By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

 

Part 36: While the Philippines seeks War, China sees Diplomacy

The Associated Press reported that Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships used water cannons and blocking maneuvers against Philippine fishing boats off a disputed South China Sea shoal, injuring three Filipinos and damaging two boats. 

Liu Dejun, a CCG spokesperson, said that the CCG took necessary control measures against multiple batches of Philippine vessels that deliberately intruded into the waters adjacent to Xianbin Jiao (Sabina Shoal) under the pretext of fishing, despite repeated  stern warnings from the CCG.

The fishermen were said to be aboard indigenous wooden boats, each carrying around 10 to 15 fishermen. There were roughly 300 fishermen on 20 boats that were driven away. The magnitude of this “fishing expedition” proves this was not an isolated case of fisherfolk intending marine catch but a false start baiting Chinese.

The smoking gun is the fact that the operation was conducted in coordination with MV Mamalakaya of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources which is part of the president’s Kadiwa para sa Bagong Bayaning Mangingisda program.

An inquiry must be made if the Department of Agriculture has already joined provoking Chinese maritime law enforcers.

The smoking gun was officially provided by the Philippine Coast Guard showing an official, preplanned, seriously organized and well-funded violation of UNCLOS disguished as “fishing” under the Department of Agriculture. The question now: Is Secretary Kiko Tiu Laurel the new  chief architect of Philippine foreign policy?

To prevent similar incidents from happening again,  first let us first define our terms. The PCG is echoing the “traditional fishing rights” handle that the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources is using.

Firstly, the 2016 Arbitral Award which interpreted the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea for the Philippines, never mentioned “Sabina Shoal” in the context of traditional fishing rights.

The tribunal however explicitly acknowledged our submissions instead that Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc) were traditional fishing grounds, and affirmed that they were indeed used for many generations by many nationalities, including Filipinos and Chinese.

Second there is absolutely no reason why Sabina can be mistaken for Scarborough; besides the spelling difference, neither could there be a confusion geographically. Sabina Shoal is about 75 nautical miles (around 140 km) west of Palawan. Scarborough Shoal is 120 nautical miles (220-230 km) west of Zambales. The distance between Zambales and Palawan is substantial, around 804 kilometers (about 500 miles) by air and sea, that is not less than one hour flight.

Thirdly, no coastal state can unilaterally assert sovereign rights over any exclusive economic zone over Sabina Shoal because it is contested by the Philippines (as Escoda), Vietnam (as Bãi Sa Bin), China and Taiwan (as Xiānbīn Jiāo).

Moreover, the 200 nm entitlement to an EEZ only bestows functional maritime jurisdiction, not “land”sovereignty. The Arbitral Award, also clarified that UNCLOS is not empowered to address any question of territorial or land sovereignty involving Sabina Shoal, and worse, the ruling emphasized specifically – “even the Philippines could not declare archipelagic baselines surrounding the Spratly Islands.” (Paragraph 574).

Thus, the argument that the waters in Sabina Shoal are traditional fishing grounds on the basis of being part of the Philippine exclusive economic zone, is fallacious many times over.

Fourthly, neither can Sabina Shoal be the subject of sovereignty claims, even if it carries the nomenclature “shoal” because it is technically a low tide elevation (LTE) classified as  a coral atoll.

Fifthly, low tide elevations cannot belong to the maritime zone of any claimant state since it falls under the UNCLOS Article 86 as part of “high seas” – “…sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.”

Sixthly, while Article 87 grants freedom of fishing on the high seas, it is not absolute but balanced by duties to conserve resources. UNCLOS requires a treaty, convention or protocol through what it calls “Regional Fisheries Management Organizations” (RFMOs) to set sustainable catch limits (MSY) and protect marine ecosystems, considering dependent species.

“All nations must ensure their nationals follow these rules and obligations, especially regarding highly migratory fish, ultimately promoting optimum utilization and conservation for present and future generations. 

Since there is no protocol existing among claimant states at Sabina Shoal, BFAR and the Filipino fishermen were in violation of UNCLOS, subsequently fair game to any other claimant.

What a responsible Philippine Coast Guard should be preoccupied with is informing the fishing community in the vicinity of Sabina Shoal and elsewhere in the South China Sea that they cannot fish in maritime areas that are not covered by an RFMO without endangering the lives and safety.

It is the PCG’s responsibility to prevent putting our fishermen in harm’s way.  Commandant Ronnie Gil Gavan must not tolerate the use of twisted perspectives and false references to a ghost West Philippine Sea.

The fishermen who got injured in the last confrontation between Chinese and Filipino vessels in Sabina Shoal, would not know any better. Gavan is either ignorant or incompetent allowing the use of an imaginary map and coordinates that have not been sanctioned by the United Nations and published by the International Hydrographic Organization at best, or multilaterally by all affected  claimant states at least.

Instead of acting constructively, the PCG escalates the situation to a blame game instead of a diplomatic opportunity to mend fences and protect our citizens.

