By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

 

Part 3: Rebutting Dissensions from the Supreme Court’s Retirement Gallery

A quick disclaimer by erstwhile Honorable Reynato Puno that a widely-circulating position paper of the Philippine Constitution Association has not been authorized by its board, made me embargo its corresponding rebuttal I scheduled for today.

That was quick, intelligent and prudent for a former chief justice of the Supreme Court who is now chairman of Philconsa, because Speaker Martin Romualdez is awkwardly the president of the association and nothing it can say would be two-cents worth.

The hated First Lady of the Republic is also a Philconsa member.

Moving forward, we have shifted our attention from the “unauthorized statement” to the news report that Congressman Joel Chua, one of the assigned House prosecutors has recommended the inclusion of an open letter from the University of the Philippines–College of Law in their motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s ruling that the impeachment of Vice President is unconstitutional.

Actually the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth is that in throwing out the fourth complaint endorsed by 215 lawmakers, the SC decision – penned by Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen – argued that the first three impeachment complaints filed against Duterte on December 2, 4 and 19, 2024 were “deemed initiated” but “terminated and archived” on February 5, the same day that the fourth was passed by the House.

As the Philippine Constitution mandates that only one impeachment complaint may be filed against the same individual within a one year period, the highest court ruled, “no new impeachment complaint, if any, may be commenced earlier than February 6, 2026.”

If your mind cannot understand that, your damn brains must be full of Spanish guisantes.

UP Law professors

On August 1, 2025, individual members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law, expressed grave concern on the Supreme Court ruling, asserting:

“…Impeachment in the Philippines has existed as a mechanism of political accountability. It is a process formerly described by the Court as even “purely political. With its unique moral underpinnings, impeachments are decided only upon the simple question of whether a high public official should continue to be entrusted with public office.”

I sense a bit of a crack at the juncture as they added:

“In this light, decisions in impeachment are products of political and moral judgment, not strict legal analysis. The correctness of those decisions is not ordinarily reviewed by a higher court for errors of law and fact, but by the sovereign Filipino people via the ballot box.”

There is a bit of irony here. The person that has been impeached by 215 members of the House of Representatives was elected by 32 million voters, the highest vote any individual has received in the history of Philippine elections.

Mention of morals sends tingles to my spine when nowhere in their paper did the UP faculty members footnoted Congressmen Toby Tiangco and Duke Frasco’s expose that each of these 215 have been bribed P150 million each by Speaker Martin Romualdez, totalling P32 billion of an programmed taxpayers’ money.

Coverup by legalese

To support the foregoing the UP professors engaged in simplistic analysis, as it claimed “the Constitution made it clear that the House has the “exclusive power to initiate,” and the Senate the “sole power to try and decide,” “all cases of impeachment”, in order to bolster its allegation that the highest court over-judicialized the process—”by laying out evidentiary and court-like procedures for Congress, even at the early point of initiation—will permanently change impeachment’s nature.”

The problem with this narrative is that even in the application of the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review, the UP faculty members misread the jurisprudence it cites and remains blind to the fact it is Congress that has committed a grave abuse of discretion.

“We believe that Congress simply relied on the rule set by the Court in Francisco v. House of Representatives12 and Gutierrez v. Committee on Justice that initiation by the House consists of the filing of a complaint and its referral to the proper committee. This could not be an abuse of discretion, much less a grave one.”

The legal roundtable of the Asian Century Philippines Institute for Strategic Studies, who is led by Atty. Arnedo Valera, a member of the Philippine and New York bars, however, disagrees with this disagreement. “

We assert that “Restoring Accountability” by select members of the UP College of Law misapprehends both the constitutional architecture and judicial precedent governing impeachment in the Philippines.”

It erroneously asserts that impeachment is purely a political process beyond meaningful judicial scrutiny, and thereby challenges the Supreme Court’s rightful exercise of judicial review in Duterte v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 278353 (2025).

While impeachment is indeed a political mechanism, it is not immune from constitutional limits.

In Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 (Nov. 10, 2003), the Philippine Supreme Court held that judicial review may be exercised even over impeachment proceedings, particularly when constitutional boundaries are breached.

As Justice Carpio himself stressed in that decision, “[t]he power of judicial review is not suspended simply because a political process is involved.”

Similarly, in U.S. jurisprudence, while Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), held that the Senate has the “sole power to try” impeachments, the U.S. Supreme Court did not foreclose review over jurisdictional or constitutional violations at the threshold. This aligns with the doctrine in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that it is emphatically the duty of the courts to say what the law is.

Filed and referred

The Court emphasized: “An impeachment proceeding is deemed initiated when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.”

This doctrinal formula—filing plus referral—is not a casual observation. It forms part of the ratio decidendi of the case, and is thus binding precedent.

