By: Atty. Rafael P. Tuvera

The Marcos Sr. years and Controlled Corruption

Before 1986, corruption in the Philippines was centralized and controlled. During the authoritarian rule of President Ferdinand Marcos, Sr., corruption existed but operated within a strict hierarchy. The system demanded loyalty in exchange for political and economic favor. It was rigid and disciplined, which limited the spread of corruption to those within the circle of power.

According to the National Statistics Office (now the Philippine Statistics Authority), the total national budget under Marcos, Sr. from 1965 to 1985 amounted to P480 billion. Within this period, however, the government completed major infrastructure projects that transformed the national landscape. Among these were the rehabilitation of the Manila International Airport, Magallanes Interchange, LRT 1, San Juanico Bridge, international airports in Cebu and Davao, the North and South Expressways, Cultural Center of the Philippines, the PICC, and Folk Arts Theater. Marcos, Sr. also initiated the Bataan Nuclear Plant, National Steel Corporation, Philippine Heart Center for Asia, Lung Center, National Children’s Hospital, as well as extensive system of roads, irrigation, and electrification.

Corruption during this era was real, but it was accompanied by visible results. There was a functioning exchange between patronage and development. Although authoritarian in nature, the administration delivered measurable progress that at least justified the centralization of power.

The Post-EDSA Dispersion of Corruption

The 1986 People Power was expected to usher in clean governance. What followed, however, was the dispersion of corruption. The “restoration of democracy” actually meant the restoration of old political habits. Under Corazon Aquino, political patronage was no longer concentrated in one center of power but was fragmented across Congress, local government units, and the bureaucracy.

From 1986 to 1992, the Aquino administration spent approximately P1.077 trillion. Despite the sharp rise in spending, the only visible infrastructure development during her time was the series of EDSA flyovers in Metro Manila, with nothing else to show across the country.

A significant portion of her budget was distributed through the newly created Countrywide Development Fund, later known as the pork barrel. Under this scheme, legislators now had direct access to public funds in the name of local development. The 1987 Constitution expanded the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for local governments, dispersing both authority and financial discretion. Corruption ceased to be a privilege of the few and became a right claimed by many.

Aquino’s privatization program, meant to encourage efficiency, instead benefited the same elite families who had long dominated the economy. The refusal of the Aquino family to divest from Hacienda Luisita symbolized the contradiction between reformist rhetoric and entrenched privilege.

Buying Loyalty During Political Uncertainty

President Aquino faced repeated coup attempts that threatened her government. To survive, she needed to buy loyalty from both the military and political elite. The cost of loyalty was tolerance. Corruption became a practical tool for maintaining political stability. What began as necessity evolved into habit, and what was once transactional became systemic.

Under her successor Fidel Ramos, who served from 1992 to 1998, government spending reached P2.237 trillion. Although Ramos pursued modernization and liberalization, his administration also continued the culture of compromise. The sale of Fort Bonifacio, intended to fund military modernization, did not achieve its stated purpose. The proceeds were instead dissipated in ways that raised questions of private gain and political patronage, leaving the armed forces unreformed.

President Joseph Estrada, who served from 1998 until his ouster in 2001, spent roughly P1.1 trillion. His presidency was short but marred by the “jueteng” and Bell Resources scandals that eventually led to his impeachment and removal.

The Expansion of the Culture of Corruption

The administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo from 2001 to 2010 had a cumulative budget of about P6 trillion. Her term saw both economic growth and deepening public distrust. The “Hello Garci” controversy, NBN-ZTE and Fertilizer Fund scams, and the “pabaon generals” racket reflected how corruption had reached not only political institutions but also the military hierarchy.

