By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

 

Part 15: Is it worth saving a weak, incompetent and utterly corrupt president?

As the Social Weather Station indicated a devastating “Negative 3%” net trust rating of President Bongbong Marcos, Commissioner Rossana Fajardo struck a double whammy by resigning  from the Independent Commission for Infrastructure effective December 31, 2025.

The November 24 to 30 numbers of the Social Weather Station, released December 27, showed a distrust level of 41% over a trust of 38%.

Net trust in Marcos declined in all areas, but the President experienced the biggest declines in Metro Manila, where he scored -8 in November from +11 in September, and in Mindanao, where he scored -37 from -21. His net trust was at +18 from +22 in Luzon outside of Manila and -7 from -1 in the Visayas.

Appointed last September, Commissioner Fajardo, said in her letter:

“I have completed the work I set out to accomplish when I was appointed. Throughout my tenure, I have developed comprehensive approaches for evidence gathering, prepared detailed work plans, and supervised volunteer efforts in investigations.”

Fajardo said she believes that the investigative and prosecutorial responsibilities will now return to other agencies, such as the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman which from the very start, are better positioned to ensure accountability for contractors and government officials.”

This bolsters ICI’s existence as an added toothless bureaucracy that does not only waste time but taxpayers’ money.

This was reinforced by Assistant Ombudsman Mico Clavano who responded to her resignation admitting that the ICI does not have any immunity from possible retaliatory lawsuits, which can expose them to possible charges, especially its high-ranking officials.

However, I debunk Clavano’s inference that this development follows a “natural flow of things,” which recklessly infers that ICI ensured a quick and reliable fact-finding and investigation to fill in an interregnum between the end of Samuel Martires’ term as Ombudsman in July 27, 2025and President Marcos’ appointment of Jesus Crispin Remulla on October 7, 2025,

This is a mockery of the institutional nature of the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutional and career body, that doesn’t cease operating because it has no pilot.

Obviously, Clavano is sucking up to Remulla, his new boss.

Moreover, he is insulting President Marcos Jr, as incompetent and the root cause of the delay for not having anticipated a given eventuality.

He is also exposing and confirming that it was Remulla himself who sat for more than two months on his duties as Secretary of Justice who commands the vast powers of  the National Bureau of Investigation and the National Prosecutorial Service, in order to lobby to fulfill his ambition to be the next Ombudsman vice Martires.

In fact, this explains why ICI’s role has been questionable since it was created. It is a problem for a pre-existing solution.

Mayor Benjamin Magalong was first to smell something was rotten when he resigned his advisory role before the ICI could even grow legs.

A few months after, more recriminations surfaced as one of ICI’s commissioners, Rogelio Singson also resigned, this time more forthcoming to reveal the true state of the body.

• Lack of Resources: The ICI had no adequate staffing, funding, or basic supplies, forcing personnel to work as volunteers and use personal laptops.
• Budget Discrepancy: Singson claimed the P41-million budget cited by Malacañang never reached the commission, existing only in name or news reports.
• Inadequate Powers: The commission needed stronger backing and more powers, beyond its initial executive order, to effectively investigate corruption which he said ought to be focused on high-level officials rather than “small fries”.

Lacson’s contradictions

Meanwhile Senate Pro-Tempore Panfilo Lacson said Fajardo’s resignation underscores the urgent need to pass a measure creating an Independent People’s Commission (IPC) that will institutionalize the ad hoc work of the ICI.

This is lame argumentation. What the presidential ICI experiment has proven is the opposite –  the solution lies in a functioning Ombudsman, supported by the vast investigative and prosecutorial powers and functions under the Department of Justice.

Existing laws and institutions can serve the issues. Moreover, appropriations have already been fattened in the 2026 general appropriations bill (GAB) that just passed the bicameral  conference committee, to enable the Ombudsman and the DOJ meet public expectations for substantial investigations and swift filings with the appropriate courts.

The IPC theory will only delay bringing the corrupt government officials and their cohorts to justice.

It will take another two years for any IPC to function properly. The legislative path, its signature by the president into law, generating it implementing rules and regulations, vetting for and appointing commissioners, staffing, housing, providing for office furniture and equipment, because no appropriations for it has been earmarked in the 2006 budget.

On top of it all, I am not a lawyer, yet I know Congress may legislate “contempt powers”, for enforcement agencies including the issuance subpoenas and maintaining order, but when it comes to extending the application of “immunity from suit” to a new body it creates, I doubt it.

Immunity from suit is a sovereign right of the State that only the Constitution can recognize. My readings indicate that Congresscan only legislate to waive or abrogate it under specific circumstances, in other words, IPC may need a constitutional amendment.

Vista’s viewpoints

One of my favorite legal bloggers is Anthony Ludalvi Vista who has extensive experience in the Philippine judicial system having served in the Sandiganbayan, with the Special Prosecutor and the Office of the Ombudsman. He is now connected with Shim Law in Calgary, Canada.

Vista called attention to a statement by House Deputy Minority Leader Leila de Lima , saying that Fajardo’s leave “can very well be the end of the ICI.”