Former President Rodrigo Roa Duterte had authorized the Department of Foreign Affairs to establish a continuing Bilateral Consultative Mechanism (BCM). In the 10^th BCM held last January 2025, Beijing and Manila discussed managing South China Sea tensions and agreed on a provisional understanding for resupply missions to Ayungin Shoal. No more untoward incident followed at this location to this day.

Real and true maritime zones

The only areas in the South China Sea that Filipinos can do artisanal fishing are:

1. Territorial seas within 12 nautical miles from our coastlines drawn by Republic Act 9522, our baselines law, which also enclosed our archipelagic and internal waters. (UNCLOS)

• The 12 nautical miles territorial sea (TS) of all our occupied high-tide elevations (HTEs) or rocks in the Spratly Islands by virtue of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct. In the cases where such 12 nm overlaps with the TS of another state, the median principle applies (Article 15) Fir instance, East Pagasa and West Sandy Cay, both rocks, only have 1.5 nautical miles TS each.

• The traditional fishing grounds of Scarborough Shoal, subject to regulations by China who exercise sovereignty over it. (2016 AAward)

• Effective April 2012, in the 13 million hectares of what comprises the Benham Rise east of Luzon islands that has been recognized by the United Nations as the undisputed Philippines’ 118 nautical mile extended continental shelf (ECS) in addition to 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone (EEZ). (United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf) 

• South of the Benham Rise, in the Philippine Sea, we also have a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone east of our Philippine baselines. No other state has contested this. (UNCLOS)

• South of Mindanao baselines, in the Celebes Sea,we also have 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone. No other state has contested this. (UNCLOS)

Can Filipino fishermen fish beyond these artisanal limits?

Yes, but for areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), referring to the high seas and deep seabed outside any country’s territorial waters, but fisheries management organizations engaged in deep-sea fisheries are required to sustainably manage these fish stocks and address the impacts of fishing on marine biodiversity, in accordance with UNCLOS, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, and a range of other conservation-oriented obligations.

Currently, eight such organizations exist: the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR); the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM); the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO); the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC); the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC); the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO); the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA); and the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO).

Recalcitrance at Scarborough

What is more dangerous to our good relations with China, however, is an incident before the Sabina Shoal.

The Peoples Liberation Army organized naval and air forces to track and monitor, sternly warn, and resolutely expel several small aircraft of the Philippines in accordance with laws and regulations after they illegally intruded into the airspace of China’s Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal) in recent days without authorization from the Chinese government.

Senior Colonel Tian Junli, a spokesperson for the PLA Southern Theater Command, said Huangyan Dao is an integral part of China’s territory.

“We sternly warn the Philippines to immediately cease its infringement and provocations. The troops of the PLA Southern Theater Command remain on high alert at all times and will resolutely safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty and security as well as peace and stability in the South China Sea region, Tian added.

Unlike Sabina Shoal that has a tinge of vagueness because of the presence of many disputing parties, Huangyan Dao is a red line when it comes to China.

China has been in effective control of this rock for thirteen years since the Philippines abandoned it following the 2012 PH-CN Standoff.  China has bolstered its position on the shoal when it submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General, its baselines and other supporting documents last December 2024. That manifestation of sovereignty extends to 12 nautical-miles of territorial sea around it.

It is for all intents and purposes, already Chinese territory and that is why it is no longer principally the Chinese Coast Guard on top of it but the Peoples Liberation Army.

Even the Philippine Coast Guard Commodore Jay Tarriela acknowledges this, when he went on social media saying, “Right after the Scarborough Shoal standoff, we totally lost control of Bajo de Masinloc. Since 2012 until now, it’s passing through three presidential administrations, from the time of President Aquino, President Duterte, and now President Bongbong Marcos. It is already an open book that the Chinese Coast Guard has complete control of Bajo de Masinloc.”

In international law, effective control refers to a state’s actual, continuous, and peaceful exercise of state functions and authority (like jurisdiction, administration, and law enforcement) over a territory proving it possesses the power to govern rather than just a legal claim.

In a recent hearing for our Defense budget, Senator Rodante Marcoleta admonished Committee Chairman Sherwin Gatchalian to initiate a revalida of presidential orders and legislations providing for a “West Philippine Sea” that has confused law enforcement and dispatched ghost missions.

The end view  is to arrive at an official and internationally accepted map of the Philippines.

The senator cited conflicting provisions of the National Maritime Zones Act that President Marcos signed on November 2024, with UNCLOS and the Arbitral Award that it simultaneously codified.

That is why in the Lower House Tricom hearing last June 5, I went on record calling it a stupid law.

            I have also called the attention of the Chairperson of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Imee Marcos to conduct an open and unmuffled review of all legislative and executive fiats that has a bearing on land sovereignty (territory), sovereign rights (EEZ), territorial states, total vs functional jurisdiction, baselines vs treaty limits, archipelagic domains vs regime of islands, and other asymmetries, especially as they relate to the UN Convention on the Laws of the Seas and the 2016 Arbitral Award.

            I am hopeful that the 20^th Congress can address this concern, as a lot of Western propaganda has infiltrated our lawmaking that now our government agencies are confronted with having to enforce disingenuous and anomalous laws.

            I urge this with urgency before our politicians’ fixation for ghost territories kills or maims one of our own people.

To be continued.