by Daniel Long

 

“Lest I sound unpatriotic for striking a discordant note in a strident anti-China chorus, let me clarify what I understand by patriotism. It simply means standing for the national interest. This is not the same as supporting our government’s foreign policy even when it is wrong.”

— Professor Francisco “Dodong” Nemenzo Jr., Ph.D. (09 February 1935 – 19 December 2024)

In a news forum last Saturday (June 7), National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea (NTF-WPS) spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela said the next Philippine leader must not be somebody “who is going to set aside our fight in the West Philippine Sea.”

“Ito ang dahilan kung bakit we need to reach out to increase awareness more para siguraduhin natin ang Pangulo ng 2028 is not somebody who is going to set aside our fight in the WPS at sasabihin ulit walang kinalaman sa sikmura ng Pilipino ito, magkakagiyera (there will be war) at mangangakong magje-jet ski,” he said, seemingly alluding to Vice President Sara Duterte’s plan to run for President in 2028, mocking former President Rodrigo Duterte’s 2016 campaign joke to ride a jetski to the West Philippine Sea and plant the Philippine flag, and trivializing the primary concern of Filipinos which is hunger.

Before anything else, I would like to disclose that I am not a lawyer, nor do I claim to be an international law expert. The views I present in this article are guided not by Chinese sources, but by two highly respected Filipino academics: the late Dr. Francisco Nemenzo, professor emeritus of political science at UP Diliman and the 18th president of the University of the Philippines (UP) from 1999 to 2005; and Walden Bello, former Akbayan Partylist representative in the House of Representatives, an international adjunct professor at Binghamton University, and professor of sociology and public administration at UP Diliman. Their relevant articles include Dr. Nemenzo’s “Fishing for Trouble in the South China Sea” and Bello’s “Duterte Is Right to End the U.S.-Philippine Military Exercises” (The New York Times, 2016) and “China, US Must Both Stop Destabilization” (Inquirer, 2021), respectively.

I am a Filipino who believes that the West Philippine Sea is the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines, holding primacy in fishing rights and oil exploitation. This claim is legally grounded in Administrative Order No. 29, which names the West Philippine Sea; Republic Act No. 9522, the “New Baselines Law,” which established Philippine sovereignty over the Kalayaan Island Group and Bajo de Masinloc (also known as Scarborough Shoal); and Republic Act No. 12064, the “Philippine Maritime Zones Act,” which enshrines into law the western side of the Philippine archipelago, including the territorial seas of Bajo de Masinloc, and the maritime features of the Kalayaan Island Group as part of the Philippines’ maritime zones. However, I believe the West Philippine Sea still lacks ASEAN and international recognition – a necessary element for full sovereignty – since the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), the UN body responsible for charting and naming the world’s seas, continues to use the name South China Sea.

I do not agree with China’s sweeping claim that 80% of the South China Sea is part of their “internal waters.” I condemn all aggressive actions – such as armed attacks, water cannon use, island seizures, and vessel collisions – in the area undertaken by ourselves and other claimants: the Chinese, Vietnamese, Malaysian, Bruneian, and Taiwanese. However, I understand these incidents as normal occurrences in the context of a territorial and maritime dispute. I align with the view of U.P. Professor Nemenzo, who says, “Physical occupancy is the only ground for claiming sovereignty, not ancient maps, diaries, and broken pottery. The Chinese cannot claim a territory just because they had been there centuries ago. Since they did not establish permanent settlements in these tiny islands, the Spratlys and the Paracels properly belong to the ‘world’s commons.’” Still, I say we must not oversimplify the issue or lose sight of the bigger picture. I believe we should not let our territorial disputes with China define the entirety of our bilateral relations. Malaysia and Vietnam also claim the same areas yet continue to maintain strong cultural and business ties with China. We should strive for de-escalation by promoting friendship, encouraging diplomacy, and seeking a peaceful resolution to the issue.

To set the record straight: under President Duterte, the Philippines did not lose any of its claimed territories in the Spratlys. He ordered the repair of the runway at Pag-Asa Island, had the surrounding waters of Scarborough Shoal reopened to our fishermen in 2016, and renamed Benham Rise as the “Philippine Rise” in May 2017. In 2021, Masinloc Mayor Arsenia Lim refuted claims that China was harassing Filipino fishermen in the shoal. Joeffrey Elad, Chairman of the Tropical Fish Gatherer Association in Zambales, testified in a May 2024 congressional inquiry that fishermen were actually able to fish freely during Duterte’s presidency. Sandy Cay was never lost under Duterte – to this day, it remains unoccupied by either China or the Philippines, as both countries are signatories to the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration of Parties, which forbids occupying new disputed island territories.

Under President Duterte, no Chinese serviceman boarded a Filipino vessel, no Filipino soldier lost his thumb, and there were no monthly water cannon incidents. He established the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, which fostered diplomacy and constant dialogue, resulting in relative peace in the West Philippine Sea. The “gentleman’s agreement” between President Duterte and President Xi was intended to ensure peace and stability in the South China Sea. The arrangement to send only humanitarian supplies to our BRP Sierra Madre outpost in Ayungin Shoal existed long before Duterte’s presidency, as confirmed by former Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin in 2013. Additionally, our two countries reached a memorandum of understanding for a 60-40 joint oil and gas venture in the Reed Bank, consistent with UNCLOS’ (UN Convention for the Law of the Sea) Article 123, which calls for shared development of living and non-living resources among semi-enclosed South China Sea claimants.

Vice President Sara Duterte sensibly addressed her silence on the West Philippine Sea dispute in August 2024, stating that she follows the Philippine Constitution, which provides for an independent foreign policy. She affirms that the “West Philippine Sea” is firmly anchored in UNCLOS and the 2016 arbitral award registered at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).

She further explained, “Bilateral relations are not governed by a single issue, like a territorial dispute, but rather by a comprehensive approach that considers the broader context of shared interests and regional stability. While silence on specific harassment issues may be perceived as a lack of response, it is essential to recognize that such decisions are made following established mandates and the particular responsibilities of relevant agencies. As a reserved officer of the AFP, I sincerely appreciate the sacrifices made by uniformed personnel in service of the national interest. It is crucial to avoid politicizing their sacrifices for media mileage.”

In an interview last May, VP Sara said she is “pro-Philippines,” taking the nation’s side over China’s. It would do Commodore Jay Tarriela some good to research before cheating the public about Sara’s track record, as she is the most trusted and approved top government official and consistently tops surveys of 2028 presidential hopefuls. Based on the results of the 2025 midterm elections, China-friendly senator Rodante Marcoleta ranked #6, while local absentee voters (LAV) such as law enforcement personnel, police, military, and soldiers – voted overwhelmingly for Duterte’s senatorial candidates who advocate for peace. The rank and file, who would actually be on the frontlines of a war with China, soundly rejected the hawkish policies of the Marcos regime.

Sara will definitely fight for the WPS, but on mature Filipino terms – not for American interests. She will certainly pursue ASEAN centrality, aiming to restore the region as a “Zone of Peace, Neutrality, and Freedom” and a “Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone.” Sara’s view that the Philippine claim is firmly anchored on the 2016 arbitral award is well-founded. While Paragraph 298 of the ruling declares the “nine-dash line” of China and Taiwan invalid under UNCLOS, Paragraph 207 clarifies that this drawing is not even the basis of China’s claims in the South China Sea. In fact, Paragraph 272 explicitly states that the award should not be “used in any way” to suggest that China’s historical claims to the area have been invalidated. Paragraph 805 notes that Scarborough Shoal is a “traditional fishing ground” shared by fishermen from China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Above all, Filipinos must heed the award’s often overlooked wisdom in Paragraph 1198: “The root of the disputes presented by the Philippines in this arbitration lies not in any intention on the part of China or the Philippines to infringe on the legal rights of the other, but rather – in fundamentally different understandings of their respective rights under the Convention in the waters of the South China Sea.” Thus, demonizing China and inciting Sinophobia among the public is not a productive way to resolve the dispute.

First and foremost, we must disabuse ourselves of the mentality that the Americans will back us up in fighting for the West Philippine Sea. They did nothing when the Chinese and Vietnamese built artificial islands and military bases in the area. They only issued strongly worded statements when our vessels were water-cannoned by the Chinese during resupply missions to Ayungin Shoal. Their mediation in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff resulted in its falling into Chinese hands in the first place. To be clear, as Professor Walden Bello observes, the Philippine interest is in fighting for the livelihood of our fishermen and the continued occupation of our island territories, while the American interest is ensuring their warship presence in the region and using us as a proxy to contain China’s rise – not to promote diplomatic attempts at resolving the disputes.

