By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

 

Part 3: An old order gives way to a new one, reshaping global geopolitics

Duplicity point on! Hypocrisy to boot!

Stratbase Institute, just like Rappler, is an overt US-spy base in the Philippines, masquerading as a think-tank.

The present chairman of Stratbase is Manny Pangilinan, point-CEO of Forum Energy, Philex Mining and PXP Energy, the consortium booted out of Reed Bank in 2011 for unilateral exploration of an area outside of the 12 nautical mile territorial sea of the Philippines.

Stratbase is the local adjunct of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of Washington DC, one of the top lobbyists for the Deep State, the US industrial military complex, It serves in-country Philippines as the flipside of Bower Asia Group that established the Southeast Asian Studies program for CSIS.

It is also known as the Stratbase Albert del Rosario Institute, after a Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs who became its top benefactor, front and co-chair after he retired from public office.  

Circular reasoning

When the Stratbase Institute issued a statement recently that it was firmly rejecting any move to pursue joint energy exploration between the Philippines and China in the West Philippine Sea, it came as a no surprise, breeding a series of fallacies begging many questions.

Begging the question, known in logic as principio principii, occurs when an argument’s premise assumes the truth of its conclusion rather than providing independent evidence. It leads to a pattern of circular reasoning where arguments become invalid even if they appear to be true.

A content analysis is in order because this institute has a habit of making conclusions on the basis of its own eschewed and loaded perceptions.

First, Stratbase concludes that “China has repeatedly demonstrated that it is neither a reliable partner nor a responsible actor,” but this conclusion only based on the premise of the loaded perceptions of the institute’s regarding Philippine-China conflicts in the South China Seas.

China and the Philippines has agreed, time and again, that its relationship will not depend on this single issue.  

Moreover, Stratbase offers as a premise another conclusion that China “has damaged Philippine assets and endangered the lives of Filipino uniformed personnel and civilians…” which it does not qualify, further asserting such “as part of its sustained effort to assert unlawful control”, without explaining why such is unlawful, “over areas that belong to the Philippines…” without identifying what those areas are, “under international law…” without identifying which specific law that applies.

China has never engaged the Philippines in any of its 12-nautical-mile territorial sea extending from the archipelagic baselines drawn by Republic Act 9522 submitted to the United Nations before its May 2009 deadline.

Second fallacy

This leads us to the second fallacy: If Stratbase is referring to other areas intentionally left by Philippine legislation as ambiguous to the international community, why pin the blame on China whenever other coastal states view that our ships are lost at sea?

To illustrate, President Bong Bong Marcos signed on November 2024, the Philippine Maritime Zones Act that obfuscated instead of clarifying the issue.

This Republic Act 12064 provided for a phantom “west Philippine sea” that:

1) Included a “Luzon Sea” with no description, no coordinates, no charts. If this sea pertains to how the 1898 Treaty of Paris” extends our border limits to 118 degrees East longitude of Greenwich, it might as well revisit the Supreme Court decision GR187167 that collapsed our historic right to those limits in favor archipelagic coordinates closest as possible to our coastlines inclusive of our internal waters, to conform with international law that is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS, effective 1994.

2) Usurped the 12nm territorial sea around Bajo de Masinloc, or Scarborough Shoal, whose land sovereignty China has effective control since 2012.

3) Demarcated waters inside a box which Presidential Decree 1596 unilaterally created in 1978 called “Kalayaan Island Group” (KIG) constituting this archipelagic description:

“From a point [on the Philippine Treaty Limits] at latitude 7°40′ North and longitude 116°00 East of Greenwich, thence due West along the parallel of 7°40′ N to its intersection with the meridian of longitude 112°10′ E, thence due north along the meridian of 112°10′ E to its intersection with the parallel of 9°00′ N, thence northeastward to the intersection of the parallel of 12°00′ N with the meridian of longitude 114°30′ E, thence, due East along the parallel of 12°00 N to its intersection with the meridian of 118°00′ E, thence, due South along the meridian of longitude 118°00′ E to its intersection with the parallel of 10°00′ N, thence Southwestwards to the point of beginning at 7°40′ N, latitude and 116°00′ E longitude.”

Stratbase cites compliance with international law but this conflicts with the definition of an “archipelago” under Article 45 of UNCLOS, so in order to save the residual features the Philippines is claiming inside this box, Republic Act 9522 converted it onto a “regime of islands” which is compatible to another provision of UNCLOS found in Article 121(3).  

Romel Bagares, now a doctoral researcher at Vrieje University of Amsterdam,said in an 2021 interview with Vera Files that “This is an important point that many policy-making sectors in government apparently continue to miss or to misunderstand.” He addedthat, in light of the Arbitral Award, the Philippines “needs to redraft” its baselines around the Kalayaan Island Group, set by PD 1596 “because the Tribunal had, in fact, declared these baselines incompatible” with UNCLOS.

What territorial sea remained of the erstwhile KIG, are only 12nm around what the 2016 Arbitral Award clarified as high-tide elevations (HTEs) or rocks (subset of islands), specifically Pagasa, Likas, Parola, Lawak, Patag, Kota, Laoita, Melchora Aquino and Panata, but excluding Balagtas, Ayungin and Rizal which are low-tide elevations (LTEs).

To be perfectly accountable about it, they must be appropriately termed now under UNCLOS no longer as Kalayaan Island Group but Kalayaan Regime of Islands (KRI). If Stratbase is honest at all, it should lead advocating this transparency moving forward.

Third fallacy

The think-tank also said “Any discussion of joint energy exploration must be firmly anchored in international law, particularly the 2016 Arbitral Award.”

I absolutely agree, which brings us to its third fallacy: “This landmark ruling unequivocally affirms the Philippines’ exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit natural resources within its exclusive economic zone in the West Philippine Sea.“

I disagree. The UNCLOS “unequivocal affirmation” or automaticity for application to 200 nm for exclusive economic zones is good only where there are no conflicting claims by other coastal states.

This is obvious when the Philippines claimed Benham Rise on our eastern side as part of our extended constitutional shelf, beyond a 200nm exclusive economic zone, in a claim filed with the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on April 8, 2009.

The UNCLCS approved it under UNCLOS) in April 2012 and in addition, we gained another 150nm eastward, for a total extent of 350 nms.

But what could have happened, if there were coastal states that objected to it on basis of an overlap? UN would be estopped from acting and instead Articles 74 of UNCLOS applies. Please read very carefully because this is what pseudo-analysts often omit to promote their own biases:

“Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts

“1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.

“2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV.

“3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation.

“4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.”

In short, when a dispute occurs, as true to the western side of the Philippines, the enforcement of automaticity of the letter of UNCLOS awarding EEZs stops, and enters into a caveat, where the principle of the basic right to consent by the parties involved becomes paramount. The UN ceases to adjudicate, without the participation of the dissenting parties, because international law is primordially based on relations between and among countries and not on any rigid constitutional law.

Fourth fallacy

Thus, when Stratbase continued saying: “These rights are non-negotiable. All resources must remain under full Philippine ownership, control, and supervision. Any arrangement that creates ambiguity or undermines these rights is unacceptable,” it is in serious error.

This opens up to the fourth fallacy that is bereft of veracity and reeking with demagoguery: “China’s continued refusal to recognize and comply with the arbitral ruling further underscores its lack of credibility.”

The Arbitral Ruling did not bestow any additional or special rights to the Philippines, especially with regard to sovereignty. The reverse is true.

On the contrary the Tribunal deferred to China. In Paragraph 271, it said:

“271. Accordingly, in the Tribunal’s view, China’s ratification of the Convention in June 1996 did not extinguish historic rights in the waters of the South China Sea. xxx China’s freedom to navigate the South China Sea remains unaffected.”

This is further bolstered in the succeeding paragraph:

“272. Finally, because the Tribunal considers the question of historic rights with respect to maritime areas to be entirely distinct from that of historic rights to land, the Tribunal considers it opportune to note that certain claims remain unaffected by this decision.

“In particular, the Tribunal emphasises that nothing in this Award should be understood to comment in any way on China’s historic claim to the islands of the South China Sea.”

In fact, China using the last portion of this paragraph to strengthen its claim to Scarborough Shoal and its territorial sea in addition to its historic rights in the South China Seas that is vouchsafed by both customary law and conventional treaties:

“Nor does the Tribunal’s decision that a claim of historic rights to living and non-living resources is not compatible with the Convention limit China’s ability to claim maritime zones in accordance with the Convention, on the basis of such islands.

In December 2, 2024, China submitted the coordinates of the shoal and its territorial sea and accompanying charts and evidences to the UN for corresponding documentation with the Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea and subsequently the International Hydrographic Organization.

China defined a system of 15 straight lines connecting 16 basepoints around the shoal. The entire system covers approximately 25 nautical miles (46.3 km), serving as a “natural step” to strengthen marine management consistent with UNCLOS requirements.

The Philippines on December 10, 2024, through Ambassador Antonio Lagdameo, made a formal statement) at the 51st Plenary Meeting of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York.

Outside of that noise, and obscure maps peddled by expired asso justice Antonio Carpio and recently WPS spokesperson Jay Tarriela, I am not aware of any official Philippine action, on paper by the National Mapping and Research and Information Authority, or geological and maritime surveys on the ground, or any submissions and deposits made to the UN to support our claim.

To confuse the public, NAMRIA released an “administrative map” of the Philippines which is not the kind of map required by the UN for consideration by DOALOS.

Fifth fallacy

So, we now move to the fifth fallacy in the Stratbase statement, as it continued to say:

“Energy security must never come at the expense of sovereignty. No crisis should be used to justify compromising the Philippines’ legal position or ignoring the lived realities of Filipino fisherfolk and frontliners who continue to bear the consequences of China’s actions in the West Philippine Sea.”

