate its leadership position of the Global South, while persisting on its responsible, “non-hegemonic” model of global governance in contrast to the US.

   

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