Retired Admiral Harry Harris Jr., former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, admitted as much in May 2024, saying, “We don’t recognize the territorial claims that the Philippines has, even those claims in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. Those at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal – those islands are contested space, so we don’t recognize sovereignty over them.” The 2025 US Annual Threat Assessment Report, released in March by the U.S. Intelligence Community, doesn’t even use the term “West Philippine Sea” and refers to our claimed areas as disputed. The official US legal view, outlined by then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1975, is that the “legal interpretation of MDT (Mutual Defense Treaty) commitments” is that they “do not apply in the event of Chinese attack on the Spratlys or attack on Government of the Philippines forces stationed there.” Kissinger viewed the Spratly Islands as not being Philippine territory. “U.S. Government maps accompanying the presentation of MDT also exclude the Spratlys from territories covered by the MDT.”

What explains the US involvement in an Asian sea dispute despite being thousands of miles away? It is its “Pivot to Asia” foreign policy, which involves shifting naval assets from the Middle East to Asia to contain China’s peaceful rise, militarily encircle it, and block its emergence as the primus inter pares of the region. Professor Nemenzo explained it well: “China dreads the prospect of America policing the area” because it “is a major industrial power” whose “foreign trade is now crucial to its economic life.” He points out that China’s trade with Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe passes through the South China Sea. “Freedom of navigation in this trade route is therefore a matter of survival” for China. Before this US policy, there was relative peace among the various ASEAN claimant states and China, anchored by the 2002 Declaration of Parties. Since China views the “Pivot to Asia” as a US attempt to contain it, they took steps to “fortify the islands it controls and build military structures on unoccupied islands” in the Spratlys. Professor Nemenzo rejects the view that “the current tensions in the South China Sea are due to China’s aggressiveness,” stating that “China’s muscle-flexing is a response to a US challenge, not the trigger of discord.” With the 2014 EDCA agreement to restore five de facto US bases in the Philippines and the 2023 expansion of four more under Marcos 2.0, China sees the Philippines as a willing agent of the US defense strategy and not pursuing its own national interests.

How then would an Asian solution to the dispute look? Professor Bello points out that it is “the fear of military encirclement by Washington that is driving China’s behavior” in the West Philippine Sea. He understands that China is acting defensively, not offensively. Bello describes China’s actions as simultaneously “unjustifiable and understandable.” He explains that Beijing’s decision to place surface-to-air missiles on its occupied territories in the Spratlys is part of a defensive strategy to “ward off a potential US attack.” Thus, Beijing will only cease its defensive aggressive actions in the South China Sea if and only if the Americans withdraw. Bello says the Philippines and ASEAN should not only work to finalize the “Code of Conduct” to set a framework for all claimants’ behavior in the South China Sea but also propose a “demilitarization agreement.” This would call for reciprocal military withdrawal by the two superpowers: China would return Scarborough Shoal to the Philippines and dismantle its military bases on its occupied artificial islands in the Spratlys, while the US would withdraw its 7th Fleet of nuclear-armed attack submarines and aircraft carriers in the area; and EDCA military bases (all rent-free) and the Typhon Missile System (the only one in ASEAN) in the Philippines.

Professor Bello concludes by saying, “Filipinos and Chinese are both Asians, separated by colonialism, imperialism, the Cold War, and the continuing external hegemonic forces in the region. It is time for both sides to commit to bridging that separation, no matter how difficult the process might initially be.” He may be a dreamer, but he is certainly not the only one. As we celebrate Filipino-Chinese Friendship Day, let us remember that the Philippines and China have been neighbors, friends, and family for a thousand years. Together, we can grow in the Asian Century through win-win cooperation in trade, culture, people-to-people exchanges, and tourism. China has lifted over 800 million people out of poverty in the past four decades, accounting for 75% of global poverty reduction. Let us reject war, promote peace, and encourage diplomacy and dialogue with China – learning from their success to improve our country’s living conditions. May the future of Asia be determined by Asians, not Westerners.

   

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