He noted that recent and ongoing developments have drawn attention not only to the future of the commission, but also to what it had actually achieved. They raised a basic question: after the publicity, the hearings, and the announcements, what concrete results reached the courts?

Vista went back to basics, first reviewing what the ICI was supposed to do:

“The ICI was created to show that the government was serious about addressing corruption in infrastructure projects, especially flood control projects. The idea was that putting experienced legal and public officials together in one body would lead to faster and stronger cases.”

But he explained, “the commission was never designed to prosecute cases. It had no role in trials, no duty to defend cases once filed, and no responsibility when cases failed. Criminal prosecution already belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman, whose prosecutors are trained to handle cases against public officials from investigation up to trial.”

This setup allowed the ICI to be highly visible, while legal responsibility remained elsewhere, he said.

From the start, Vista acknowledged there was pressure to act quickly. The public expected immediate results, and the commission was expected to deliver visible action in a short time:

“Because of this, cases were pushed forward even when records were incomplete or still needed careful review. Audit findings were not always fully checked against technical and engineering reports. Normal verification steps were shortened. Speed became more important than careful case preparation.

“Quick movement created the appearance of action, but it also reduced the time needed to examine who was truly responsible and whether cases were strong enough for court.”

Vista said, “public announcements played a large role in the ICI’s work. Allegations were discussed openly and widely shared on social media long before cases were ready for court. This created strong public attention. Once names and projects were mentioned publicly, expectations were already set. At the same time, attention shifted toward maintaining public interest rather than quietly strengthening the legal foundation of cases.”

Public discussion made it look like accountability was already happening, even while the legal work was still unfinished, he said.

Case buildup

Vista qualified that building a corruption case is detailed and technical work. Prosecutors must identify who approved projects, who released funds, who benefited, and whether actions were done in bad faith or through serious neglect. Each charge must match the law exactly. Each person’s role must be clearly explained. If even one required part of a crime is missing, the case becomes weak. This is the kind of work prosecutors do every day inside the Ombudsman system.”

When this work is done outside a prosecutorial setting, mistakes are harder to catch early and easier to fix later without addressing deeper responsibility, he added.

Vista cautioned, when cases finally reached court, serious problems became clear. Pieces of criminal information filed before the Sandiganbayan were defective:

“In simple terms, the facts written in the charges did not fully support the crimes being accused. Some required elements were missing or unclear. These are not minor errors. Courts can dismiss cases for these reasons alone. Because of this, prosecutors from the Office of the Special Prosecutor had to amend and correct charges after they were already filed.”

This shifted attention away from accountability and toward repairing paperwork, he quipped.

Visa continued, “the same problem appeared in the administrative cases. Some complaints were copied from an earlier and unrelated case. They did not describe the actual duties or actions of the officials involved in the flood control projects. Administrative cases must be specific to each situation. Because the charges were wrong, they had to be corrected only after the officials were already asked to submit their defenses.

“This delayed proper review and weakened the focus on what actually happened.”

No cohesive approach

Vista said this resulted to selective accountability as not all individuals involved in the projects were included in the cases. Some people were excluded or given immunity. This narrowed the scope of responsibility. Instead of showing the full chain of decisions, the cases focused on a smaller group. Attention moved away from how large decisions were made and toward isolated acts that were easier to explain.

“Although many projects were reviewed and publicly discussed, only one ICI-related flood control case has been clearly identified in public records as having been filed before the Sandiganbayan. This case involves the Oriental Mindoro flood control project.”

Vista clarified that the single filed case involves a project that exists, is not yet completed, and is still under warranty. This matters because the project can still be corrected or completed. The government still has contractual remedies. The case does not involve a project that was paid for but never built.

Such cases are harder to prosecute and easier to defend, he added. Defenses such as good faith, future completion, or warranty repair were easy to raise.

Beyond this case, there have been no publicly reported arraignments, pre-trial orders, or trial schedules linked to other ICI-flagged projects. Later announcements referred to other projects as being “referred” or “under evaluation,” but without visible court action that could be independently confirmed.

The gap between public announcements and court proceedings became noticeable.

He lamented that stronger cases existed but were not pursued first. This shaped the overall outcome.

Ghost projects—where money is fully paid and nothing is built—are usually easier to prosecute. The loss is obvious and visible.

These cases were not the main focus. Instead, attention centered on a project that was still ongoing and fixable. This choice limited how far accountability could go.

The Department of Justice also became involved in discussions about restitution, or the return of money. This shifted focus toward settlement rather than full determination of responsibility. Decisions about restitution affect criminal liability and should be handled by prosecutors within the Ombudsman system, not by outside agencies.

Vista clarified that within the Ombudsman system, decisions on restitution belong to the Office of the Special Prosecutor. These decisions require careful judgment about timing, intent, and legal impact. When restitution discussions happen early or outside prosecutorial control, attention moves from proving wrongdoing to closing issues quickly.

The analytical precision of Anthony Ludalvi Vista, especially his wholistic and enlightened view of the prosecutorial system, qualifies him to be recalled from Canada by the next president of the Philippines, and installed as the next Ombudsman.

To be continued.

   

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