Showing a “West Philippine Sea” but not the correct map for submission to the United Nations for international recognition. As the name suggests, this version is only for the political administration of the country.

It appears that this portion which mixes legalese with an emotional insinuation, was not cleared with Carpio who has been lawyering for Stratbase.

In a Vera Files interview datelined March 15, 2017, Carpio made a very important statement reflecting on my earlier allusions west of the Philippines:

“Under international law, Benham Rise is not part of Philippine national territory because we do not have sovereignty over Benham Rise. However, we have ‘sovereign rights’… “

The expired magistrate accurately affirmed an asymmetry between sovereignty and sovereign rights.

In anti-China narratives, Stratbase has influenced the Marcos government in lumping together “sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction” in PCG activities in their so-called west Philippine sea,

This is the root of all misunderstanding with China in the South China Sea, crystallized in the slogan “Atin Ito”.

What is ours, or sovereignty, denotes ownership of all features from under the seabed, the seabed, the water column, the surface water and the aerospace above it.

Stratbase takes a cheap shot at misleading the public that the Philippines has sovereignty over Reed Bank or Recto Reef where the PH-CN oil and gas joint exploration is proposed.  This is wrong because the feature is outside the 12nm territorial sea of our country off Palawan.

While “sovereign rights” are accorded within the 200nm provided by UNCLOS for EEZs, jurisdiction cannot be unilaterally enforced by the Philippines as we have not qualified with UNCLOS Article 74 if disputed by another coastal state.

(Sovereign rights in EEZs only pertains to maritime entitlement to exploit what is below the surface of the water all the way to below the seabed. In fact, freedom of navigation and overflight already applies to the surface and what is over the water.)

Ironically, instead of going north rectifying issues with our neighbors, we went south stonewalling our position.

As discussed earlier, Republic Act 12064, or the Philippine Maritime Zones Act, obfuscated the crucial distinction between sovereignty and sovereign rights by introducing ambivalence to the three improvised components of a west Philippine sea that we exposed earlier, and arbitrarily factoring in our unresolved claims to exclusive economic zones west of the country – a field that is contested by four parties – Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and China.

Our senate leaders refused their peer Rodante Marcoleta’s in-aid of legislation moves to upgrade our country’s laws to clarify the disjunction between sovereignty and sovereign rights in order to correctly preposition our presence on the ground.

Kiko Pangilinan exposed that he has not read the 2016 Arbitral Ruling when he asserted that the Tribunal awarded a “West Philippine Sea” to the  Philippines, and that this issues being raised by Marcoleta were not touched by the discussions. Miguel Zubiri also manifested his ignorance that the baselines law of 2009 and the two laws sponsored by then Senator Francis Tolentino covered only coordinates of the baselines of the Philippine archipelagp, and not for the Kalayaan regime of islands and neither for any west Philippine sea.

Government officials, and poseurs, casually brandish “international law” to the face of the public but does not identify what specific ‘international law” they are applying.

For instance, Carpio dismisses the need to properly identify the boundaries of our claimed EEZs claiming automaticity, yet Article 75 of UNCLOS states:

“Charts and lists of geographical coordinates.

“1. Subject to this Part, the outer limit lines of the exclusive economic zone and the lines of delimitation drawn in accordance with article 74 shall be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position. Where appropriate, lists of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted for such outer limit lines or lines of delimitation.

“2. The coastal State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”

Carpio’s insinuation this is not necessary because we already have Geographic Positioning System (GPS), belies his expertise in international and maritime law.

This explains why we are always disadvantaged when challenged by China, relying on the headless propaganda that China is bullying us.

When Stratbase asserted, “Engaging actors that have consistently acted in bad faith is not only unnecessary but ultimately detrimental to the Philippines’ long term national interest…Entering into such a partnership would expose the country to unnecessary risk,” was it referring to China or another foreign country?

Conclusion

Only the United States’ objectives to keep freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) open and to maintain bases in the Philippines, are benefited by its induced fishing for false flags in the South China Seas.

Our economy has suffered greatly since February 2023 when President began his zer-sum dalliance with the Americans.

Imagine, our Ambassador to the Washington DC, Babes Romualdez, was even gloating he was able to secure a 30-day exemption from a US sanction against importation of crude and oil from Russia.

What canine devotion!

What about the crimes of the US military against the Filipino people, guaranteed perpetuation by the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement?

What about Balangiga, Bud Dajo and Bud Bagsak and the rest of about 1 million massacred by the American expeditionary and pacification forces from 1898 to 1906?

How can we objectively search for a reliable partner when our defense chief is allegedly a Maltese citizen, and our chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is a great grandson of a deserter US Buffalo Soldier?

This is the ultimate test of BBM’s quest for legacy. If he accedes to the alien demands proxied by Stratbase, he will never recover from being the worst president in our history.

Next Part: Exposing the Unites States as an Unreliable Partner

   

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