To now suggest that “transmittal alone” suffices contradicts both the language and spirit of that ruling, and represents a limited reading that detaches initiation from referral.

The operative word the Constitution uses is the modal verb “shall”.

In the practice of law, “Shall is an imperative command, indicating that certain actions are mandatory and not permissive. This contrasts with the word “may” which is used to indicate a permissive provision, implying some degree of discretion.

Was the first complaint verified? Yes. Was it endorsed by a member of Congress? Yes. Was it formally received by Congress? Yes through its secretary-general.

What is clear as daylight is Article XI Section 3:

“(2)… which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three sessions days thereafter.

“The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.”

So what did the House of Representatives do to the first, second and third complaints? The SC had the decency to ask but the Congressmen chose not to reply.

Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled the commonsensical logic that they was “deemed initiated” but “terminated and archived” on February 5, the same day that the fourth complaint was passed by the House.

Now because the Constitution also provides:

“(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year”,

consequently, thirteen (13) magistrates ruled unanimously that “no new impeachment complaint, if any, may be commenced earlier than February 6, 2026.”

Essential and mandatory

Hence, the basic procedural safeguards expressly provided for by the Constitution, are not optional

The UP professors have also alleged that “…while Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution requires the “rights of persons appearing in, or affected by” legislative inquiries “shall be respected,” no similar rule applies in Article XI, Section 3 on impeachment.

Thus, impeachment has never required the observance of due process that applies to administrative proceedings: the impeachment trial is itself the due process.”

Their claim that due process is alien to impeachment misreads Article XI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.

The phrase “verified complaint” and the prescribed procedural thresholds (1/3 vote to bypass committee hearings) are not mere formalities but are constitutionally mandated safeguards against tyranny of the majority.

As reiterated in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459 (Feb. 15, 2011), even the internal rules of Congress must conform to the Constitution when fundamental rights or procedures are implicated.

No bearing on the separation of powers

Moreover, contrary to the implication of the UP statement, the Supreme Court’s decision does not violate separation of powers.

Rather, it reinforces it.

Separation of powers is not a locked mechanism as it requires Constitutional accountability. Judicial review precisely serves as the constitutional check when Congress oversteps its bounds.

In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), the Court emphasized that the Constitution is the supreme law, and no branch may act beyond its limits under the guise of political discretion.

The faculty members also alleged “We express our conviction that Congress is constitutionally vested with high prerogatives and thus deserves the appropriate deference in its procedures and in the conduct of impeachment. At the very least, given the House’s reliance on two decades of precedents and practices, any new rules should be prospective in application,” the statement read.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Duterte v. House of Representatives is not an affront to accountability but its vindication. Judicial review ensures that impeachment remains a constitutional—not arbitrary—tool of public trust.

To assert otherwise invites not only the erosion of procedural fairness but the weaponization of impeachment for political expediency, undermining the very democratic institutions the authors claim to defend.

Let us remember: constitutional supremacy is the lifeblood of accountability.

Without it, impeachment devolves from an instrument of justice to a blunt tool of factional power. # 

Wisdom of the practitioners

Where the academe narrows, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines threw its full weight behind the Supreme Court calling its ruling as a defining moment for the rule of law and a stern reminder that no public office is beyond accountability.

The IBP said the Court’s decision in Duterte v. House of Representatives is not just about impeachment or judicial review, but about safeguarding the very architecture of Philippine democracy — “where power is limited, roles are defined, and accountability flows through process.”

“This is not a power grab by the judiciary, but fidelity to the Constitution — a legal order that binds those who govern and empowers the governed. We defend that order.”

The IBP, the country’s largest organization of lawyers, affirmed that the Supreme Court’s role as the final arbiter of constitutional questions includes determining the limits of impeachment — even when it involves politically explosive cases.

“In recognizing the Court’s authority to interpret constitutional limitations, even on matters as politically charged as impeachment, we do not diminish the exclusive power of the House of Representatives. We dignify it,” the IBP statement read.

Warning against insolence

The IBP also issued a warning against efforts to stir public defiance of the Supreme Court’s ruling, calling such acts “a dangerous erosion of legal order.”

“Disagreement with the Court’s reasoning is part of democracy. But to incite repudiation of its authority, or to call for outright defiance, undermines the very foundations of our legal institutions,” it added.

“Every adverse ruling cannot become an invitation to disobey. The law must not become the first casualty of dissent.”

The integrated bar took aim at leaders and institutions that disregard legal remedies in favor of populist outrage.

The IBP stressed that defending due process is not simply about preserving institutions — it is about upholding the sovereign will of the people, the true source of power, to whom all leaders must ultimately be held accountable.

“The Constitution does not require agreement. It demands adherence.”

To be continued

   

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