By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

 

Part 6: An old order gives way to a new one, reshaping global geopolitics

Truth to tell, the Philippine claim is the weakest among the protagonists in the South China Sea.

In the race for sovereignty, we have been johnny-come-lately occupying islands in 1971 formalizing it in 1978 with Presidential Decree 1596, creating a box or polygon which we called the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG).

Firstly, the features we occupied were never terra nullius. In recent history control of the Spratlys, for instance, has shifted from occupations originally Chinese, French in the 1930s, Japanese in the 40s and finally Chinese again in the 50s after the Second World War.

Let us not twist history. In fact, Thitu Island which we renamed as Pagasa, was occupied by the Taiwanese but momentarily relieved by its troops who sought refuge in nearby Itu Aba, due to a fierce typhoon.

Secondly, we began staking our claims using force in violation of UN statutes. After the typhoon, the Taiwanese could no longer return to Thitu (Pagasa), because we had already invaded the feature.

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is the primary provision prohibiting the threat or use of force, including the occupation or acquisition of territory. It requires members to refrain from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, making such acquisitions illegal under international law.

Thirdly, the archipelagic intent of KIG was frustrated by the new definition of an archipelago by UNCLOS getting effective 1994 in its Article 47, that in harmonizing our internal statutes with this international law, Presidential Decree 1596 was superseded by Republic Act 9522 that altered the nature of our presence there, no longer as an archipelago but a “regime of islands”.

The rescission of PD 1596 was admitted by our legal representation during the 2013 Arbitration as evidenced in its memorials.

Fourthly, in order to save the day for the KIG, we repositioned our stand claiming a 200 nm exclusive economic zone west of the Philippines deliberately obfuscating the asymmetry between sovereignty and sovereign rights.

Four of the ‘islands’ we are claiming are outside of that improvised delimitation of 200nm. Worse it is a conflicted EEZs that loses the automaticity or exclusivity as claimed by international law poseur expired “asso” justice Antonio Carpio, whose sovereign rights thereto must first be resolved between and among parties in accordance with Article 74 of UNCLOS.

Fifth, Senator Rodante Marcoleta exposed the feebleness of our claim for any regime of islands because they remain without cover as their coordinates, baselines and appropriate charts have so far not been submitted to the UN in compliance with Article 75 of UNCLOS.

We cannot just cherry-pick jurisdiction over features in the South China Sea and must follow internally-accepted norms, especially land sovereignty and whatever territorial seas and sovereign rights it generates.

Sixth and arguably, using domestic legislation such as Republic Act 12064 or the Philippine National Maritime Zones Act in grabbing more territorial seas as component of a phantom ‘West Philippine Sea’, takes us further south onto aggravating an already thorny issue among many disputants.

Seventh, and as matter of illustration as example number one, arrogating territorial sea that belongs to a land territory where China exercises sovereignty since 2012 as in Bajo de Masinloc or Scarborough Shoal.

Seventh, and as example number two, this ghost sea also arbitrarily included a Luzon Sea, providing no justification, and no description. If this body of water suggests the territorial sea limits carved by the 1898 Treaty of Paris, this comes too late, because under the Supreme Court’s over-interpretation of our baselines law, RA 9522, superseded its coordinates as close as possible to our archipelagic coastlines and extent of internal waters.

GR 187167, with expired magistrate Antonio Carpio as ponente, even abused the powers of the judiciary and according to internal law expert and post-doctoral fellow in Copenhagen, amended Philippine Constitutional provisions last held by Republic Act 3046 our old baselines law.

This violation of the Constitution, by no less than the Philippine judiciary must be rectified.

Militarism

Internal legal repairs, starting with Senators Marcoleta and Imee Marcos suggestion in aid of legislation become even more crucial in the face of growing militarism in the world today.

The present government has shown recalcitrance instead of wisdom after being manipulated by dogmatists and oligarchic interests in our society to physically and aggressively “assert” our presence in the South China Sea in order “strengthen” our claims, instead of using diplomacy.

As a result, our military and coastguard have become proxies to the American and Japanese hegemons to bolster their presence in what could be a peaceful and amity waters in the South China Sea. This is a travesty because neither is a coastal state therein, and the United States is not even a member of UNCLOS.

This is typical rules-based, Cold war mentality, which suggests a country foreign not just to the Philippines but to the South China Sea, is meddling in our internal and regional affairs.

Their way or the highway!

We have enrolled into the predicament of a descending superpower, grasping at straws with failure, the United States, increasingly relying on surrogates in Europe, the Middle East and Asia to share the burden of pursuing its foreign and defense policy objectives.

Notably, in Europe it has subcontracted the conduct and financing of the war in Ukraine to the Europeans.

In the Middle East, it has depended on Israel to extinguish regional fires even as that country continues to annihilate the Palestinians and attack other Muslm-dominated states.

In Asia, it expects Japan, India and Australia to be its main backers as the Philippines and Taiwan are being used to counter Beijing.

As of April 2026, Japan is accelerating its defense transformation, moving away from its post-war pacifist stance toward a more active “neo-militarism” that includes record defense spending, the deployment of combat troops abroad, and the acquisition of long-range strike capabilities, including its homegrown Type 25, 1000km range hypersonic missiles and the US subsonic Tomahawk that can be tipped with nuclear warheads. 