President Benigno Aquino III, who served from 2010 to 2016, spent about P12 trillion. His campaign slogan “Daang Matuwid” promised transparency, yet his administration was shaken by the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), where billions of public funds were channeled to Janet Lim Napoles and her congressional cohorts. The Corona impeachment exposed another level of transactional politics. Under the scheme known as the Development Acceleration Program (DAP), reports surfaced that senators who voted for Corona’s conviction received additional allocations of P50 to P100 million pesos, while members of the lower house were said to have received P10 million pesos each just to endorse the impeachment complaint.

During the Duterte administration, total government spending surged to P24.409 trillion from 2016 to 2022. While major infrastructure programs were launched under the “Build, Build, Build” banner, corruption remained deeply rooted. His administration was also marred by the Pharmally scandal, where billions in pandemic funds were funneled to a small, undercapitalized firm linked to political allies, exposing how large-scale corruption persisted even under emergency conditions.

By this time, corruption ceased to provoke national outrage. It had become an expected part of political life.

Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. has, so far, presided over a government budget of P5.024 trillion in 2022, P5.268 trillion in 2023, P5.768 trillion in 2024, and P6.33 trillion for 2025, based on figures from the DBM and the Philippine News Agency.

The Social Acceptance of Corruption

The growth of the national budget mirrors the expansion of corruption’s reach. The deeper tragedy, however, lies not in the scale of theft but in its acceptance by the public. Filipinos have learned to view corruption as a permanent feature of political life. The common remark “lahat naman magnanakaw” captures a people who have surrendered to cynicism.

Institutions created to enforce accountability exist mostly in form. Each administration promises reform but ends up repeating the same cycle. Political turnover has not brought moral renewal. Corruption has adapted to every new system, surviving leadership changes and evolving with every reform.

Over time, the public’s tolerance for corruption deepened, giving rise to the social acceptance of graft as part of governance. This normalization has eroded moral boundaries and lowered expectations of public integrity.

The recent flood control scandal highlights how decentralization has fragmented corruption rather than reduce it. Billions of pesos were allocated to local projects with little or no oversight at all, leading to overpricing, ghost works, and kickbacks spread across agencies and districts. The diffusion of accountability has made corruption harder to detect and prosecute. This pattern reinforces the argument that when corruption becomes localized and uncontrolled, it drains public funds faster than when fiscal authority is centralized and monitored.

A Realist Approach to Corruption

It is unrealistic to believe that corruption can ever be completely eradicated. It springs from human nature, from greed, ambition, and the temptations of power. Every society faces it. The difference lies in the certainty of punishment.

The example of China demonstrates that law enforcement, not moral preaching, greatly reduces corruption. Public officials there understand that corruption carries a price no wealth can outweigh. The fear of accountability, rather than public shaming, is the most effective impediment to corruption.

The Philippines must learn from this lesson. The problem is not merely that corruption exists but that those who commit it feel safe. What the country needs is not moral rhetoric but consistent enforcement of the law. Corruption cannot be eliminated, but it can be contained within boundaries that do not cripple governance.

When graft becomes a high-risk act rather than a routine opportunity, it will begin to decline. A society that tolerates corruption will drown in it. A society that punishes it will eventually rise from it.

Conclusion

Corruption in the Philippines evolved alongside its political systems. Under authoritarian rule it was centralized and controlled. Under democracy, it became dispersed and democratized. The tragedy lies not in freedom itself but in the failure to discipline it.

Every system of power invites abuse, and every bureaucracy creates its own opportunities for rent-seeking. The best and only way to manage it is through firm and certain punishment. In countries like China, the law is enforced without compromise, and public officials fear the consequences of corruption. The Philippines must learn from this example. Reform should no longer rely on appeals to conscience but on fear of retribution. The revival of the death penalty for large-scale graft may be harsh, but it would send a clear signal that the looting of public funds is an unforgivable crime against the nation.

As realists, we must accept that corruption will always exist because it reflects human imperfection. The task of the state is not to chase an impossible purity but to impose certain justice. When those who plunder public funds begin to fear the law more than they desire wealth, only then can our country move from moral decay to moral recovery.

   

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