Part Two of Three: Secrets Government Keeps from Our People
The US Army Pacific “successfully” deployed last April 11, 2024, its Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile system, also known as the Typhon Weapon System, on an undisclosed place in northern Luzon, putting mainland China and Taiwan in striking distance.
Wittingly or unwittingly, President Bongbong Marcos has also placed the country within striking distance of not just China, but of North Korea.
Typhon is a land-based, ground-launched system that improves the military’s multi-domain capability. The launcher can fire the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) which is supersonic interceptor with an operational range of 240 kms for ships and 370 kms for incoming missiles, and the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), whose Block II-N version has a maximum range of more than 240km (150 miles) and 2,500km, respectively.
It is the first time that such a weapon system has been deployed in the Asia-Pacific region since the 1987 US-Soviet Union Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty prohibited the development and possession of land-based missiles ranging from 500km to 5,500km.
Xi Jinping must protest this move and demand the US remove this dangerous provocation from Philippine soil just as John F. Kennedy made Nikita Kruschev withdraw its missile build-up in Cuba in the 1960s.
Otherwise, this might serve as an open invitation for North Korean Kim Jong Un to be a participant in the South China Sea disputes.
Tomahawks are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It used to be launched from airplanes and naval ships, but the Typhon enables a land-based launch. It is slow and subsonic, but it is a long-range, all-weather, jet-powered, low altitude attack missile that can go from 1,100 to beyond 2,500 kilometers, able to reach Guangzhou in China and Pyongyang in North Korea.
On the other hand, the SM6 is basically a defensive interceptor up to 370 vertical kilometers that can also be used as a high-speed missile against ships 240 miles away.
At Mach 3.5 (1.2 kms/second) it provides capability against fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, anti-ship cruise missiles in flight, both over sea and land, and terminal ballistic missile defense.
I couldn’t care less for saving the American and Chinese face here, and it is irrelevant that the Philippines can hardly afford to buy Tomahawks and SM6s (each costing $4 million or about Php230 million a shot) for launch by Typhons.
Preemptive Attack
This is not deterrence but an invitation for trouble.
Actually, an actual armed attack is not even necessary.
The Philippines, more specifically, the EDCA bases, would become prime targets for retaliation or preemptive attacks because of the mere existence of US military assets even if there is no substantial presence of foreign boots on the ground here.
Melissa Loja, a senior research fellow at the Integrated Development Studies Institute and an expert on international law, said that the EDCA has created a “security dilemma” for the Philippines. She said under the agreement, the Philippines has no right to inspect, much less demand permission for the positioning of weapons.
“The same threat to our country would still exist, because the US can preposition weapons in (any location) and magnet a counterstrike (or instigate) preemptive strike from any of the elements of the United States,” she added.
Under this scenario, Loja said that the presence of US military weapons means the Philippines can no longer be considered a “neutral state” and will become a legitimate target in an international conflict.
According to Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University Anthony C. Arend, in his paper “International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force” published by the Washington Quarterly, preemptive strike is “the use of military force in advance of a first use of force by the enemy”- it is a first strike in anticipation of receiving an attack from an opponent in the near future.
The United States has been notorious for using this excuse for attacking many countries around the globe. Foremost of which is the attack on Iraq for fictitious “weapons-of-mass-destruction”.
While the United Nations Charter expressively forbids the use of military force in international relations with aggressive war declared illegal following the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, the exception in principle is in cases of self-defense, a state is not obliged to suffer the first blow of an attack before it may be permitted to respond.
What does this mean? A state (China or North Korea) may launch an attack preemptively against another (the Philippines) if it perceives there is an imminent threat (coming from the American EDCA bases).
North Korea is less than 2,500 kilometers from EDCA sites in Cagayan Province.
Kruschev-Kennedy face-off
After the failed American attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, red-faced U.S. President John F. Kennedy. officially authorized on November 30, 1961, Operation Mongoose, an extensive campaign of terrorist attacks against civilians, and covert operations to be carried out by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in Cuba.
In order to deter any future invasion attempt by the US, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev reached a secret agreement with Cuban premier Fidel Castro to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, eight months after.
After US intel discovered evidence of a general Soviet arms build-up on Cuba, President Kennedy issued on September 4, 1962, a public warning against the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba.
That did not stop the Russians. On October 14, a U.S. U–2 aircraft took several pictures clearly showing sites for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba.