On December 19, 2025, a senior official advising Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi indicated that Japan has an estimated 44.4 tons of plutonium stockpile good for 5,500 nuclear bombs. This statement sparked significant backlash, challenging Japan’s long-standing “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”, confirming a burning debate on nuclear armament intensifying within government circles.

2002 DOC

The only hint of sovereignty that we have earned in the disputed waters comes from the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) that ASEAN and China signed in November, 2002. This serves as modum, but is yet non-binding, which is the reason why the Philippines is rushing its elevation to a treaty to become a Code of Conduct (COC).

Marcos, the current rotational president of ASEAN, is again sleeping on his job.

This brings us to eighth reason why we have the weakest claim in the SCS.

We have yet no domestic law naming our claimed island subsets, no coordinates for their proposed delimitation and no detailed submission to reinforce whatever is vaguely referred to in RAs 9522 and 12064 as “regime of islands” which were already clarified as hightide elevations or rocks by the 2015Arbitral Award that are capable of having 12nm territorial sea but not 200nm EEZ.

That prospective law, however, must preclude Chinese-occupied Bajo de Masinloc, if we want to avoid China’s objection to a COC.

Paragraph 5a of the 2002 DOC states that “The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features.”

This provision implicitly suggests de facto acceptance of a claimant’s presence in a SCS feature. This not being presumptuous. Reading the 5b and the entire Section 6 expressly provides not just representation of one’s position but exercising some sovereignty. 

(5b) “Pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the Parties concerned undertake to intensify efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build trust and confidence” to wit: holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between defense and military officials including impending military exercise; ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are either in danger or in distress; and exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant information.

The next section allowed exploring or undertaking cooperative activities, that may include marine environmental protection, marine scientific research; safety of navigation and communication at sea; search and rescue operation; and combating transnational crime.

Sole Objection to China

Ninth. The only argument we have against China is a statement in Paragraph 278 of the Arbitral Award saying the nine-dash line has no legal basis in UNCLOS.

This narrow interpretation of this paragraph deliberately ignores the series of premises which can be summarized in the middle of Paragraph 272, “In particular, the Tribunal emphasises that nothing in this Award should be understood to comment in any way on China’s historic claim to the islands of the South China Sea.”

This carries more weight in the totality of international law because maritime issues are based on land sovereignty and the enforcement of conventions or treaties are mostly based on the principle of state consent, failing which retrogresses to the principle of effective control in customary international law, such as what happened to us when we lost Bajo de Masinloc.

Conclusion

The afternoon of April 22 carried a refreshing note.

The exhibition “A Millennium of Boats: A New Silk Road Chapter – The Balangay and the Enduring Ties Between China and the Philippines” opened at the Bahay Tsinoy Museumin Intramuros, Manila at 32 Anda St. cor. Cabildo.

This special display, presented by National Commission for Culture and the Arts and the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines, focuses on the Balanghai—the ancient Filipino boat—as a symbol of the deep-rooted maritime and cultural connections between the two nations through early trade routes. 

The museum also features life-sized dioramas, rare ceramics, and archival photographs detailing the evolution of the Chinese-Filipino community from pre-colonial trade to their role in modern nation-building. 

Art Valdez, a former Department of Transportation and Communications undersecretary has been rekindling Filipinos’ spirit to rediscover their nation’s maritime skills and culture to prevent being swayed by false claims and help the government assert Philippine sovereignty in the South China Sea.

Explaining his “exploration extraordinaire”, as the Daily Tribune put it, he told the Wednesday gathering keynoted by Ambassador Jing Quan of China, that “government policies may vary from time to time but people-to-people engagements leave a more enduring amity among nations.” 

Valdez is educating Filipinos and other races about the balanhai or balangay, a type of sea craft used by Filipinos’ ancestors to sail from mainland Asia to the Philippine archipelago, proving that Filipinos dominated naval travel in the South China Sea and were more seafarers and shipbuilders than land-based workers.

The sail of the balanghai not only brought ancient Austronesians to our archipelago but traced travels by Rajah Quiling to China during the Song Dynasty and the spectacular tributary journey of Sultan Paduka Pahala to Beijing in 1417 during the Ming Dynasty.

“It is sad to note that Filipinos shipwrights living between these extreme islands lost their craft because the Spanish colonizers discouraged them from building the swift and highly maneuverable Balangay boats from threatening the slow and lumbering Spanish Galleon especially in naval warfare.”

Valdez said his team, which includes the Sama tribe of Tawi-Tawi, worked to replicate the traditional “balangay” excavated in Butuan, Agusan del Sur in 1976.

The three balangays at Victoria Harbor in Hongkong. Proud crew below.

 

Valdez led three balangay replicas Sama Tawi-Tawi, Lahi ng Maharlika, and Sultan Sin Sulu, sailing for a sentimental journey to Hongkong, Guandong and Xiamen on May 2018, reliving people-to-people millennial relations between China and the Philippines from the past.

It definitely inspires the sea between the two countries no longer as poisoned waters of legalese, division and possibly war but understanding, amity and lasting peace.

From weaknesses of past failures to prevailing strength of cooperation towards the future.

Sun rising behind the balangay docked at the Manila Bay.

   

Email: contact@asiancenturyph.com

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/asiancenturyph/

Twitter: https://twitter.com/AsianCenturyPH

Substack:

Also read: