By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

 

Part 19: An old order gives way to reshaping regional geopolitics

What was an awkward and humiliating experience for an official Philippine delegation, was when Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto “Gibo” Teodoro Jr. and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Romeo Brawner took a detour through a hotel kitchen to exit the 23rd IISS Shangri-La forum in Singapore.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies is Asia’s premier annual inter-governmental security summit, bringing together defense ministers, military chiefs, and security experts to discuss regional and global security issues.

The incident occurred following high-stakes sessions regarding regional maritime disputes as a contingent of Chinese reporters and international media waited outside the main venue exit, preparing to question Teodoro regarding territorial issues in the South China Sea. To bypass the confrontation and evade the working press, the Philippine delegation intentionally rerouted Teodoro through the back-of-house kitchen corridors.

Daily Tribune provides a broader context that the exit incident followed sharp public exchanges during the panel discussion where a Chinese officer asked why the Philippines could not follow the supposed example of Malaysia and Vietnam who, according to the official, have engaged China in dialogue rather than confrontation. The implication was clear: The Philippines was unnecessarily provoking tensions and refusing diplomatic engagement.

Instead of addressing the question foursquarely, Teodoro appeared onion-skinned dismissed the inquiry as “propaganda spiels disguised as questions,” sharply exposing the underlying intent of the inquiries — to distort facts and delegitimize the Philippines’ rightful position. He emphasized that “the Philippines’ actions in the West Philippine Sea are rooted in the defense of its territorial sovereignty and not dictated by foreign influence.”

Wrong answer. China has never questioned Philippine sovereignty over what it submitted with corresponding charts, coordinates and supporting documents before the UNCLOS deadline of May 2009. Teodoro is so after the fact.

The Philippine has not been prepositioning in the South China Seas in defense of territorial sovereignty, but promoting an ambiguity between “sovereignty” and its “asymmetrical claims for sovereign rights” west of the country.

US spox

The defense secretary, further stumbled by reiterating that the country’s maritime policy is not about choosing sides in a geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States, but rather, “it is about upholding a rules-based international order, especially in light of China’s unlawful and sweeping claims represented by the infamous nine-dash line, which was invalidated by the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling in The Hague.”

Teodoro was obviously aping American lines of argumentation. Rules-based international order (RBO) is not international law.

As a former bar topnotcher, it was inexcusable that he does not know that international law refers to a set of rules and principles that govern the conduct of states in their relations with one another. It is a system of rules that are binding on states and are designed to promote peace, security, and cooperation among nations.

On the other hand, a rules-based international order refers to a broader concept that encompasses not only international law but also norms, institutions, and practices that guide the behavior of states in the international arena.

While international law provides a legal framework for states to interact with one another, a rules-based international order goes beyond legal obligations to include informal norms and practices that shape the behavior of states.

According to Foundation of the Leiden University Journal of International Law, RBO is the “United States’ alternative to international law, an order that encapsulates international law as interpreted by the United States to accord with its national interests, ‘a chimera, meaning whatever the US and its followers want it to mean at any given time’.

“Premised on ‘the United States’ own willingness to ignore, evade or rewrite the rules whenever they seem inconvenient’, the RBO is seen to be broad, open to political manipulation and double standards.”

There are several reasons that may explain why the United States prefers honing its behavior after a ‘rules-based international order’ instead of invoking international law.

First, the United States is not a party to a number of important multilateral treaties that constitute an essential feature of international law. It is not a party to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which means that it is compelled to reprimand China for threatening the ‘rules-based international order’ in the South China Sea rather than international law.

It is not party to a number of fundamental treaties governing international humanitarian law, to the extent that these rules are not considered by the United States to be part of customary international law.

Second, the United States has placed interpretations on international law justifying the use of force and the violation of international humanitarian law that are controversial and contested.

Its interpretation of the right of self-defense to allow pre-emptive strikes and the use of force against insurgents and militants characterized as terrorists are widely disputed such as the 1999 bombing of Belgrade, the use of force in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011, the denial of prisoner-of-war status to Taliban soldiers detained at Guantanamo Bay following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, the use of drones in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen to kill suspected terrorists, and of late the unprovoked bombing of Iran.

Third, the United States is unwilling to hold some states, such as Israel, accountable for violations of international law. They are treated as sui generis cases in which the national interest precludes accountability.

This exceptionalism in respect of Israel was spelled out by the United States in its joint declaration with Israel on the occasion of President Biden’s visit to Israel in July 2022, which reaffirms ‘the unbreakable bonds between our two countries ‘to combat all efforts to boycott or de-legitimize Israel, to deny its right to self-defense, or to single it out in any forum, including at the United Nations or the International Criminal Court’.

RBO way or the highway?

Using RBO as lame point of departure, Teodoro had the gall to invoke the 2016 Arbitral Ruling on the nine-dash line.

This ruling has no effect on international law, but only on the participating parties, because it was a voluntary arbitration that the Philippines called on China, and worse a procedure where China did not participate. State consent is a sine qua non in international law.

When the ruling in Paragraph 278 said the nine-dash line has no legal basis in UNCLOS, it considered only maritime issues.

Paragraph 272 preempted this by not precluding China’s historic rights to land sovereignty: “Finally, because the Tribunal considers the question of historic rights with respect to maritime areas to be entirely distinct from that of historic rights to land, the Tribunal considers it opportune to note that certain claims remain unaffected by this decision. In particular, the Tribunal emphasizes that nothing in this Award should be understood to comment in any way on China’s historic claim to the islands of the South China Sea.”

Since maritime issues are based on land sovereignty, precedent historical treaties as late as the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China signed September 29, 1972 (novating Japan’s surrender to the Republic of China in the Treaty of Taipei of 1952) presumes China has sovereignty over all land features in the South China Seas.

UNCLOS is not a complete or a self-fulfilling document. Since other coastal countries such as Vietnam in 1956, the Philippines in 1978, Malaysia in 1979, Brunei in 1984 have staked their own claims. Taiwan’s claims are of course a duplication of what China claims. This is why UNCLOS provided for conflict resolution that is a structured process designed to resolve disputes concerning interpretation or application of the Convention.

• Peaceful Resolution: States are encouraged to settle disputes through negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration. If no resolution is reached, parties may opt for voluntary arbitration outside the convention’s framework which was what the Philippines resorted to in 2013.
• Binding Procedures: UNCLOS provides a tiered system for resolving disputes, including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), arbitration under Annex VII, and special arbitral tribunals under Annex VIII for technical matters.
• Enforcement: UNCLOS does not provide direct enforcement mechanisms. Non-compliance can lead to diplomatic and political pressure, and possible referral to the UN Security Council for enforcement measures.
• Objectives: The system is designed to balance the rights and duties of coastal and landlocked states while ensuring the protection of the marine environment and the sustainable use of maritime resources. It aims to maintain international peace and security in the maritime domain and to uphold the rule of law at sea.

Expansionist PH ambitions

          Himself engaging in propaganda, Teodoro further asserted that China’s maritime behavior — ranging from aggressive coast guard maneuvers to the installation of artificial features within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone — “has led to a massive trust deficit”. He argued that meaningful dialogue is not possible when one party continuously undermines the other through coercion and unilateral actions.

          But as I earlier pointed out, China never opposed our submissions to the United Nations before May 2009 pertaining sovereignty over our archipelagic baselines and our sovereign rights to Benham Rise. What China filed a diplomatic protest on, in November 2024 were provisions in the National Maritime Zones Law, or Republic Act 12064 where the Philippines turned a blind eye on subsequent historical alterations brought about by the Scarborough Standoff of 2012 and engaged in unilateral actions by legislating expansive maritime delimitations beyond our May 2009 submissions, violating the 2002 Declaration of Conduct between ASEAN countries and China, in creating as “West Philippine Sea” out of phantom features. In brief, summarized:

• The Philippines lost Bajo de Masinloc, or Scarborough Shoal to China’s effective control three years after its inclusion in the 2009 Republic Act 9522 or the Philippine Baselins Law, thus it has been under China’s sovereignty since 2012.
• A fictitious Luzon Sea, assumably out of treaty limits that have been superseded by the new baselines law Republic Act 9522.
• A Kalayaan Island Group that has been repealed by the same Republic Act as an archipelago in compliance with UNCLOS Article 47 and reclassified as a “regime of islands” under UNCLOS Article 121(3), confirmed by the 2016 Arbitral Ruling in its Paragraph 574.
• and worst, a 200 nautical mile “exclusive economic zone” west of the Philippines, which is currently disputed by four parties, namely Vietnam, Malaysia, China and Taiwan” whose entitlements and delimitations has yet to be resolved according to UNCLOS Article 74.

I just wonder, did the Maltese dog eat his homework?

In Senate hearings, Rodante Marcoleta correctly points out that the these features have not satisfied Article 75 of UNCLOS by the Philippines, requiring “(1) the outer limit lines of …the lines of delimitation… be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position (and that 2) the coastal State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”

This deficiency aggravates the lack of conflict-resolution that has led the compass and sextant of Philippine enforcement boats to be often lost at sea, often encroaching in the coordinates of other coastal states. To prove this point, how many times have the Philippine Coast Guard trespass the 12 nautical mile territorial sea of Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) under the guise of distributing supplies to Filipino fishermen within the area.

China respects, tolerates but regulates the activities our fishermen in those traditional fishing grounds, but does not allow law enforcement of any other coastal state to trespass, patrol and lord it over there as that is not just in violation of UNCLOS Article 17 on innocent passage and Article 38 on freedom of navigation and overflight, but an intrusion into its effective control over the area, ipso facto customary international law.

On the part of the Chinese, they have complied with required submissions of charts, coordinates and other pertinent documents to the United Nations as far back as December 2024. The Philippines cannot make such submissions because the only cartography it has to support its vague claim over the feature is a 1734 Murillo Velarde map peddled by former magistrate Antonio Carpio that has served no use but a symbolic mural in some government offices and an administrative map publicized last year by the National Mapping Research Information Authority, with a “West Philippine Sea” edit, but whose usefulness is limited only to the governance of the archipelago.

Single-issue secretary

When Chinese military delegates asked whether the Philippines was acting as a proxy for the United States, Teodoro lost his balance firmly asserting that the primary issue blocking productive dialogue was a major “deficit of trust” stemming from China’s words against “its aggressive actions in the West Philippine Sea”.

This deficit of trust narrative is a Teodoro classic, but he has never once substantiated it with acceptable premises citing formal expectations, punctuated by his avoidance of the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism (BCM) set up by both countries to enforce the 2002 Declaration of Conduct between ASEAN and China.

This reckless assertion caught the ire of Chinese Embassy spokesperson Ji Lingpeng calling Teodoro’s comments a “typical case of biting the hand that feeds you.”

Ji argued Teodoro’s comments show a “disregard for the Filipino people’s welfare and bilateral relations,” accusing the defense chief of prioritizing political intrigues over public interests, and actions that could harm mutual trust.

What baffles China is that despite providing real help to the Philippine people, including vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic, fertilizer donations amid a global shortage, helping build major infrastructure projects, delivering immediate disaster relief whenever the Philippines was hit, offering soft long-term loans and being the Philippines’ biggest trade partner, the defense secretary seems detached from his surrounding reality and locked in a single issue of maritime disputes.

Of course, China will never understand Teodoro because he himself does not know what he wants. Have you heard of any reasonable request our secretary of national defense has asked his Chinese counterparts ever since he assumed office? All we hear from him is buying and promoting the fallacy that we can strengthen our claims in the South China Sea by physically asserting them.

Even his concept of diplomacy is remedial and not proactive.

Teodoro supported President Marcos’ attempts to disregard established protocols between China and the Philippines since 1999 regarding peaceful routine resupply of humanitarian needs of our soldiers stationed at BRP Sierra Madre that President Estrada grounded in Ayungin Shoal, just to show-off to the Americans, the missions deteriorated from challenges, to shadowing to use of water cannons  and lasers to actual blockades and ramming that almost triggered armed confrontation between the Chinese and Philippine navies.

It was only the sober intervention of Foreign Affairs Secretary Teresa Lazaro, that brought the Chinese to the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism table to return to the peace protocol status quo ante. 

Teodoro is again detached from reality as he argues that China’s actions in disputed waters is eroding confidence among neighbors, unaware that all other ASEAN state has moved north with China and its Belt and Road Initiative, while only the Philippine has retrogressed as an ally of the United States. The loyalty of the Philippine government to the US made its economy worst hit especially as Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, with prices of fuel hitting double at its peak and settling at 50% higher at the present interim.

I am citing this example because during the Shangri-La Dialogue, Teodoro mentioned that “settlements among rivals like Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia are possible when parties trust each other and avoid exploiting their counterparts”. I wish he were more specific because I do not know of any.

What I know is that these countries are not as sensitive about trespassing their positions as China is. In fact, these countries do not even regularly patrol around their claimed features because China policing the waters. Other than China, it is only the Philippines with its puny fleet that forays from south of Palawan to north of Batanes in order to enforce its assertive transparency initiative with the US Naval Institute, an agency of a state whose coast is 10,000 miles away and who is not even a member of UNCLOS.

That is not even mentioning the counterproductive showing of the Philippines as the phallus of the United States and it regional allies. But what is highly incongruent is Philippines inviting France to actively join direct, large-scale war exercises in the South China Sea while maintaining regular security presence with other European powers—specifically the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands – by conducting freedom of navigation joint patrols.

Marcos Jr and he have also to learn it the hard way that the South China Sea is not among the first two categories covered by the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, and that China would be remain resolutely professional in restraining itself only to non-lethal weapons in responding to Philippine provocations, a matter that does not meet the third category of the MDT about “armed attack”.

Inutile that he is, I can only surmise that Teodoro expects the Americans and its kennel to come to the succor of the Philippine side every time he would cry wolf. Insiders sat the secretary may be also hoping that his canine devotion would merit himself being installed as Marcos Jr’s successor in the event of a US rules-based regime change.

To be continued.

Next: Teodoro replaces Tarriela as American pointer dog

   

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