Kennedy summoned his closest advisers to consider options and direct a course of action for the United States that would resolve the crisis. All the Joint Chiefs of Staff—argued for an air strike to destroy the missiles, followed by a U.S. invasion of Cuba while some favored stern warnings to Cuba and the Soviet Union.
The President decided on a mid-course. On October 22, he ordered a naval “quarantine” of Cuba. The use of “quarantine” legally distinguished this action from a blockade, which assumed a state of war existed; the use of “quarantine” instead of “blockade” also enabled the United States to receive the support of the Organization of American States.
That same day, Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev declaring that the United States would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba, and demanded that the Soviets dismantle the missile bases already under construction or completed, and return all offensive weapons to the U.S.S.R.
That very evening, the President also went on national television to inform the American people of the developments in Cuba, his decision to initiate and enforce a “quarantine,” and the potential global consequences if the crisis continued to escalate.
The tone of the President’s remarks was stern, and the message unmistakable and evocative of the Monroe Doctrine: “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.”
A series of direct and indirect communications ensued between the White House and the Kremlin throughout the remainder of the crisis. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a military readiness status of DEFCON 3 as U.S. naval forces began implementation of the quarantine and plans accelerated for a military strike on Cuba.
On October 24, Khrushchev responded to Kennedy’s message with a statement that the U.S. “blockade” was an “act of aggression” and that Soviet ships bound for Cuba would be ordered to proceed.
That day and the next, some ships turned back from the quarantine line; others were stopped by U.S. naval forces, but they contained no offensive weapons and so were allowed to proceed. Meanwhile, U.S. reconnaissance flights over Cuba indicated the Soviet missile sites were nearing operational readiness.
With no apparent end to the crisis in sight, U.S. forces were placed at DEFCON 2—meaning war involving the Strategic Air Command was imminent.
On October 26, Kennedy told his advisors it appeared that only a U.S. attack on Cuba would remove the missiles, but he insisted on giving the diplomatic channel a little more time.
As the crisis reached a virtual stalemate, that afternoon, however, the crisis took a dramatic turn. ABC News correspondent John Scali reported to the White House that he had been approached by a Soviet agent suggesting that an agreement could be reached in which the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba if the United States promised not to invade the island.
While White House staff scrambled to assess the validity of this “back channel” offer, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a message the evening of October 26, which meant it was sent in the middle of the night Moscow time.
It was a long, emotional message that raised the specter of nuclear holocaust, and presented a proposed resolution that remarkably resembled what Scali reported earlier that day. “If there is no intention,” he said, “to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.”
Although U.S. experts were convinced the message from Khrushchev was authentic, hope for a resolution was short-lived.
The next day, October 27, Khrushchev sent another message indicating that any proposed deal must include the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. That same day a U.S. U–2 reconnaissance jet was shot down over Cuba. Kennedy and his advisors prepared for an attack on Cuba within days as they searched for any remaining diplomatic resolution.
It was determined that Kennedy would ignore the second Khrushchev message and respond to the first one. That night, Kennedy set forth in his message to the Soviet leader proposed steps for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba under supervision of the United Nations, and a guarantee that the United States would not attack Cuba.
It was a too risky to ignore the second Khrushchev message.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy then met secretly with Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, and communicated that removing the Jupiter missiles from Turkey could not be part of any public resolution of the missile crisis, but the US was planning to remove it soon anyway.
The next morning, October 28, Khrushchev announced that Soviet missiles would be dismantled and removed from Cuba. It is no exaggeration to say the history of mankind changed its path that day.
Six months later, the Jupiter missiles were removed from Turkey.
Armaggedon
Flashing back to Philippine scenarios, the Tomahawk missile N version can be equipped with a nuclear warhead and a US plan to increase its speed from subsonic to Mach 3, is a factor China cannot ignore.
The US must recall the Typhon Weapon System.
All parties involved to hurry not to allow North Korea to make up their minds for them.
Last January 18, 2024, Japan’s ministry of defense signed a letter of offer and acceptance for the acquisition of 200 Block IV Tomahawks, 200 Block V Tomahawks and 14 Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control Systems, along with support, training, maintenance, spares and other ancillary services to the tune of 2.35 billion with acquisition and deliveries occurring between the Japanese fiscal years 2025 and 2027.
My gutfeel is that Kim Jun Un would not foray to nuke Filipinos. But I cannot say the same thing for the Japanese.
To be continued.
Next: Reveal Marcos Secret Agreement with The Americans
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