By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

 

Part 35: Where the Philippines seeks War, China sees Diplomacy

Zachary Cooper of the American Enterprise Institute wrote on X that Southeast Asia was “almost completely absent” from the national security strategy of the United States, and highlighted its formal treaty ally the Philippines “isn’t even mentioned.”

The document, typically released once each presidential term focused on the Western Hemisphere, drug trafficking and stemming migration, which outlined his foreign policy priorities and echoed the Monroe Doctrine asserting U.S. influence and military buildup in the Caribbean, significantly against oil-rich Venezuela.

It  also took a swipe at the science behind global warming as it called for a return to American energy dominance, and suggested Europe is in decline and pledges to end the war Russia started in Ukraine.

Trade war

China took center stage. This latest strategy arrives at a time of heightened U.S.-China tensions—with disputes over Taiwan and the South China Sea and the global race for artificial intelligence dominance. Its release also comes as Trump seeks to build on his high-profile October 30 meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, where he progresses toward a deal to end the ongoing trade war.

(After making us abandon our independent foreign policy and pitting us to play with fire with the dragon, Trump elopes with China to repair its own foreign policy.)

“If America remains on a growth path—and can sustain that while maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing—we should be headed from our present $30 trillion economy in 2025 to $40 trillion in the 2030s, putting our country in an enviable position to maintain our status as the world’s leading economy,” the strategic paper said.

It called for Washington to muster its partners to provide an answer to Chinese loans in the developing world, much of which has been distributed under the aegis of the trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative. China has recycled perhaps $1.3 trillion of its trade surpluses into loans to its trading partners but the U.S. and its allies “have not yet formulated, much less executed, a joint plan for the so-called Global South,” the document added.

First island chain

On the s1ecurity front, the strategy used strong language, without naming China, of stressing the need to maintain U.S. military dominance in the so-called first island chain (a string of territories spanning from South Korea to Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines and Indonesia) that the Pentagon considers critical to containing Chinese forces in the event of a conflict.

Taiwan remained perhaps the most concerning potential flash point. “This will interlink maritime security issues along the first island chain while reinforcing U.S. and allies’ capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan or achieve a balance of forces so unfavorable to us as to make defending that island impossible,” it continued.

Without naming Beijing outright, the document also raised concerns over the country’s expansive moves into the South China Sea, the trade-heavy waterway where it has territorial disputes with its neighbors, neither naming the Philippines. The document called for stronger investment in military, particularly naval, capabilities and cooperation with governments in the region “to keep those lanes open, free of ‘tolls,’ and not subject to arbitrary closure by one country.”

China’s response

The only viable way forward for relations between China and the United States is to gain from cooperation and lose from confrontation. The principle of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation is the right way for the two countries to get along and is the only realistic choice, . Guo Jiakun, spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry, told reporters.

“China stands ready to work with the U.S. to maintain the steady development of the bilateral relationship and at the same time will firmly defend our sovereignty, security, and development interests,”

            Guo also addressed Taiwan, which was listed in the Trump administration document as a major security priority, and reiterated China’s sovereignty claim over the self-ruled island, a semiconductor hub, and major recipient of U.S. weapons sales – “The Taiwan question is at the core of China’s core interests and is the first red line that cannot be crossed in China-U.S. relations,” as he called on Washington to “stop conniving with and supporting Taiwan independence forces.”

The U.S. officially opposes unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait but maintains a longstanding policy of “strategic ambiguity,” leaving it unclear whether Washington would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of an attack.

Trump and Xi secured concessions that lowered the temperature of U.S.-China ties after months of tit-for-tat trade tensions. Yet the two sides remain at odds over a number of structural differences, including a military rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region.

The US president is expected to travel to China in April at Xi’s invitation for another round of face-to-face talks.

Cooper’s essay

What particularly called my attention, however, was Zack Cooper’s yellow flag that while the document discussed tensions in the South China Sea and emphasized the need to maintain U.S. military dominance across the first island chain, analysts noted that it did not mention the Philippines.

“China is by far the biggest focus in Asia (and elsewhere). Trump team clearly seeing all of Asia through the lens of China. Southeast Asia? Almost completely absent. US treaty ally Philippines isn’t even mentioned! Pacific Islands also nowhere to be seen,”

Cooper is an AEI senior fellowwho specializes in U.S. strategy in Asia, focusing on defense, alliances, U.S.-China competition, and Chinese economic coercion, also serving as a professor and podcast co-host. He researches and comments extensively on Indo-Pacific security, information warfare, and strengthening democratic alliances against autocratic influence.

The former White House and Pentagon staffer sees that dreams of a fully united American and European front toward China are over. His essay that appeared in the website of the American Enterprise Institute, examines how best to do so by assessing the constraints inhibiting cooperation on China strategy and then identifying specific opportunities for policy convergence in the economic and security domains.”

Cooper continues on , “the United States has traditionally treated Europe as a source of power that could be drawn upon to help address global challenges. Although leaders in Washington, Brussels, and other European capitals often did not see eye-to-eye, they still found ways to coordinate responses on China across a wide range of issues.

“But as the unipolar moment fades and leaders in Washington contemplate retrenchment from overseas commitments, the Trump administration has come to see Europe as a power drain rather than a force multiplier. Some American officials have even urged European counterparts to focus on the continent, rather than getting distracted by activities in the Indo-Pacific.”

He said that this new way of thinking comes just as Europe’s willingness to follow America’s lead on China is waning. In some capitals, Washington is now seen as even more unpredictable and coercive than Beijing. In other capitals, leaders are understandably preoccupied by their own security concerns related to Russia. China’s actions in Asia are more important in Washington than in Brussels, for understandable reasons.

First, as the world becomes more fragmented and multipolar, the United States and European countries are likely to find that cooperation will be more issue-specific. Although there is still potential for Washington and Brussels to work together, China will have many opportunities to drive wedges between the two when transatlantic interests diverge. Cooper views the possibility of a major break in the transatlantic alliance is lower now than it was at the beginning of 2025, but Trump’s unpredictability will push many in Europe to hedge against a downturn in relations with Washington.

In some capitals, this will make cooperation with China attractive on certain issue sets, despite American leaders’ protestations. As a result, Beijing will find that wedge issues can sometimes push the United States and Europe apart, unless the two carefully coordinate their approaches.

Second, Cooper points out that neither the United States nor Europe has an internally unified approach to China. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have expressed heightened concern about Chinese behavior in recent years, but they have yet to develop a strategy with broad-based political support. Any China consensus that previously existed in Washington has been severely tested in the second Trump administration’s first year. Trump’s worldview, however, mow appears to reflect a spheres-of-influence logic, in which the United States should give China greater latitude in East Asia. Others in his administration appear to favor retrenchment, withdrawing U.S. forces from abroad to focus more on homeland defense.

Cooper  thinks Trump administration is unlikely to articulate a single strategy, but rather embrace elements of spheres of influence, retrenchment, and prioritization strategies at different times and on different issues. Similarly, European approaches toward China vary dramatically depending on the capital one visits and who holds power. As a result, cooperation is likely to be episodic, depending significantly on the leaders directing key polices at any given moment.

Third, as the United States and Europe increasingly focus on their own individual interests, they are likely to prioritize different issues vis-à-vis China. Security considerations in Asia are foremost for some in the Trump administration, particularly related to Taiwan. Conversely, China’s support for Russia is the top China-related security issue for many in Europe.

Meanwhile, Cooper is convinced economic issues may be most European policymakers’ prime concern, given the impact that China’s industrial policy is having on a range of critical European industries. Against this backdrop, Washington’s coercive economic policies and its insistence that Europe increasingly fend for itself against Russia will impede a great deal of cooperation. This implies that transatlantic cooperation on China will require trades across different issue areas.

Fourth, according to Cooper, even in the economic arena, cooperation will be challenging due to transatlantic tensions over trade, tax, and technology policies. The United States and Europe have more in common economically than they do with China. But the current perception that both Washington and Brussels are taking advantage of each other will hamper cooperation. Therefore, the United States and Europe will be suspicious of one another’s intentions regarding China, and efforts will need to be made to minimize these disagreements over time.

Cooper’s prognosis

Taken together, the AEI senior fellow says these constraints suggest that cooperation between the United States and Europe will likely be issue-based, episodic, economically focused, and often guarded. This is not a recipe for a straightforward partnership.

Cooper adds, consequently there is a real risk that the United States and Europe will become increasingly disconnected on China strategy in the years ahead. Discord between Washington, Brussels, and other European capitals—plus the unfortunate reality that the second Trump administration does not have a unified China strategy—will impede efforts at cooperation.

Nonetheless, aligning transatlantic policies toward China remains critical. In this long-term systemic competition, it is vital that the United States and Europe show that democracies can deliver results at home and public goods abroad. Although they may differ on specifics, countries on both sides of the Atlantic share an overall goal in this regard.

He clarifies that observations and recommendations are not intended to obscure the scale of the challenge that lies ahead, but rather to highlight what can be done despite these challenges.

Read: EDCA sites, Taiwan’s frontline https://tribune.net.ph/2025/11/27/scuttlebutt-415

Read: Takaichi’s latest in long string of controversies

https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20251209/p2a/00m/0na/008000c

Conclusion

From the Philippine perspective, however, it remains crystal clear not to rely on the United States and its white allies not knowing when they can put their act together. Even holding a war for thirty days for another liberation in the case of an outbreak of war, as President Marcos has ordered his military chief-of-staff Romeo Brawner Jr. is ridiculous.

The US national security strategy, however, explains why a heavier onus is being unloaded by the United States on the shoulders of Taiwan and Japan.

Now I understand why out of nowhere, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, an independent U.S. congressional body. Is urging Taiwan to assume the fiscal responsibility for the American bases in the Philippines under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which are actually under the US Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE).

The triangular offsetting arrangement will obligate Taiwan to shell out cash to the Deep State, and in turn the US military industrial complex delivers modernization equipment and supplies to the Philippines, which the Philippines  in turn covers with a long-term IOU in the form of foreign military credits in favor of Taiwan.

This also explains why Japan’s militarist Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi also told the Japanese Diet  that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could be considered a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, potentially triggering a military response from the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.

In her doing her own “Monroe Doctrine”, Takaichi not only torpedoed China-Japan diplomatic relations, but cause the cancellation of over 500,000 tourist arrivals to Tokyo this Christmas, that is expected to cost sayonaraland a damage of at least $9 billion, in addition to the loss of 37 out of 47 prefectures of their seafood exports to various destinations in China.

Takaichi has also resurrected a frozen dispute over Russia-held islands north of Hokkaido, while stirring upthe nationalist sentiments of the Okinawans in the Kingdom of Ryukyu, an island chain between Taiwan and Japan, which was held by the United States after the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco and turned over to Japan under the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement as Senkaku, as the United Nations recognized the Peoples Republic of China as the sole government of China.

Japan formally annexed them as Okinawa Prefecture in 1879during the First Sino-Japanese War, ending the independent Ryukyu Kingdom and its tributary status with China. This became a touchy issue because it is not consistent with the 1943 Cairo Declaration mandating the restoration to China of all territories stolen by Japan from it. This was once of the sly reasons why the United States disinvited both the Republic of China (under Chiang Kai-shek) cand the Peoples Republic of China under Mao Zedong were disinvited from the Treaty of San Francisco.

These miscalculations, I predict will not only hastened the peaceful reunification of Taiwan to China but accelerate the birth of a new Ryukyu nation in northeast Asia.

As for the Philippines, we must find our way back to peace and diplomacy with China, enroll into its Belt and Road Initiative and with that expanded market, seek our country’s own industrialization.

To be continued.

   

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